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 Foreword
Peter Ester brilliantly captures the varied but vital role that accelerators 
play in minting new entrepreneurs essential for economic development and 
new job creation in America. Based upon recommendations from various 
people, myself included, Peter set out on a mission to thoroughly study two 
dozen accelerators in Silicon Valley, the mecca of innovation. He chose the 
interview method with carefully def ined questions in a quest to contrast 
his discoveries in Silicon Valley with Europe.
In an easy-to-read-and-grasp style of writing, Peter does an excellent 
job of communicating his f indings. His conclusions are descriptive and 
prescriptive. The target readers – whether established entrepreneurs or 
aspiring ones and policymakers or concerned citizens imagining new ways 
of economic development – are in for a treat here.
Peter highlights the notion of ‘culture’ rather prominently in his analysis 
of critical success factors in Silicon Valley. He goes on to suggest that culture 
– which includes a winning mindset and the ability to take risks, try, and 
fail without a stigma being attached in European society– is an essential 
ingredient for success. What is common to all effective accelerators, Peter 
notes, is the existence of an ecosystem of successful role models and men-
tors who are eager to offer advice and guidance to new entrepreneurs, 
something that is lacking in Europe. The prevalence of investors – both 
angels and venture capitalists – who are willing to take risks on unproven 
entrepreneurs is another key ingredient in Silicon Valley that is also missing 
in European society.
I strongly encourage all success-seeking Europeans to pay close attention 
to what Peter Ester, a European, has to say in this book. This includes develop-
ing a mindset of risk-taking that is free from stigma, stepping forward to coach 
and mentor others, and setting up more angels and venture capital funds.
Lastly, I encourage readers to study more of Silicon Valley’s successes to 
build better European innovations, which in turn should lead to increased 
economic activity, more jobs and wealth creation, and, ultimately, better 
societies.
Silicon Valley has stood the test of time, so it’s a very safe bet to emulate 
a piece of it!
Vish Mishra
Venture capitalist, Clearstone Venture Partners
Accelerator advisor and startup mentor
Former president of TiE Silicon Valley
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 The Interviewees and their 
Accelerators
Below, I provide brief descriptions of the people I interviewed and the 
accelerators they lead.
Saeed Amidi, founder and CEO of Plug and Play, a large accelerator hous-
ing nearly 400 startups, with 22 locations worldwide. Plug and Play has 
accelerated over 2,000 startups, which have raised an additional $5 billion. 
It invests anywhere from $25,000 up to $500,000 in its startups. Offers 
different industry-specif ic, three-month accelerator programs (in brand 
and retail, f inancial technology, food, health, insurance, Internet of Things, 
mobility, new materials, logistics, travel and hospitality). Plug and Play may 
take equity in its startups.
Sunil Bhargava, founder and managing partner of Tandem, a seed 
fund. Small accelerator for hardware and software startups. Its focus is 
on mobile. Investing both sweat and f inancial capital. The current fund, 
Tandem 3, is $100 million in size. Tandem offers a six-month program in 
which it works hands-on with portfolio companies to f ind product-market 
f it. Investments in early-stage seed deals up to $500,000 and later-stage 
investments up to $2 million; it may take about 10% equity in its startups. 
Small batches: two to six teams. It currently has investments in over 30 
companies.
Gary Coover, head of global operations at Samsung NEXT Start, a 
corporate accelerator. It invests in seed-stage startups and entrepreneurs-
in-residence who it supports in co-located spaces with funding, expertise, 
mentoring, and an alumni community. Its focus is on software startups 
(both consumer and enterprise-oriented) in frontier technology such as 
AR/VR, IoT, mobility, data and analytics, machine learning and AI, mobile 
health, payments, and smart cities.
Danielle D’Agostaro, partner and COO at Alchemist Accelerator, a 
venture-backed general accelerator focusing on growing seed-stage enter-
prise startups. Alchemist seeds about 40 startups per year with an average 
cash investment of $36,000. Co-working space is available. Strong emphasis 
on technical founding teams. The length of the accelerator program is six 
months, and it accepts a maximum of 17 teams in three batches per year. Its 
program consists of mentoring, coaching, and group activities. The average 
equity required is around 5%.
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Doug Davenport, founder and former CEO of Prospect Silicon Valley, 
a non-prof it urban-tech innovation hub for next-generation smart and 
sustainable cities. Its focus is on transportation, energy, and the built 
environment. Prospect works with industry and government. It helps 
startups to demonstrate and commercialize their products and scale their 
companies. It has a 23,000 square-foot Technology Demonstration Center, 
over 25 corporate sponsors, and over $90 million funding and f inancing. It 
takes no equity in its startups.
Cyril Ebersweiler, founder and managing director of HAX, an investment 
company that accelerates hardware startups – both consumer hardware 
and B2B. Its focus is on lifestyle, health, robotics, Internet of Things, and 
manufacturing. Provides seed funding, mentorship, off ice and lab space. 
Selected teams spend 15 weeks of the four-month program in Shenzhen, 
China – the ‘Silicon Valley of hardware’ – to f inalize their prototype. HAX 
accepts two classes per year and 15 teams per class. Equity is 9% for $100,000.
Marlon Evans, CEO of GSVlabs, a large 72,000 square-foot campus and 
co-working space that provides a community for startups and established 
companies who wish to accelerate their vision. Its focus is on education 
technology (EdTech), sustainability, big data, and mobility. It is backed by 
GSV Capital. GSVlabs offers virtual and onsite programs, innovation labs, 
mentorship, and events. It currently houses about 170 startups. Startups pay 
a monthly desk fee. GSVlabs does not make direct investments, but it does 
take equity in startups participating in its quarterly accelerator.
Tom Ferguson and Nimesh Modak are respectively vice president of 
programming and director of Imagine H2O, a non-prof it, grant-funded 
accelerator aiming to bring new solutions to global water challenges to 
the marketplace. It offers a virtual program on turning water challenges 
into business opportunities, including mentorship and access to customers 
and investors. It also organizes a boot camp. Imagine H2O has supported 
over 550 startups in 30 countries. It has an annual ten-month program of 
about 10-12 startups in which no costs are involved. It takes no equity in 
its startups.
Ian Foraker, executive director of Cleantech Open, a large, non-prof it 
accelerator of early-stage clean technology companies. Its mission is to 
f ind, fund, and foster entrepreneurs with ideas to solve our greatest en-
vironmental and energy challenges. It has a volunteer community that it 
relies on. Cleantech Open works with about 150 startups per year (across 
the U.S.). Awarded over $6 million; over 1,000 participating startups raised 
more than $1.1 billion. Cleantech Open is funded through sponsors, fees, 
and memberships. It offers mentoring, webinars, boot camps, events, a prize 
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competition, and capital raising. It works on the basis of a participation 
fee. No off ice space is provided and it does not take equity in its startups.
Brian Hoffman, vice president of revenue and director of legal affairs 
at StartX, an educational, non-prof it accelerator for Stanford University 
startup founders, from students to professors and alumni. StartX is industry 
and stage agnostic. Its programs are based on access to Stanford community, 
mentors, education, and resources. Offers one-to-one mentorship, drop-in 
off ice space, legal advice, and three ten-week sessions per year. It is backed 
by an uncapped StartX-Stanford Fund. StartX deployed over $90 million 
in 185 StartX companies. It boasts over 350 alumni companies, which have 
raised a total of over $1.9 billion. It offers a special medical program. StartX 
does not charge fees, and it does not take equity in its startups.
Ari Horie, founder and CEO at Women’s Startup Lab, which aims to 
catalyze and empower women-run startups. Year-long program, of which 
two weeks is a residential program and six months is via remote coaching. 
It is highly selective and will take only a maximum of nine female founders. 
Its programs consist of workshops, coaching, network expansion, advising, 
leadership skills, assessments, and access to investors. Unique features are 
its high-impact engagement and interaction and its personal approach. It 
charges a $10,000 tuition fee.
Emily Kirsch, co-founder and CEO of Powerhouse, a for-prof it but 
mission-driven incubator and accelerator for solar software startups. 
Powerhouse Accelerator offers a six-month program, two batches per year, 
eight startups in total. It has 14,000 square feet in co-working off ice space. 
Cold hard investments of $10,000. Startup investment up to $50,000; equity: 
5%. One-to-one coaching, free off ice space, and access to investors and 
contacts in solar industries. Its workspace currently hosts 20 solar startups; 
nine solar organizations, and 80 solar entrepreneurs.
Cindy Klein-Marmer, associate director of the Butler Venture Accelerator 
Program of Babson College; branch in San Francisco. The program is for both 
students and alumni, and startups are aided in everything from ideation via 
business model, team recruiting, minimal viable product, and marketing to 
business launch and growth. Its resources include faculty advisors, outside 
mentors, work space, seed funding, legal advice, workshops, events, and 
peer groups. Offers a summer venture program and organizes a rocket pitch 
and a prize competition. Cross-campus collaboration. 365 entrepreneurs 
participated in 2015-2016.
Naomi Kokubo, co-founder and COO of Founders Space, a global, for-
profit accelerator focused on educating and training seed startups as well as 
early-stage startups. It provides an online incubation program, innovation 
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workshops, co-working space, startup pitch events, a two-week intensive 
startup accelerator program, a three-month online program as well as access 
to lawyers, marketers, VCs, serial entrepreneurs. Equity under 5%; startups 
may opt to pay a fee. Founders Space has a branch in Shanghai.
Duncan Logan, founder and CEO of RocketSpace, a large, co-working 
campus to help grow tech startups. It currently has 200 startups on its 
campus and has hosted more than 800 startups since 2011. RocketSpace 
offers 24/7 turnkey off ice solutions (private off ice, dedicated desk, drop-in 
desk); community education (workshops, speakers); access to VCs, mentors 
and advisors; and meeting and event spaces. 16 of its alumni companies are 
valued at over $1 billion. The average total of funds raised by startup mem-
bers is $18 million; 1.5 startups secure funding per week. Special Industry 
Accelerator Program. It takes no equity in its startups.
T.M. Ravi, co-founder and managing director of The Hive, a small, co-
creation studio and specialized fund focused on AI, context computing, 
autonomous agents, ambient intelligence, and blockchain. It targets startups 
in the enterprise, IoT, security, and f inancial services markets. Disruption 
driven by data. The Hive is involved in the intensive co-creation of new 
ventures and provides seed f inancing of $1.5 to $2 million. It takes in only 
four to f ive startups a year. Its equity policy is that if a company is started, 
The Hive also becomes a founder.
Prashant Shah, managing director of TiE LaunchPad, an accelerator 
dedicated to fostering entrepreneurship in the Bay Area with a focus on 
B2B startups, e.g. cloud apps, IT infrastructure, mobile, big data. Linked 
to TiE group, that has 13,000 members globally. The funding of startups is 
arranged through TiE Angels & TiE50 (awards program). Beyond idea stage; 
demo or prototype. Co-working space. Seasoned TiE entrepreneurs are 
startup mentors. TiE LaunchPad accepts eight companies per f ive-month 
batch. Funding $50,000; 4% equity.
Prem Talreja, vice president of marketing at The Fabric, an accelerator 
based on a collaboration model that works hands-on with startup entre-
preneurs to help them ref ine their product, team, and business model and 
prepare them for series A funding. Seeds between $1 million to $1.5 million. 
Its focus is on cloud infrastructure technologies, and it has a Technology 
Innovation Lab in India. Only a few startups a year are accepted, for about 
six months. Network of mentors, investors, technologists, professionals. 
Equity proportional to investment.
Harm TenHoff, founder and CEO of BayLink, which combines a global 
medical incubator with a business accelerator. Its focus is on high-tech 
medical devices, life sciences, IT, and online retailing. Its incubator 
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concentrates on product ideas and concepts, while its accelerator focuses 
on product introductions. It links Silicon Valley to Europe, and vice versa. 
BayLink offers one-on-one coaching and mentoring. Invests in kind, soft 
money. No cash investments. Its business model is based on consultancy 
fees and sometimes equity.
Marco ten Vaanholt, co-founder and managing partner at BootUP, a 
micro-ecosystem for startups to create better entrepreneurs and accelerate 
their companies. It works on the basis of four pillars. BootUP World is a 
Silicon Valley launch pad and global hub. BootUP Corporate Acceleration 
empowers corporate ventures. BootUP Capital accelerates and funds start-
ups; post-seed and series A/B. BootUP Wings is a private club of startups, 
VCs, and seasoned Silicon Valley CEOs. It offers co-working space and 
currently has 55 startups under its wing. Takes equity, between 5-10% for 
early-stage and between 2-5% for later-stage companies.
Matt Walters, former managing director of Runway, a 30,000 square-foot 
co-working space and startup hub for new business incubation. It provides 
office space to about 80 startups and 200 entrepreneurs; educational events, 
lectures, and network meetings; access to VCs, legal advice, domain experts; 
a Zen area; and demo days. Valuations totaling over $600 million. Virtual 
EdTech accelerator; $25,000 future equity investment. Runway itself does 
not require equity.
Jun Wong, executive director of Hacker Dojo, “a community for hackers 
and startups” that supports everything from launching a software startup 
to building a robot. It hosts a mix of software developers and hardware engi-
neers and offers them 24/7 co-working space, an events venue, maker space, 
seminars and workshops, code tutorials, parties, and a startup program. 
Hacker Dojo cherishes its community feeling and emphasizes participation. 
There is no selection process for members. Its business model is based on 
memberships, sponsoring, and donations. Hacker Dojo takes no equity in 
its startups.
Elizabeth Yin, partner at 500 Startups, a global venture capital seed fund 
and startup accelerator with over $250 million in assets. It has invested 
in over 1,800 startups from more than 60 countries and has had over 50 
exits. Its accelerator programs emphasize internet marketing and customer 
acquisition, design and f irst-use experience, lean startup practices, and 
metrics. It has a four-month in-house program for four batches per year, 
with 40-50 startups per batch. 500 Startups provides 10,000 square feet in 
co-off ice space and organizes investor pitches, demo days, events, work-




The DNA of an Entrepreneurial Region
Introduction
For over half a century, Silicon Valley – the 60-mile strip in the Bay Area 
between San Francisco and San Jose – has been the world’s premier high-
tech hotspot for innovation and entrepreneurship. It houses more startups 
than any other region on the globe and has managed to perpetually renew 
itself. The Valley is a magnet for high-tech startup entrepreneurs who want 
to excel, and its business climate is based on a unique combination of tal-
ent, ideas, creativity, competitiveness, perseverance, and passion. It is an 
amazing innovative economy f illed with ambitious entrepreneurs who are 
mission-driven and positively obsessed with the aim of disrupting existing 
markets and mainstream technologies. Silicon Valley is the headquarters 
of iconic high-tech companies such as Google, Apple, HP, Oracle, Cisco, 
Facebook, LinkedIn, Uber, Airbnb, WhatsApp, Twitter, Dropbox, Insta-
gram, Salesforce, WMware, and many more: all innovation giants that 
have changed our lifestyles and our very way of thinking, working, and 
communicating, and which all began as small but eager startups. These 
high-tech companies have had an unparalleled social and economic impact 
and have inspired thousands of hungry startups to shoot for the moon 
as well. The fact that most startups fail to hit this objective is part of the 
prevailing Darwinian business logic in the Valley.
A few simple but telling statistics illustrate Silicon Valley’s success in 
cultivating corporate and startup performance. It has been calculated that if 
the Bay Area, with Silicon Valley as its technological and economic nucleus, 
were a country, it would rank 19th in terms of GDP.1 The Valley has the highest 
concentration of startups (between 14,000 and 19,000) in the world, and this 
has been the case for decades. It houses more U.S. and Global Fortune 500 
companies than anywhere in the U.S. except for New York.2 The region is 
home to the headquarters of practically all major social media companies as 
well as half of the top 100 U.S. private clean technology companies. Silicon 
Valley high-tech f irms are worth over $3 trillion, hold more than one-third 
of U.S. corporate cash reserves, and earned over $100 billion in aggregated 
prof its (in 2014). Five out of ten U.S. venture capital dollars are spent in 
Silicon Valley, mirroring the ample availability of VC (venture capital) fund-
ing there. It has launched more unicorns than any other place in the US. In 
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2014 alone, the Valley had 14 initial public offerings (IPOs: f irst sale of stock 
of a private company to the public), which was slightly less than 10% of the 
total number of U.S. IPOs in that year. The Valley’s exit volume represents 
half of the value of startup exits within the top 20 global startup ecosystems 
and dominates these top rankings in terms of performance, funding, and 
talent.3 Its focus on high tech is reflected by the large number of patents 
originating in the Valley: almost 16,000 in 2013 (13% of the U.S. total in 
that year). R&D is clearly vital for a region that makes its business out of 
innovation. Apple and Google, two leading Silicon Valley players, together 
spend over $12.5 billion on their R&D efforts. With world-class private and 
public universities such as Stanford and Berkeley in its midst, the Valley 
offers access to an abundant pool of talented graduates and high-quality 
fundamental and applied research. Moreover, the region is home to a large 
number of renowned corporate and non-corporate R&D labs.
All this happens in an area of some 1,800 square miles and a population of 
about three million people. Unlike in Europe, immigrant entrepreneurship 
flourishes in Silicon Valley: about half of all startups are founded by f irst-
generation immigrants, particularly from India and China. Some immigrant 
entrepreneurs have become extremely successful and serve as important 
role models: they include Sergey Brin (Google), Andrew Grove (Intel), Vinod 
Khosla (Sun Microsystems), Jan Koum (WhatsApp), and Elon Musk (Tesla). 
Immigrant human capital is an indispensable part of the Silicon Valley saga. 
There is no Silicon Valley without its highly educated army of immigrant 
coders, software engineers, and technologists.
Europe and Silicon Valley
For many European countries, regions, and cities, Silicon Valley is the global 
paragon of innovation, startups, and high-tech entrepreneurship and a place 
they want to emulate. Cities such as London, Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam, 
Eindhoven, Barcelona, Madrid, Dublin, Milan, Tallinn, and Helsinki are 
quickly developing into profiled European startup innovation hubs.4 Europe 
understands that it needs to invest in a dynamic startup economy and 
to boost entrepreneurship. The Netherlands, for instance, has concluded 
that it needs more ambitious entrepreneurship and has accelerated its 
agenda for innovative entrepreneurship and new ventures.5 The European 
Union has declared that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) must 
become more innovative if Europe is to strengthen its vulnerable post-crisis 
economy and to stimulate economic growth. In 2014, the EU launched its 
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comprehensive Horizon 2020 program to boost research and innovation. 
With nearly € 80 billion in funding made available, the program aims to 
enhance Europe’s global competitiveness, drive sustainable economic 
growth, and create jobs.
Silicon Valley’s innovation and startup architecture is a global bench-
mark. Every year this high-tech region is toured by busloads of European 
(and non-European) policymakers; politicians; entrepreneurs; venture 
capitalists and other investors; university representatives; and national, 
regional, and city authorities who want to learn from Silicon Valley – to 
taste its secret sauce, so to speak. They all want to see what makes the 
Valley tick, to understand the anatomy of this exceptional innovation area, 
and ultimately, of course, to explore what Europe needs to change in order 
to energize its level of competitive innovativeness and entrepreneurship. 
This is not an easy challenge. Major institutional and cultural obstacles 
need to be overcome, entrepreneurial attitudes must become stronger, 
governments must redefine their role, educational systems need to become 
more entrepreneurial, more venture capital must become available, and a 
more elaborate startup support infrastructure must be established.
In considering Silicon Valley as the startup and innovation mecca, Europe 
should understand that there are at least three constraints to adopting this 
model: the impact of path dependence, the role of culture, and the risk of 
an increase in social inequality. Let me briefly explain these issues.
Silicon Valley is not the intended outcome of an innovation and pro-
entrepreneurship policy that was designed a priori. It was not created 
overnight, nor did it start as a technological tabula rasa. Rather, it is rooted 
in an innovation history that advanced through a series of technological 
paradigm shifts. The history of Silicon Valley, going back to the early 20th 
century, clearly embodies this primacy of path dependence (Scaruff i 2014; 
Sturgeon 2000). Its current high-tech dominance is embedded in a long 
chain of technological disruptions and innovation waves that spanned 
decades. It started with vacuum tube radio technology that later became 
a fruitful breeding ground for technologies such as microwave tubes, 
semiconductors, and integrated circuits (Lécuyer 2007).
Both World Wars, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Space Race led 
to massive government spending on new defense technology from which 
Silicon Valley greatly benefited (Leslie 2000; Mazzucato 2014), spearheading 
the Valley’s role as a center of innovation and technology. These develop-
ments in technology and their new applications paved the way for the 
more recent computer and software revolution, which quickly reached 
mass consumer markets – facilitated, of course, by the rapid expansion 
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of the Internet. It spurred a seemingly never-ending stream of programs 
and applications – and, more recently, apps for smart phones and other 
mobile devices – that have penetrated the lives of billions of people. No 
domain, country, continent, or generation has remained untouched by 
this revolutionary acceleration of technological hardware and software 
applications, and Silicon Valley was and is a key disruptive game changer.
This path-dependence framework (Lebret 2007; Nelson & Winter 1982; 
Stangler 2013) implies that high-tech innovation regions such as Silicon 
Valley cannot be copied for the simple reason that its history cannot be 
replicated. It also entails that creating European innovation hubs will only 
work when based on a proved innovation infrastructure and network of 
high-tech companies, or, as I argue in the next chapter, an advanced ecosys-
tem. Excellence in innovation is not something that can be attained from 
thin air; it takes a technological environment and innovation setting that 
have some degree of sophistication and maturity. Regions and cities that 
dream of having their own Silicon Valley but lack a supportive ecosystem 
will not see their dreams become reality.
The second constraint is the role of culture. The Silicon Valley innovation 
and startup model is rooted in a culture that cherishes an entrepreneurial 
mindset and big ideas but also openness, sharing, drive, achievement, 
and commitment. The model is based on a culture that prizes risk-taking 
and accepts failing; one that calls for pro-active networking and fearless 
self-presentation; one that favors thinking big, encourages disruption, 
promotes diversity, and takes persistence and hard work for granted. It is 
the combination of these cultural characteristics that is at the core of the 
Silicon Valley model. The European willingness to learn from Silicon Valley 
will only pay off if we take these cultural prerequisites seriously. Changing 
the prevalent culture in European countries with respect to an innovation 
mindset, entrepreneurship, and work attitudes takes time, in some cases 
even generations. Cultural change cannot be decreed from above but rather 
is a long-term process in which education plays a key role.
Fortunately, European leaders realize that Europe needs to address 
its entrepreneurial def icit and revolutionize its culture of entrepreneur-
ship. In the revealing words of the European Commission: “there is (…) 
a widespread culture that does not recognize or reward entrepreneurial 
endeavors enough and does not celebrate successful entrepreneurs, as 
role models who create jobs and income. To make entrepreneurship the 
growth engine of our economy Europe needs a thorough, far-reaching 
cultural change.”6 The European Startup Manifesto (2013) underlines this 
need for Europe to effect a change in culture: “To create more businesses 
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and more startups requires more than a change in policy. It requires a 
change in mentality.”
The third issue – the risk of an increase in social inequality – is of a 
different nature and relates to the underlying social model of Silicon Valley, 
a model that embraces the ideal of meritocracy and a winner-takes-all 
mentality. Though the Valley is a prosperous region with the highest per-
capita incomes in the U.S., it is also home to blatant social inequality: its 
wealth is very unevenly divided over the various population groups. African-
Americans and Hispanics in particular are overrepresented among the less 
privileged segments. Income gaps are widening. The high-tech economy 
may be booming but so are housing prices and the cost of living, squeez-
ing the lower and middle class out of the Valley and out of San Francisco. 
Wealth polarization is painful. This is also part of the Silicon Valley story, 
and Europe needs to agree on what deviations from the European social 
model it is willing to accept and where it should draw the line between 
meritocracy and social equality, between the individual pursuit of happi-
ness and the collective goal of solidarity, between exclusion and cohesion. 
From an anthropological point of view, the Silicon Valley model is based on 
an almost ‘hubristic’ paradigm and an overconfident conception of man, 
whereas incrementalism and a step-by-step approach is more characteristic 
of the European psyche.
These three basic constraints lead to the conclusion that the Silicon 
Valley innovation and startup model cannot simply be copied by European 
policymakers and stakeholders. Replication will not work because precondi-
tions cannot be met (path dependence, culture) or necessitate a social 
debate (inequality). But this conclusion, it must be stressed, is the beginning 
of the policy discussion and not the end. Europe needs to commit itself 
to building a competitive startup economy, but in doing so it must f ind 
and develop its own model – a model that f its its core values, its cultural 
challenges, and the history of its technology.
Accelerators: Pillars of Silicon Valley’s startup support 
infrastructure
Having said all this, there is much that European policymakers, innovation 
stakeholders, and startup founders can learn from Silicon Valley. One of 
the cornerstones of the Valley’s advanced ecosystem is the role played by 
for-profit and non-profit accelerators that help startups in commercializing 
their business ideas. There is a vast infrastructure of accelerators in Silicon 
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Valley that assists startup founders in developing their product (or service), 
in strengthening their team, in working towards a MVP (minimum viable 
product), in designing a business and marketing plan, in attracting funding 
and investors, in coaching and mentoring the startup team, in bringing 
the product to the market, and in getting f irst customers and achieving 
traction. This ref ined accelerator support structure is a key feature of the 
Silicon Valley innovation and startup model (Bay Area Council Economic 
Institute 2016).7 The approaches and business models of accelerators differ 
considerably (CBIA 2016). Some accelerators are large, some are small; some 
have specific target groups, others welcome a diverse array of entrepreneurs; 
some focus on specific technologies, others are more general; some accelera-
tors take equity, others do not. Some offer off ice space, others work online. 
But they all share the same ambition to help startups to succeed.
These ‘schools of startup entrepreneurship’ f lourish and are an intrinsic 
part of the way Silicon Valley innovates and launches new startups.8 Because 
they service new ventures with an integral offer of resources, coaching, 
and networks, they empower startup teams to make their business viable. 
Serious startups are thus keen to be admitted to an acclaimed accelerator. 
It enhances their market chances and funding opportunities. “A stepping-
stone towards further f inancing”, according to Højer Nicolaj Nielsen (2017: 
100), well-known Danish serial entrepreneur and business angel. But 
competition is tough, as demand does not match supply by any measure. 
It is extremely diff icult to get into the top accelerators. Accelerators’ rates 
of rejection are considerable; the entry bar is set high.
The economic impact of accelerators is substantial. CBIA (2016) has 
calculated that portfolio companies from accelerators (and incubators) in 
California have raised $16.9 billion in cumulative funding since 2004. The 
average accelerator injects over $400,000 annually in its local economy. 
Two-thirds of accelerators invest directly in the startups they admit into 
their programs. Accelerators, CBIA concludes, “have become a key ingredi-
ent to supporting new generations of startups, whether they are corporate, 
non-profit, academic, or private.” (2016: 7). Their graduates “have harnessed 
those resources for expansion in the U.S. and the world, and have invested 
in new jobs, facilities, and equipment, while spending extends to every 
corner of the world.”9 Brad Feld, co-founder of Techstars, one of the earli-
est U.S. accelerators, even speaks of an ‘accelerator movement’ that has 
fundamentally changed the way companies are created.10
I believe that in its ambition to upgrade its startup infrastructure, Europe 
can greatly benef it from having a closer look at how Silicon Valley has 
developed its accelerator support system. This is precisely the goal of this 
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study: to share the main f indings, conclusions, and recommendations of 
the research I conducted among a signif icant sample of Silicon Valley ac-
celerators with European policymakers, scholars, students, entrepreneurs, 
and startup founders. I believe that the way these accelerators operate can 
serve as examples for Europe in its development of a more professional 
startup support system.
In this descriptive study, I examine the way Silicon Valley accelerators op-
erate in priming startups for the marketplace. Based on a series of interviews 
with accelerators in the Valley, I outline the different underlying business 
philosophies of accelerators and the target startups they focus on. I also 
describe the accelerators’ unique selling points (USPs) as well as the rigorous 
way they select the startups that will enter their program. Furthermore, I 
report on the content and intensity of the accelerator programs with respect 
to product development, team building, coaching, mentoring, networking, 
funding, and support facilities. What is crucial, of course, is the access 
of accelerators to angel investors, VCs, and investor funds. I analyze the 
business models that accelerators are based on and their startup funding 
options (e.g., equity). Likewise, I describe the networks that accelerators are 
involved in, the way they cooperate with external partners, the challenges 
they see, and future plans they may have (including expanding their busi-
ness to Europe). Finally, I examine the perceived success of accelerators. 
How effective accelerators are in growing and scaling startups is a topic 
that has been much debated in the literature and in the public discourse. 
Is there a strong correlation – or even a causal relationship – between 
accelerator participation and startup success? Settling this issue is beyond 
the scope of this study, but in my interviews I invited the chief executives 
of accelerators to reflect on these matters.
Accelerators mentor and facilitate startups in the process of making their 
new product or service market-ready. Let’s take a look at how some accelera-
tors market themselves, often peppered with a dose of positive Californian 
bravado. RocketSpace prides itself on its alumni such as Dropbox, Spotify, 
and Uber, stating that: “We help bring the future to the market. Our campus 
is a tech startup’s paradise. We’ve designed the perfect ecosystem that fosters 
networking, community, and innovation specif ically to help startups to 
thrive.” 500 Startups, which has funded successful startups such as Twilio, 
Credit Karma, MakeBot, Wildfire, and Viki, brands itself as “a startup MBA 
on steroids”. Tandem’s mission is to back “the next generation of disruptive 
entrepreneurs”, and HAX defines itself as “the world’s f irst and largest hard-
ware accelerator”. Runway’s passion is to be “the workplace for innovators”, 
and The Hive’s vision is to “change the world with artif icial intelligence”. 
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Corporate accelerator Samsung NEXT’s drive is to partner with (startup) 
entrepreneurs “wherever they are and empower them with what they need to 
go farther, faster.” Plug and Play, an investor in numerous startups including 
PayPal, SoundHound, and LendingClub, claims to be “the world’s biggest 
startup accelerator (…) which produces unbelievable success stories every 
day”. Modesty and unpretentiousness are not concepts that dominate the 
Silicon Valley dictionary of entrepreneurship, to put it mildly. Instead, “Think 
Big, Aim High” is the leading mantra, mirroring the ambition, passion, and 
spirit of entrepreneurship that are embedded in the Valley.
Accelerators: their role, research, and results
Empirical studies on the role of accelerators in launching startups are very 
scarce (Dempwolf et al. 2014). This lack of systematic research can be attri-
buted to the simple fact that accelerators are a relatively new phenomenon. 
Pioneering accelerators such as Y Combinator (Mountain View, California), 
Techstars (Boulder, Colorado), and Seedcamp (London) were created only 
ten years ago, and the rapid growth of accelerators in Silicon Valley and 
elsewhere has only taken place in the last f ive years. The implication of this 
short history is that there is only limited comparable data available on the 
effectiveness of accelerators (GALI 2016; Cohen & Hochberg 2014; Miller & 
Bound 2011). For-profit accelerators, moreover, are not obliged to publicize 
details about their startup growth programs.
There is some conceptual confusion, too. This begins with the definition 
of what an accelerator is. One of the issues here is the validity of the distinc-
tion between an incubator and an accelerator. There is an ongoing debate 
in the academic and popular literature on the relevance of this distinction, 
and definitions differ considerably (CBIA 2016; Deering 2014; Nielsen 2017; 
Van Weele 2016). The first-generation incubators – which emerged in Europe 
in the 1980s and in Silicon Valley in the late 1950s – primarily offered co-
working off ice space and were based on a real estate business model. They 
supplied new ventures with economy-of-scale advantages. Examples are 
science parks and shared off ice buildings. The second-generation incuba-
tors, which emerged in the early 1990s, added an in-house support service 
structure including training and coaching as well as some funding. The 
third-generation incubators came onto the scene in the late 1990s, offering 
a more extended portfolio that provided access to networks and external 
resources such as venture capital (Van Weele 2016; Grimaldi & Grandi 2005, 
2012; Bruneel et al. 2012; Mian et al. 2016; Pauwels et al. 2016).
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Accelerators, which were launched in the last f ive to ten years, might be 
seen as fourth-generation incubators or, alternatively, as startup growth 
facilities of their own, as they differ from typical mainstream incubators. 
An accelerator can be def ined as a miniature or micro-ecosystem that 
helps startups to rapidly grow their business, offering a broad scope of 
support and facilities such as coaching, mentoring, and training; f ine-tuning 
product-market f it; providing access to investors, networks, and clients; and 
creating a learning community of practice and peers.
Inspired by recent contributions by CBIA (2016), Nielsen (2017), Cohen & 
Hochberg (2014), Miller & Bound (2011), and Dempwolf et al. (2014), I identify 
a number of features that differentiate accelerators from incubators. These 
include the admissions process, duration, funding, program intensity, teams, 
culture, and cohorts.11 Accelerators apply highly competitive and restrictive 
selection procedures: only the most promising startups are admitted. The 
screening process is scrupulous, and only a small percentage of startups 
make the cut. By contrast, incubators have open admissions policies and 
are solely restricted by limited off ice space. The duration of accelerator 
programs is deliberately short and in most cases lasts up to three months. 
Accelerated startup business cycles may speed up growth or may hasten 
failure. Graduation from an incubator, however, may take up to f ive years 
and occurs within a generally protective environment, often framed as a 
‘safe haven’ for nurturing new businesses (Bergek & Norrman 2014). Funding 
also differs. Privately owned accelerators provide admitted startups with 
some funding in return for equity or convertible notes, as they primarily 
aim to develop a profitable portfolio of seed-stage investments. By contrast, 
many incubators are publicly owned and not based on a business model 
that centers on f inancial participation in new ventures. Accelerators seek 
startup growth and scale that allows for a prof itable exit (i.e., going public 
through an IPO or getting acquired by another f irm), while the rent-seeking 
business model of incubators is by def inition based on delayed exits and 
prolonged stays. Coaching, training, mentoring, and networking are pro-
vided by accelerators on a much more extensive and intensive basis than 
incubators do, something economist Ian Hathaway (2016a) describes as 
‘immersive education’. Offering ‘smart capital’ by seasoned entrepreneurs 
is a defining characteristic of professional accelerators. The focus on startup 
teams rather than on individual entrepreneurs is a further trait of accelera-
tors, while incubators do not have distinct entry policies in this respect. 
Accelerators, furthermore, are usually very outspoken in their preference for 
startup founder teams, as they believe complementary skill sets are needed 
that as a rule cannot be embodied in one person. According to the logic of 
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accelerators, growing a startup is a team effort and is simply too much for 
one individual. Accelerators endeavor to create a vibrant, high-pressure 
environment and an entrepreneurial pro-innovation culture that reinforces 
competition, performance, and rapid growth. This is much less the case for 
incubators. A f inal basic difference between accelerators and incubators is 
that startup teams in larger accelerators enter and graduate in groups, also 
known as batches or cohorts. This fosters bonds between startups, enables 
peer group support, and cultivates a shared identity between founders in 
the same cohort. The admissions procedure in incubators, as mentioned, 
is on a continuous basis, dependent on available off ice space.
It should be noted that these seven features I use to distinguish accelera-
tors from incubators result in Weberian ideal-type representations of the 
two startup growth facilitators. In reality, as we will see, the distinction 
between incubators and accelerators is less clear-cut and more diffuse, 
as these def ining features are not necessarily fully represented in con-
crete examples. There is clearly a gray area (CBIA 2016). Consequently, 
the taxonomy is instrumental rather than conceptual; it mainly points to 
operational differences.12 Deering (2014: 13) uses a simple but clarifying anal-
ogy to explain these differences: “Incubators can be thought of as startup 
gyms – equipped with the necessary resources, environment, and guidance 
to grow your startup – while accelerators can be thought of as startup 
boot camps – just as equipped as incubators, but involving a more def ined 
mission, application process, methodology for progress, and stakeholders. 
All in all, accelerators tend to focus more deliberately on achieving certain 
success criteria for a startup.”
Van Weele (2016) recently published an important study on the role 
of accelerators (though he uses the term incubators) in varying national 
contexts. I particularly like the three theoretical frameworks he offers to 
explore the mechanisms and practices of the startup incubation and growth 
process. The f irst framework is the Resource Based View (RBV), which 
identif ies the main tangible and intangible resources that accelerators 
provide to startups in order to increase their competitive advantage: off ice 
space, funding, knowledge, and networks. Startups struggle to accumulate 
resources that are necessary for product market launch, and accelerators 
help them to overcome this basic def icit. The second framework consists 
of theories on Organizational Learning (OL), which define entrepreneur-
ship as a learning process in which startup teams learn by doing. In this 
perspective, accelerators aim to boost the teams’ learning curve. The third 
theoretical framework states that starting entrepreneurs learn through 
active participation in Communities of Practice (CoP). Accelerators provide 
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such a community-learning environment by sharing expertise, practices, 
and challenges and by creating an internal culture that shapes startup 
identity and generates entrepreneurship, passion, energy, and competition.
These three theoretical frames of reference are important because they 
focus on specif ic support processes and attributes that add to accelera-
tors’ potency in bringing startups to the marketplace. These accelerating 
mechanisms, according to Van Weele, may directly or indirectly support 
startup performance. Networking is a powerful aspect of the accelerating 
process. The accelerators’ networks “contribute to startup performance 
by enabling startups to access missing resources, to eff iciently acquire 
market, business, and technological knowledge, to gain legitimacy and to 
overcome challenges in the entrepreneurial ecosystem” (Van Weele 2016: 
250). Accelerators, furthermore, may facilitate ‘higher learning’: a process 
in which startup teams come to question the assumptions underlying their 
new business, which may lead them to experiment with their product or 
even to radically change their business model.
Pauwels et al. (2016) investigated accelerators across Europe and came 
up with three basic types: the ecosystem builder, the deal-f low maker, 
and the welfare stimulator. The ecosystem builder is an accelerator that 
is often created by corporates as a matchmaking device linking startups 
with customers and stakeholders, which in turn creates an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem around the corporate company. The deal-flow maker typif ies 
an accelerator that is funded by VCs, angels, and investment funds with 
the primary goal of selecting promising startups for investment purposes. 
The welfare stimulator is commonly an accelerator backed by government 
stakeholders in order to promote startup communities and economic 
growth centered on certain technological themes and domains.
Though research on accelerator effectiveness is scarce, there is a handful 
of research studies that we can consult. One study by Hallen et al. (2014) 
showed that accelerator-backed new ventures were faster at raising venture 
capital and at gaining customer traction than similar non-accelerator ven-
tures. Winston-Smith & Hannigan (2015) found that accelerator graduate 
startups were more likely to raise next-round f inancing sooner than non-
graduates and had a higher chance of exiting by acquisition or by quitting.13 
A 2016 study by the Global Accelerator Learning Initiative also indicated 
that accelerator startup graduates managed to raise larger new investments. 
Fehder & Hochberg (2015) concluded that accelerators have a positive impact 
on regional ecosystems, particularly by having more seed and early-stage 
entrepreneurial f inancing activity. But, again, it has to be emphasized that 
these studies are early accounts of accelerators’ effectiveness. Performance 
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metrics based on comparable longitudinal data are rare. We need much 
more empirical data and case studies on how accelerators are doing in 
terms of effectively growing and scaling startups, and not only in Silicon 
Valley. Having such metrics would greatly enhance our understanding of 
how accelerators operate and what determines its achievements.
Methodology
This study is part of a broader research program aimed at understanding and 
explaining why Silicon Valley has succeeded in becoming the global center 
for innovative startups and cutting-edge entrepreneurship. This larger 
research program is based on a variety of data collection methods, using 
different primary and secondary sources. Based on these insights, I come 
up with recommendations for improving Europe’s policy towards startups. 
The ecosystem concept is a key notion in the way I frame the Silicon Valley 
success story. A reconstruction of the Silicon Valley ecosystem shows how 
this region’s economic and technological track record is rooted in a set of 
advanced institutional and cultural factors that fuel innovation and new 
ventures. It is an ecosystem that manages to renew itself continuously 
and that spurs talented startups. My book Silicon Valley: Planet Startup 
(2016), co-authored by Arne Maas, attempts to portray this remarkably 
well-advanced ecosystem and to demonstrate how it lays the foundation 
for a thriving startup community.
Over the past years, I took various research trips to the Valley to interview 
numerous startup founders and CEOs in the area; consulted local domain 
experts, entrepreneurs, and business representatives; had conversations 
with colleagues from the Bay Area universities; spoke with economic think 
tanks and chambers of commerce; talked with policymakers and politicians; 
organized group interviews with students; studied the history of Silicon 
Valley; and reviewed the scholarly and popular literature on the Valley’s 
success and impact.14 I furthermore interviewed VCs and angels, attended 
angel funding pitch rounds, went to startup events and network meet-ups, 
drank numerous lattes in startup cafes in SoMa– the neighborhood in San 
Francisco that is home to many startups– and, of course, visited the Valley’s 
iconic high-tech corporates.
As explained above, accelerators are pillars of Silicon Valley’s highly de-
veloped ecosystem. Some of them have launched mega-successful startups. 
On an aggregate level, they receive thousands of applications a year. Because 
accelerators need to be both profiled and visible to startups and funders, 
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most of them are fairly well known. This makes it relatively easy for a study 
such as this one to identify accelerators, even if their numbers are rapidly 
growing (CBIA 2016). The f irst methodological step was to reduce the long 
list of accelerators to a meaningful short list of about twenty to twenty-f ive 
companies where an in-person interview could be arranged. A transparent 
set of criteria was used to facilitate the selection procedure. The sample 
I ended up with is a fair representation of the following six accelerator 
features: prof it vs. not-for-profit, general vs. specif ic focus, taking equity 
vs. not-taking equity, large vs. small accelerators, offering workspace vs. 
virtual program, short vs. longer programs. I allowed myself some f lex-
ibility in applying these criteria, also in view of the overlapping gray area 
between accelerators and incubators. And f inally, the accelerators in my 
study needed to be in business for at least two to three years.15
With this set and with the help of some well-known key persons in my 
Silicon Valley network (see Acknowledgements), accelerators were selected 
and approached by email for a personal interview. Most of the accelerators 
accepted the interview invitation, some of them did not respond, and one 
declined because of lack of time. All the accelerators that were directly 
linked to me via email by my key contact people agreed to be interviewed, 
illustrating the strength of networks in the Valley. This non-probability 
sampling procedure worked well: a total of twenty-three accelerators could 
be interviewed (see Appendix 1). Two accelerators were interviewed in the 
autumn of 2015, twenty accelerators in the summer of 2016, and one in the 
autumn of 2016. The two accelerator interviews held in 2015 were part of 
my f ieldwork for the previous book project but f it well into this research 
study and were therefore included. Twenty-one interviews were conducted 
face-to-face, and two interviews were conducted via Skype. Eight of the 
twenty-three selected accelerators are based in San Francisco, fourteen in 
Silicon Valley, and one in nearby Oakland. All the interviewees are accelera-
tor founders and/or chief executives. Three of the accelerators in my sample 
rank in the top nine best performing accelerators in the United States: 500 
Startups, the Alchemist Accelerator, and StartX.16 Four of the accelerators 
are in the top ten global accelerators for overseas startups: Founders Space, 
Plug and Play, 500 Startups, and HAX.17
The questionnaire I used is thematically structured and clustered around 
a number of subjects relating to the way accelerators operate and to the 
conceptual model outlined in the next chapter. The main topics covered are: 
accelerator philosophy, perceived unique selling points, startup intake and 
selection procedure, technology focus and startup target group, funding and 
business model, accelerator program characteristics, perceived accelerator 
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challenges, cooperation partners, success attribution, and future plans (see 
Appendix 2). Although the questionnaire is quite lengthy, all the interviews 
were without exception animated, open, informative, and very pleasant. 
Interviewees were genuinely interested in the topics of the interview, and 
the conversations were energetic and lively. The length of the interview 
varied between 60 and 90 minutes.18 With the exception of the two Skype 
interviews, I conducted all the interviews at the accelerator itself, in most 
cases preceded or followed by an on-site guided workspace tour.19 This 
provided couleur locale and a good impression of the accelerator in action. 
It also offered an opportunity for me to talk to startup teams that were 
taking part in the accelerator program.
With the interviewees’ permission, the interviews were recorded 
digitally.20 Transcripts were made by Flatworld Solutions, a specialized 
transcription service in Bangalore, India.21 Three random quality checks 
per interview were done by the research team, and no irregularities were 
observed. All the interviews were analyzed by Atlas.ti, a professional 
software program for qualitative data. Interviewees gave their consent 
for me to publish quotes from the interviews.22 Two of my respondents 
changed jobs in the period between the interview and the f inalization of 
the manuscript. Doug Davenport, founder and CEO of Prospect SV, is now 
on its Board of Directors. Matt Walters, the managing director of Runway, 
is now general partner at Mission VC. TiE LaunchPad’s three-year lifecycle 
was concluded at the end of 2016 and has since continued as TiE Angels. 
Additional secondary data collection on accelerators’ performance and 
portfolio was closed on March 31, 2017; developments after this date could 
not been included.
I decided to write this study in a way that allows the accelerator founders 
and CEOs to tell their own story of how they help startups to accelerate 
growth and scalability, their accelerator philosophy, their accelerator pro-
grams, their showcases, the challenges they encounter, and their ambitions 
for the future. I feel that this writing method adds to the readability of the 
study and helps me to communicate my main f indings to my European 
target group in a more convincing way.
Overview
This book is structured as follows. In chapter 2, an attempt is made to 
explain why Silicon Valley is such a globally successful region in terms 
of innovation and entrepreneurship. The conceptual model that will be 
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introduced stresses the particular way in which cultural and institutional 
factors interact in this region. The model emphasizes that pro-innovation 
cultural factors such as thinking big, the tolerance of failure, the prefer-
ence for openness and sharing, the eagerness to compete and to excel, and 
an entrepreneurial mindset constitute an extraordinary fertile breeding 
ground for a thriving startup community. Institutional factors such as 
access to talent, access to funding, a pro-active government, and an effective 
new venture support system are equally relevant in understanding Silicon 
Valley’s high-tech startup success story. Accelerators, I will argue, are in 
essence intentional micro representations of this unique combination of 
cultural and structural factors. They are a focal element of the Valley’s 
startup support infrastructure.
The chapters that follow examine the views of the accelerators’ chief 
executives on their role in this infrastructure and their opinions on the vari-
ous topics covered by this study: accelerators’ selection procedure, business 
model and funding; the features of accelerators’ programs; startup coaching 
and team mentorship; success and fail factors; and accelerators’ challenges 
and future plans. Chapter 3 describes some of the chief differences between 
the accelerators with respect to their philosophy of supporting and growing 
startups, whether they specialize in certain technology sectors or have a 
more general scope, and how they collaborate with external partners. The 
chapter also explores the various accelerator business models. What is the 
underlying revenue matrix of prof it and not-for-prof it accelerators, and 
what are the different funding options (e.g., equity requirements) they offer 
to startups? Chapter 4 reports on how accelerators organize the selection 
and intake process for startups to enter their programs. How restrictive are 
accelerators, what are the main selection criteria, and what is their rejection 
rate? What qualities do they prioritize among startup teams?
The accelerator startup programs themselves are analyzed in some detail 
in chapter 5. I look at the nature, frequency, intensity, and duration of the 
various programs. The chapter shows that accelerators differ markedly in 
this respect, as they look for distinct market niches, competitive advantages, 
and market or mission-driven technology segments. Chapter 6 outlines the 
chief executives’ beliefs about why some accelerator startups succeed while 
others fail. Is there a basic pattern, or do causes differ substantially? What 
are the accelerated startups they are most proud of and why? And what do 
executives perceive as the most pressing challenges their accelerator faces, 
and what are their plans for the future? Do they plan to pivot their own 
strategy? Chapter 7, f inally, puts the main f indings into perspective and 
formulates a set of core conclusions and policy recommendations. What 
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lessons can Europe draw? What roles can profit and non-profit accelerators 
play in implementing an inspiring and challenging new European startup 
agenda? To conclude the book, I offer a practical decision tool that will help 
European stakeholders and entrepreneurs in making the basic choices of 
setting up accelerators.
2 Innovation and Startups in Silicon 
Valley
An Ecosystem Approach
Modeling the Valley’s ecosystem23
In order to understand and explain Silicon Valley’s long-standing perfor-
mance as a global engine of innovation, entrepreneurship, and startups, I 
developed a model that stresses the interrelatedness of cultural and insti-
tutional factors at the micro, meso, and macro level of this high-tech region 
(Ester & Maas 2016: 29-41). I def ine Silicon Valley as a well-integrated and 
balanced ecosystem in which all constituting elements are lined up to pro-
mote and sustain leading-edge innovation and pioneering entrepreneurship. 
It is an almost organic and prototypical system that generates an enduring 
and resilient habitat for innovation and startups to thrive (Munroe 2009). 
The Valley is an environment that is built on the right cultural mindset and 
resource availability, which encourages and strengthens innovation and the 
founding of new ventures. Above all, it is an environment that stimulates a 
pro-innovation and entrepreneurial way of thinking that helps the creation 
of new businesses through a well-oiled network providing access to talent, 
knowledge, funding, mentoring, and legal counseling, and to accelerators. In 
the words of John-Seeley-Brown, the former chief scientist of Xerox, Silicon 
Valley is an ecosystem in which the different parts reinforce one another 
to create a “perpetual innovation machine”.24 It is an ecosystem that favors 
competition, disruptive thinking, and excellence and that supports startup 
teams to work on their dreams and to market their new business ideas. It is 
a habitat that fuels the fast growth of existing companies and has led to a 
booming startup economy that many other regions in the world are eager 
to learn from.
The ecosystem approach has proven to be a useful tool in analyzing inno-
vation regions such as Silicon Valley (Bay Area Council Economic Institute 
2012; Kenny 2000; Barami & Evans 1995; Brown & Duguid 2000; Moon Lee 
et al. 2000; for Europe: European Commission 2014; Startup Genome 2012, 
2017; Telefónica 2013). It provides an integral and systematic insight into the 
characteristics that matter for regions to become and remain innovative 
and entrepreneurial, taking both cultural and institutional parameters 
into consideration (Porter 1990, 1998). The ecosystem approach, moreover, 
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is by nature multidisciplinary and is an instrumental aid for policymakers 
to assess national or regional innovation strength, entrepreneurial eff i-
cacy, and startup potency.25 By identifying the cultural and institutional 
preconditions that must be present for nations, regions, and cities to be 
innovative, competitive, and attractive for startups, the approach enables 
the benchmarking of startups and innovation areas at an international level. 
The f igure below pictures the Silicon Valley Innovation and Startup Model, 
which distinguishes three interacting levels of this innovation and startup 
ecosystem interacting levels of this innovation and startup ecosystem.26








































Source: ester & maas (2016: 41)
The micro level (center block, inner ring) specifies three main factors that 
relate to how expected startup success is framed in the Valley: the startup 
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must be based on a Big Idea that will really shake and change the market 
(product), the new venture must be headed by a strong team that succeeds 
in hiring the best and most gifted talents available (team & talent), and the 
founders need to be capable of timely pivoting their original startup busi-
ness strategy when circumstances rapidly change (pivot & perseverance).
The meso level (outer blocks, inner ring) identif ies four institutions that 
have been decisive in building up Silicon Valley’s startup ecosystem: access 
to ample VC new business funding; access to high-caliber universities and 
research centers that excel in innovation, work closely with industry, and 
actively promote new ventures; a government that invests in innovation and 
believes in a startup economy and is a launching customer of innovative 
products and a setter of market rules; and the presence of a strong network 
system of startup support agencies such as accelerators, legal counselors, 
and mentors.
The macro level (outer ring) points to the typical Silicon Valley culture 
that applauds entrepreneurship and shares innovation, favors the passion-
ate pursuit of big dreams, emphasizes openness and learning, is risk prone 
and tolerates failure, and has the right startup frame of mind.27 It is a culture 
that impacts the other two levels as well.
The f igure above outlines the three levels, the corresponding factors, as 
well as their interrelationships that in my view define the main cultural 
and institutional ingredients of how Silicon Valley became the global engine 
of innovative startups.
As indicated in the model, accelerators (lower center block, inner ring) 
are part of Silicon Valley’s advanced network support system. They help 
startups in their process of developing and pivoting their product and bring-
ing it to market, they ref ine their business model and marketing strategy, 
they train founding teams and their skill sets, they offer access to funding, 
they assist them in getting their f irst customers and sales, and they provide 
a zesty accelerator startup culture. The model underlines the major role that 
accelerators play in Silicon Valley in launching startups.
Once again, it must be emphasized that it has taken Silicon Valley many 
decades to develop this well-functioning system and that its success is 
based on the intelligent combination of all of the ecosystem’s constitutive 
features. The sum of the Silicon Valley ecosystem is more than its parts. 
This axiom illustrates again that selective cherry picking will not work in 
an attempt to replicate Silicon Valley’s success elsewhere in the world. It 
is, simply said, all or nothing.
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The model in more detail
The business anatomy of Silicon Valley is dominated by a unique combina-
tion of a pro-innovation and pro-startup culture and the prevalence of 
institutions that help new ventures to excel. In this chapter, I take a closer 
look at these cultural and institutional factors by describing and examining 
the different micro, meso, and macro levels of the Silicon Valley innovation 
and startup model. This context information will help to clarify the specif ic 
role and position of accelerators in the Silicon Valley ecosystem. The chapter 
attempts to give a broad overview of the way the Silicon Valley ecosystem 
functions, which will facilitate our understanding of how accelerators 
contribute to this self-reinforcing system. I begin with the micro level by 
exploring the way that innovation works in Silicon Valley, the necessary 
startup alignment of upstream and downstream innovation, the emphasis 
on disruptive innovation, the importance of strong startup teams, and the 
need for timely product pivoting by startups.
The micro level: Product, people, and pivot
Product: “Think big”
“Think big” is at the top of Silicon Valley’s canon of innovation. Its 
mainstream business model is all about scale, the ambition to reach 
large markets, and the desire to have a social impact. Although “small 
is beautiful” is a philosophy and movement with Californian roots, it is 
def initely not how the Valley sees innovation and entrepreneurship. The 
very essence of high tech is that it is not limited by geographical boundaries 
such as regional or national home markets. As Marc Andreessen, one of 
the Valley’s most reputable VCs, once said: “software is eating the world”.28 
The Silicon Valley business model is based on scalability, preferably at the 
global level. The enormous success of high-tech companies such as Apple, 
Google, LinkedIn, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, etc. can be attributed 
to the fact that their products service markets in virtually all corners of 
the world. Their market is not the Valley, not California, not even the U.S. 
– their market is the world. They are global brands with global customers, 
and with global impact. Scalability is what startups are evaluated on by 
investors; it is their prime funding criterion. “It’s all about scale for VCs,” 
according to Silicon Valley investor Marc Philips (2013: 15). And startups 
for their part know that they are being assessed in terms of their product 
scalability. There is not much sense for startups being in Silicon Valley 
with a product that is hardly scalable (or duplicable) and that is restricted 
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to quantitatively limited markets. Their prospects for funding are meager, 
if not non-existent.
Related to scale is the need for fast startup growth: entrepreneurs need 
to launch a scalable product that will quickly sell to sizeable volumes of 
customers. VCs constantly search for early-stage startups that develop 
products that combine scalability and fast growth. Silicon Valley unicorns 
such as Airbnb, Palantir, Dropbox, Uber, Pinterest, and WhatsApp all share 
these two fundamental success qualities: they reach substantial global 
customer segments and they have fast growth records. Accelerators, as I will 
conclude, are particularly keen on launching startups with scalability and 
growth potential. It is a vital part of their startup recruitment procedure and 
training program. It opens access to investors in their continuous search for 
the Next Big Thing, i.e. innovations beyond Google, Apple, or Facebook that 
will revolutionize the technological landscape and herald a new paradigm 
shift as well as mass markets, of course.
Scale and growth are key, but so is the innovation mission: the need 
to have a social impact and to offer practical solutions to pressing social 
issues. The Silicon Valley vocabulary overflows with phrases that grasp 
this fundamental ambition of startups to develop technologies “that will 
change the world” – not a very humble ambition but def initely one that 
dominates the Silicon Valley startup jargon. It is also sometimes called 
the “big hairy audacious goal”. Apple founder Steve Jobs probably set the 
stage for this with his legendary statement: “we’re here to put a dent in 
the universe”. In pitching their product, Silicon Valley startups typically 
incorporate this mission-driven mantra of making the world a better place, 
though sometimes to the point of near meaninglessness. They know they 
should not settle for less and that the bar is raised high.29
The call to “think big” is a chronic part of the Silicon Valley narrative, 
indicated by its emphasis on scale, growth, and impact. But there is another 
dimension to this narrative: “think disruptive”. The history of Silicon Valley 
is a history of disruptive technological breakthroughs, of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction.30 These are technological changes that have radically 
transformed markets and playing f ields, disruptive innovations that have 
redefined ruling technologies, outperformed existing markets, and attracted 
new consumer segments (Christensen 1997; Moore 2014). These innovations 
have shaken up the status quo, allowing new business models to emerge 
that drastically altered prevailing market relations. Uber shook up the taxi 
market, Airbnb upset the hotel market, Skype and WhatsApp disrupted 
the phone market, Amazon disturbed the book market, eBay changed the 
shopping market, and Spotify was a bomb under the CD market. And some 
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decades earlier, the PC became a major competitor for expensive mainframe 
computers and totally broke up the computer hardware market and later 
also the software market. Disruptive innovation is in Silicon Valley’s veins. 
It reshapes markets, introduces new competitors, and creates a signif icant 
impact. The Valley has embraced the idea of disruptive innovation to a 
nearly messianic degree, supported by its series of conferences, events, 
and meetings that celebrate disruptive innovation and its many merits.31 
Various accelerators, as we will see, explicitly aim for disruptive innovation.
Silicon Valley lives off innovation. Bringing to market new technologies, 
new products, and new software and hardware is the quintessence of its ex-
istence. “Think innovation” is the backbone of the Valley.32 Entrepreneurial 
innovativeness and innovative entrepreneurship are bearers of the Silicon 
Valley narrative. Startups play a crucial role in this narrative, as they are 
pioneers in the innovation trajectory and in the commercialization of new 
technologies, products, and services. They are frontrunners, and as the 
new generation of business innovators, they challenge existing high-tech 
companies and dominant market positions. As new ventures, they are 
essential links in the chain of disruptive innovations.
People: Team and talent
Founding a startup is no small thing. Team, talent, and persistent optimism 
are absolutely indispensable in building a strong startup. It takes a lot to 
start a new business. Startup entrepreneurs must turn their business idea 
into a viable and competitive product, do the market math, secure funding, 
attract customers, develop a marketing strategy, structure the organization, 
hire and coach talent, and take timely decisions to pivot. Apart from serial 
entrepreneurs, startup founders tend to lack an entrepreneurial skill set 
based on prior business experience, but somehow they must survive in 
a mega-competitive environment of thousands of new ventures that all 
aim high, all want to make a difference, and all want a piece of the market 
pie. Founders need to cope with such daily hurdles as cash flow control, 
customer problems, technical product failures, and personnel issues. They 
must struggle with failure and address numerous challenges both instan-
taneously and simultaneously. As Noam Wasserman (2012: 6), professor 
of clinical entrepreneurship at the University of Southern California and 
author of the seminal work The Founder’s Dilemmas, puts it: Perhaps no 
business pursuit is messier than creating an organization from scratch.”
Startup life is a turbulent roller-coaster ride. And there is no guarantee 
for success. Startups are by def inition vulnerable ventures, and survival in 
most cases is questionable. It takes guts, passion, perseverance, and a good 
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deal of luck to maneuver a startup to its next stage, out of the danger zone. 
Startup founders have to live with manifold frustrations – e.g., an often 
rigorous career break, the permanent search for additional funding, the 
likelihood of having to drastically change the startup business model – and 
they must have the mental strength and energy to face a highly uncertain 
future. Startup founders need to anticipate basic business dilemmas, avoid 
sneaky pitfalls, take calculated risks, and cope with chaos, ambiguity, and 
unpredictability. They must be willing to put in long hours, to live on a 
minimal income, to accept painful mistakes, and to deal with pressure 
from family and peer groups.
Startup life is no walk in the park, that much is certain. Accelerators’ role 
in making the walk easier should not be overestimated, but they can help 
in addressing startup impasses and problems in a more structured way.
There seems to be a growing general consensus in Silicon Valley that 
startups need a team of founders rather than solo entrepreneurs. Teams 
are generally better equipped to meet startup dilemmas (Wasserman 2012). 
Only strong teams will win, so runs the prevailing new venture leadership 
diagnosis. I attended a closed Silicon Valley investor meeting in which 
startups pitched for angel funding, and the main criterion used by inves-
tors was whether the new business was led by a strong team of passionate 
founders with convincing entrepreneurial competences, the right mindset, 
synergy, and determination. For that matter, solo founders were not even 
taken into consideration for funding. The focus on teams accentuates how 
important complementary skill sets of startup founder teams are considered 
(Cohan 2012; Lazear 2004; Lewis 2012; Szycher 2015).33
Teams need to have the right mix of product development knowhow (up-
stream innovation) and product marketing and sales abilities (downstream 
innovation). In his review of entrepreneurial teams, Thomas Lechler (2001: 
276) concludes that “overall the main argument for the advantage of teams 
is based on the positive effect of a combination of people with different 
personalities, characteristics, knowledge, skills, and abilities.” Startup 
founder teams are good for emotional support, for sharing and handling 
business setbacks, for bringing in other perspectives, for adding realism, 
and for f illing skill gaps. One could also point to the wider psychological 
signif icance of the startup team’s mission. As Katzenbach & Smith (1993: 
178) argue: “credible team purposes have an element related to winning, 
being f irst, revolutionizing, or being on the cutting edge.”
Startup teams need to be goal-driven and achievement-oriented, 
focused on the development and marketing of innovations, and making 
use of the experience, expertise, and skills of team members. Effective 
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startup founding teams have at their disposal collective resources that 
can be mobilized to guide a startup through its demanding f irst phases. 
These team resources go above and beyond team members’ individual 
competences. Some team members are good in the technicalities of product 
development, some excel in marketing, and others know how to set up the 
startup as a business organization. Startup teams that lack these resources 
and complementary skills are doomed to fail. Research has shown that the 
malfunctioning of startup teams is among the main reasons why startups 
go down (Wasserman 2012). Weak teams will lose. Team building, therefore, 
is a common activity in accelerator programs.
Talent is Silicon Valley’s main resource. This is true for both existing high-
tech companies and for startups. Its talented workforce is the trademark of 
the Valley, which enables its continual development of innovative technolo-
gies. Talent is a startup’s human capital and is responsible for its innovation 
record, business performance, and growth potential. Surrounded by some of 
the best universities in the world, Silicon Valley has direct access to a large 
and renewable pool of talents. Silicon Valley thrives on talented software 
programmers, coders, engineers, and computer scientists. They are the 
cement of the Valley as a perpetual and self-reinforcing innovation machine. 
Talented employees are of paramount importance in the innovation chain 
from idea generation – via idea elaboration – to marketable new products 
and services.
A flourishing high-tech startup economy is unthinkable without a highly 
educated and highly skilled workforce. But high-tech talent Silicon-Valley 
style is not just about excellence in hard skills such as coding, programming 
or hardware design. Talent also comes down to outstanding soft skills: 
creativity, f lexibility, curiosity, passion, an orientation towards achieve-
ment, the ability to work in teams, openness, a willingness to share, an 
entrepreneurial mindset, a pro-customer attitude, being good at network-
ing, being willing to learn, and being focused on personal development. 
Talent, in other words, is about combining hard and soft skills. And it is 
this combination that makes the difference in an innovation economy. 
Sometimes bigger companies acquire a startup not because of its product 
or technology but because of its talent, its team skills – a phenomenon also 
known as ‘acqui-hire’.
Working for a startup is unpredictable and non-routine. Job descriptions 
are meaningless. “Working for an early-stage startup requires f iguring out 
what your job should be every day, how to accomplish things that have never 
been done before and when you should throw out everything that’s already 
been done and start over.”(COMPASS 2015: 17). High-tech Silicon Valley 
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corporates are involved in a constant struggle to recruit the best talent, and 
job offers reflect this rugged competition in terms of generous salaries, stock 
options, employee benefits, and company perks. Employer brand, identity, 
and culture are also major elements in the way talents evaluate prospec-
tive high-tech employers. Laszlo Bock (2015), head of people operations at 
Google, gives an interesting insight into how this Silicon Valley high-tech 
giant (which receives over two million applications a year) recruits talent 
and how it remains a talent powerhouse. His basic work rule regarding 
hiring talent is: “You want them to fall in love with you” (Block 2015: 97). 
But love must be mutual. As Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg states: “I will 
only hire someone to work directly for me if I would work for that person.”34
It is far from easy for startups to compete with high-tech corporates in the 
Valley in hiring top talents. They cannot offer the same salaries, benefits, 
and perks. Junior software engineers, for instance, may already start with 
an annual salary of $100,000 (stock options and bonuses not included).35 
Startups therefore need to approach talent recruitment using different 
unique selling points: they primarily depend on applicants’ drive to stand 
out in a hectic and dynamic work environment and their desire to share 
the excitement and satisfaction that growing a startup gives. They target 
those who enjoy working in a small company and in a small team and who 
relish the idea of personally contributing to a startup’s mission and passion. 
In short, they seek out talent that is passionate about having an impact in 
their job, even if it is their f irst job.
Pivot
Startups fuel the rejuvenation and revitalization of mainstream business 
developments as they come up with new solutions to pressing problems. 
But it is a role that takes much effort, pain, and sweat. Most startups fail. 
The main test is to f ind a balance between upstream innovation (from idea 
to product) and downstream innovation (from product to market). Product 
ideas may be brilliant, but the failure to valorize is the end of every startup. 
This balance is especially urgent after the f irst round of funding (‘the valley 
of death’), when startups quickly approach the end of their f inancial runway 
(Philips 2013). Not f inding a responsive market is disastrous for startups. The 
difference between failing and pulling through can boil down to how and 
when a startup decides to launch its product in the market. Value creation, 
market entry, and product acceptance is what startups are all about. Every 
startup founding team struggles with aligning upstream and downstream 
innovation (Bauwen 2012, 2013). It is the alpha and omega of startup life. 
Or as Ruben Daniëls, Silicon Valley startup founder, neatly summarized: 
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“A startup is a vessel to f ind a business model around the technology you 
are developing.”36
Bringing a startup product successfully to market is a tedious job. 
First-time startup founders often lack the skill set and experience to 
make an effective transition from idea to market. Accelerators can be 
very instrumental in helping startup teams to f ind their way through the 
numerous pitfalls of commercialization. Mentorship by experienced serial 
entrepreneurs can prevent startup founders from making the most common 
business development mistakes.
Pivoting is a matter of life or death for startups in their effort to survive 
the early stages as new ventures. It is an important buzzword in the Silicon 
Valley business glossary. Pivoting directly affects the necessity of balancing 
upstream and downstream innovation. Endless product polishing is sure to 
result in startup death, as its funding runway tends to be much too short. 
Startup founders, to paraphrase renowned Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and 
authors Reid Hoffman and Ben Casnocha, need to be in “permanent beta”.37 
To timely pivot one’s business concept should be the prevailing startup 
logic. “Fail fast”, so the Silicon Valley acclaimed motto goes, as that would 
be better than spending endless amounts of time on product ref inement 
under uncertain conditions of market interest.
This line of thought is convincingly argued by Eric Ries, noted Silicon 
Valley entrepreneur and author, in The Lean Startup (2011). The book is an au-
thoritative combination of analytical guidelines, methodological templates, 
and practical principles that go beyond startup founders’ entrepreneurial 
instincts. It is clearly one of the most popular books among starting entre-
preneurs. The number one insight that Ries puts forth is that “learning is 
the essential unit for startups” (2011: 49). His Lean Startup Model is based 
on what is called the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop. This analytic 
tool comes down to building a minimum viable product (MVP) with the 
lowest amount of time, money, and effort. As quickly as possible, the startup 
team needs to launch the product and meticulously measure basics such as 
customer reaction, traction profiles, product use, and willingness to pay. This 
feedback information is used for immediate product alterations and business 
plan changes. The secret is not to endlessly polish and re-polish a product 
but to market the product in its early stage, to monitor customer take-up 
and feedback, and to process this information through pivoting product 
adjustments. “If we’re not moving the drivers of our business model, we’re not 
making progress. That becomes a sure sign that it’s time to pivot.” (ibid.: 120).
Within a remarkably short period, the term “pivot” became a leading 
concept in Silicon Valley’s startup vocabulary. The merits of Ries’ approach 
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are twofold. First, it is counterintuitive. The idea is not to develop the 
perfect product, because if that fails it will surely mark the end of the 
startup given that it was simply incapable of meeting consumers’ needs. 
The idea is to quickly launch an MVP and use customer reaction to change 
the initial product and to make a better product-market f it. While the 
MVP is still full of bugs, it is shipped to customers way before it is market-
ready in traditional business terms. For strongly product-driven startup 
entrepreneurs, pivoting is often an agonizing experience – a nightmare, 
even – as they believe in their product and because it took great persever-
ance to build it. The pain is not so much in building the MVP but in not 
building the ideal product. Fortunately, Ries offers a variety of practical 
suggestions on how and when to pivot. The second merit of his approach 
is the emphasis on solid quantitative measurements of customer feedback 
and product use. Ries’ methodology is f irmly data-based, and collecting 
primary metrics on customer response and take-up is seen as a startup’s 
core activity.
The need to pivot is based on a commitment to iterations that is being 
fed by repeated MVP testing, customer accounting, product alteration 
experimentation, progress measuring – or, as Ries calls it, “validated learn-
ing“ (ibid.: 18-19). Startups operate under conditions of extreme uncertainty, 
and the trick is to make the right choice between persisting or pivoting, 
between continuing on the current path or making a sharp turn.38 Effec-
tive pivoting mirrors startups’ resilience and agility. It takes guts to pivot, 
and the principle of validated learning may improve a startup’s survival 
chances. One of the distinct roles of accelerators, as will become clear, is 
helping startups with timely pivoting, as this is what makes or breaks a 
startup.
The meso level: Capital, universities, government, and support 
networks
The Silicon Valley ecosystem facilitates startup founders in building their 
new businesses through an advanced network of institutional facilitators 
and resources: angel and VC investors (startup funding), universities and 
research centers (talent pool and knowledge), government (innovation 
policy, technology funding, visa), and the startup support infrastructure 
(accelerators, legal advice). I briefly outline how these institutional pillars of 
the Silicon Valley ecosystem have enabled the region to become and remain 
the global epicenter of innovation and high-tech startups.
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Startup funding: Angels and VCs
Funding, obviously, is of paramount signif icance for startups. Or, in the 
more prosaic words of Silicon Valley analyst Tapan Munroe: “Ideas are 
the soul of innovation, money is the life blood.” (2009: 72). Money from 
friends, family, and fools is a welcome but also a vulnerable source of startup 
financing. Access to professional investors – i.e., to angel and VC funding – is 
another pillar of Silicon Valley’s advanced ecosystem. Crowdfunding is 
becoming more important, too. Startup funding has been around for a 
long time in the Valley and has indisputably added to the strength of its 
innovation economy and new venture entrepreneurship. Recent data show 
that half of all U.S. venture capital is invested in Silicon Valley companies, 
more than all other U.S. regions combined.39 The Valley even attracts over 
15% of total global VC funding. No other region in the world captures such a 
high share of domestic and foreign venture capital. Between 2009 and 2014, 
VC firms invested over $31 billion in Silicon Valley companies.40 Particularly 
relevant sectors are software, biotechnology, clean technology, and health.
Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park is a legendary address, as it houses the 
highest concentration of prominent VC companies. One of them is Sequoia 
Capital, founded in 1972 and among the most well-known VC f irms, hav-
ing funded such illustrious high-tech companies as Apple, Atari, Cisco, 
Oracle, Google, Yahoo, YouTube, LinkedIn, PayPal, WhatsApp, Airbnb, and 
Instagram. The total funds raised by Sequoia amount to $4.12 billion; and it 
has overseen 57 IPOs, 170 acquisitions, and 1,235 investments in almost 700 
companies.41 In 2014, it participated in the selling of WhatsApp to Facebook 
for a staggering $19 billion, which made it the largest acquisition in the 
history of a venture-backed company at the time. Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield 
& Byers (KPCB), whose off ices are next door to Sequoia on Sand Hill Road, 
is another major Silicon Valley VC (also founded in 1972) with $2.68 billion 
of funds raised, 41 IPOs, 112 acquisitions, and 836 investments in over 450 
companies.42 KPCB was involved in funding AOL, Citrix, Compaq, Lotus, 
Symantec, Genentech, Zynga, Amazon, and Twitter, to name just a few 
companies. These f igures on funding and exits substantiate CB Insights’ 
conclusion that “it is clear that the Silicon Valley tech hub is the 800 lb. gorilla 
when it comes to both venture-backed tech f inancing and exit activity.”43 
Other premium Silicon Valley VC funds include Andreessen & Horowitz, 
Benchmark Ventures, Khosla Ventures, New Enterprise Associates, Accel, 
and Greylock.
Public and private pension funds, university endowments, and founda-
tions are among the largest U.S. institutional VC funders. Commercial 
banks play a minor role. Former banker John Dean has a straightforward 
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explanation for this: “The prevailing culture of banks, particularly large 
ones, is risk-aversive; it isn’t quite suited to the freewheeling, risk-embracing 
ethos of Silicon Valley.”44 The investment logic of banks and VCs differs 
markedly.
Venture capital is big in Silicon Valley, but so is startup funding demand. 
It takes serious capital to run a startup, and there are thousands of Silicon 
Valley startups competing for funding, among them a large cohort of non-
U.S. startups that settle in the Valley to raise VC funding. Building and 
growing a startup in Silicon Valley is expensive, as the cost of living is 
high and recruiting highly skilled staff is very costly. A startup’s f inancial 
runway is short, and its cash burn rate is generally high. Most startups do 
not succeed in raising sufficient capital to grow their business. The majority 
fails, and only the best survive. Silicon Valley’s def inition of ‘the best’, as I 
outlined above, is based on two criteria: scalability and growth potential. 
That is why VCs are more interested in later-stage funding, when startups 
have matured and are able to show market traction. VCs are predominantly 
looking for what they call a ‘hockey stick’ growth curve: a revenue curve that 
takes an initial linear (slow) growth rate but then suddenly turns into an 
exponential (much faster) growth curve (Philips 2013). The mobile devices 
and apps sectors are big game changers in this respect.
VC investments are high-risk investments, and VCs consequently aim for 
high returns on their money. One big winner compensates for the losses on 
many other startup investments. VC startup investment math is not rocket 
science, is highly intuitive, and according to Forbes contributor Bruce Booth, 
“a big part of the problem is that anecdotal stories about great returns drive 
much of the thinking.”45 Only successful startups will survive; the ones that 
fail but also received funding simply disappear from the radar. Picking a 
winner remains the greatest VC challenge, as is keeping the valuation of 
fast-growing businesses realistic given the recent fear of an implosion of 
overpriced and overhyped unicorn startups (CB Insights 2016; Wadhwa 
2016).46 VCs are also competitors in the sense that they are all searching for 
the next startup champion, the one that will generate their multiple returns 
on investment (ROI). It could create an investors’ tragedy of the commons. 
The fear of missing out –commonly abbreviated as FOMO –may override 
a VC’s fear of losing money, as Silicon Valley investor Bill Gurley, partner at 
Benchmark, has warned.47
How does the VC business works? Investments in new ventures begin 
with a pre-seed stage (family, friends) and move on to the seed stage, the 
early stage, the expansion stage, and later stages. In technical terms, these 
stages are known as series Seed, series A, series B, series C, series D+. The 
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more mature the startup stage, the higher the VC investment – depending, 
of course, on the startup’s capital intensity and valuation. Series Seed is the 
stage in which ideas and products are developed; the funding of this stage 
is typically between $250,000 and $750,000. Series A is about optimizing 
product and user base; the funding at this stage ranges between $3 million 
and $6 million. Series B is for expanding market reach; the funding varies 
between $6 million to more than $15 million. Series C and later is used for 
scaling; funding ranges from single digits and double digits to hundreds 
of millions, or even billions. Uber raised over $10 billion (series G), and 
Airbnb over $3.4 billion (series F). The later the investment stage, the more 
important the hockey stick return on investment calculus becomes. Huge 
investments are at stake. Series C, D, and E are later-stage investments that 
are usually aimed at working towards an exit, either via a trade sale or an 
IPO. VCs demand a greater say in these later investment rounds, which may 
involve drastic changes in the startup team, as growing a startup requires 
different skills than launching a startup.
Angel investors are more active in early-stage startup funding. They 
typically are successful former entrepreneurs with considerable business 
experience and extensive networks who like to invest their private money 
in startups. Angels are appreciated by startup founders for providing them 
with ‘smart money’: the combination of cash, expertise, experience, time, 
mentorship, and valuable contacts and networks. This is probably the 
greatest advantage of the Silicon Valley funding support system. Investing 
in startups is not simply a matter of providing capital (‘dumb money’) to 
lengthen a new venture’s runway. It is also a matter of investing smart 
money, and many startup founders will admit that this helped enormously 
to make them stronger and to bring their new business to the next level. 
Smart money counts.
Silicon Valley accelerators have strong relationships with VCs; there is a 
clear understanding of mutual dependency and shared benefits. Accelera-
tors bring VCs into contact with promising startups, and VCs get direct 
access to startup teams they may want to invest in. And in many cases, 
accelerators are backed by VC funds, which permit an even more direct 
role and active participation.
Talent pool and knowledge: Universities and research labs
Higher education is an indispensable institution in an advanced pro-
innovation and pro-startup ecosystem. Surrounded by some of the best 
universities and research labs in the world, Silicon Valley has a gold mine of 
talent, innovation, and knowledge.48 The Bay Area is home to the University 
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of California with its four campuses (Berkeley, San Francisco, Davis, and 
Santa Cruz), Stanford University in the heart of Silicon Valley (Palo Alto), 
California State University with its two campuses (San Francisco and San 
Jose), and Santa Clara University.49
Berkeley (a public university) and Stanford (a private university) are two 
of the most renowned institutions for higher learning inside and outside the 
U.S., and both top all major national and international academic rankings. 
No less than 29 Nobel prizes have been awarded to Berkeley alumni, while 
Stanford has 32 faculty members who have received this most prestigious 
academic honor. Altogether, the Bay Area universities enroll about 175,000 
students, a quarter of whom are graduate students. The area is furthermore 
served by a widely branched network of California Community Colleges, 
which are core feeders of the region’s universities. The Foothill-De Anza 
Community College District, located in central Silicon Valley, enrolls about 
65,000 students (one of whom was Steve Jobs). Such large numbers of stu-
dents provide a continuous and abundant supply of highly skilled talent that 
Silicon Valley’s high-tech f irms and startups are eager to recruit from. The 
Bay Area universities provide outstanding training at all educational levels. 
Moreover, they coach thousands of PhD students working on specialized 
dissertation projects that add to their educational excellence and state-of-
the-art research quality. The great reputation of the Bay Area’s universities 
means that they are able to hire the best and brightest academics, which 
further strengthens educational and research quality. The Bay Area is a 
magnet for not only startup founders but also students and academics.
But the area’s innovation ecosystem is not just tied to universities. 
There are numerous public and private, independent and corporate, 
federal and state R&D institutes and labs that all add to the innovation 
standing of this premier high-tech region. Some of the more well-known 
of these are Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, SLAC National Accelera-
tor Laboratory, NASA Ames Research Center, Joint Genome Institute, SRI 
International, PARC, California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Buck 
Institute for Research on Ageing, Ernest Gallo Clinic and Research Center, 
Joint BioEnergy Institute, and, of course, the various corporate in-house 
R&D laboratories (Bay Area Council 2012). These exceptional universities, 
research institutes, and laboratories attract the best researchers from all 
over the world and pull in substantial external innovation and research 
funds. For academics in the top league, the Bay Area cannot be matched in 
terms of its innovation environment, providing them with a place to pursue 
their career, work with their peers, teach smart and dedicated students, 
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and enjoy the challenge of a competitive ambiance. And to top it all off, 
the weather is not bad either.
The Silicon Valley innovation and startup ecosystem goes beyond the 
mere existence of world-class universities and extends to the way universi-
ties collaborate with high-tech industry and encourage entrepreneurship 
among its faculty and students. One thing the Bay Area universities can-
not be accused of is being focused on ivory-tower research. For decades, 
they have had a strong entrepreneurial mindset and have developed close 
cooperative relationships with industry. The commercialization of research 
output is high on the universities’ agenda, which underlines the role of 
applied knowledge, of f inding innovative solutions to practical problems, 
and of working together with industrial stakeholders. This symbiotic 
university-industry collaboration is highly cherished. Industry participates 
in the university, and universities for their part reach out to industry. As 
Emilio Castilla et al. (2000: 229) conclude: “The educational sector has been 
especially vital because the constant movement back and forth between 
industry and university has blurred the boundaries of both and created 
elaborate social networks that keep academic research focused on practical 
problems, and infuse industrial activity with up-to-date science.” Professors 
are stimulated to valorize their research on innovations, and universities 
often have special arrangements for faculty and students to launch their 
own startups. A legendary Stanford example is Hewlett-Packard, which 
was founded by two Stanford graduates in the late 1930s and coached by 
the brilliant Stanford Dean Frederick Terman. Hewlett-Packard has since 
grown into an electronics behemoth with over 300,000 employees and 
revenues of more than $110 billion.50
Bay Area universities encourage the founding of startups, and the record 
of accomplishment is remarkable. Pioneering startups that were founded 
by Berkeley graduates and alumni include great names such as Intel, Apple, 
Sybase, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, Gap, and early biotechnology companies 
such as Chiron Corporation, Tularik, Exelixis, and Renovis. Calculations 
show that companies founded by Berkeley faculty, graduates, and alumni 
employ over half a million people and have annual revenues over $315 
billion.51 Since 1990, over 145 new ventures have been launched under the 
umbrella of Berkeley’s IP licenses. SkyDeck is Berkeley’s f irst startup ac-
celerator, located in a 10,000 square-foot space. It works with corporate 
partners and has launched over 70 startups.52
Stanford can also pride itself on a fabulous startup history. Eesley 
& Miller (2012) have calculated that almost 40,000 active companies 
are Stanford spinoffs, which together produce annual revenues of $2.7 
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trillion and 5.4 million jobs. Among them are illustrious companies such 
as Hewlett-Packard, Google, Nike, Cisco, Sun, Yahoo, VMware, PayPal, 
LinkedIn, Netflix, and Tesla. The authors conclude that “if these companies 
collectively formed an independent nation, its estimated economy would 
be the world’s 10th largest.” (ibid.: 7). The economic, social, and cultural 
impact of companies started by Stanford faculty, students, and alumni goes 
beyond the imagination. In 2010, the top 150 Silicon Valley companies that 
were Stanford-aff iliated had a total market capitalization of $650 billion 
and sales totaling about $270 billion.53
Both Stanford and Berkeley promote startup founding through a wide 
array of resources, services, and networks: student mentoring and coaching; 
access to funding, patents and IPs; technology licensing; f inancial faculty 
incentives; special entrepreneurship courses; incubators and accelerators; 
extracurricular programs; leadership and team training; strategy and pivot-
ing courses; internships at the Valley’s high-tech corporates; and startup 
innovation and funding competitions (Ester & Maas 2016: 145-154). Berkeley, 
for instance, is known for its Haas School of Business entrepreneurship 
programs and the Fung Institute for Engineering Leadership. Stanford 
excels through its Stanford Technology Ventures Program (STVP), which 
focuses on the acceleration of high-tech entrepreneurship. In these pro-
grams, alumni entrepreneurs always play a major role as mentor and coach 
and also offer student internships.
A closer look at the curricula of the Bay Area higher education institutions 
reveals that developing entrepreneurial skills and a pro-entrepreneurship 
attitude is a structural feature of basically all courses. Creativity, innovation, 
sharing, thinking big, problem solving, and competitiveness are standard 
components of the curriculum. The universities provide a learning and 
experimenting environment in which students are encouraged to start their 
own businesses, to become entrepreneurs. They help them to turn their idea 
into a marketable product and supply them with the necessary resources. 
Bay Area universities (and research labs) show a unique combination of 
academic excellence and entrepreneurship. This double mindset has made 
the area into a highly successful innovation and startup region. It has cre-
ated an entrepreneurial culture that blends both innovation-mindedness 
and innovation valorization, and upstream and downstream innovation.54
Silicon Valley’s rich talent pool is a major competitive advantage and a 
solid pillar of its ecosystem. But the talent pool must be maintained regularly 
in order for high-tech companies and startups to continue prospering in the 
near future. There are serious indications that in view of the drastic budget 
cuts in recent years, the California system of public higher learning needs a 
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signif icant investment upgrade (Public Policy Institute of California 2015; 
Bay Area Council 2012, 2014a, 2016). Its reputation appears to be at stake.
Facilitating government
Many American high-tech entrepreneurs tend to believe that technological 
innovation should be left to free market forces and that government should 
not interfere with their business. The role of government in innovation 
development, they argue, is and should be minimal. In my view, this 
prevalent opinion is based on a myth that needs serious debunking, as it 
is at odds with American innovation and technology policy over the last 
seventy years. The U.S. government has, in fact, played a pivotal role in 
building strong ecosystems such as Silicon Valley. The history of Silicon 
Valley clearly shows that the U.S. government has been a prime mover in 
promoting technological innovation: through massive R&D funding, as 
a f irst customer of innovations, in its regulation of market rules, and in 
its facilitation of high-tech talent. High-tech companies, including new 
ventures, have greatly prof ited from this active government intervention.
World War I led to a spike in the U.S. navy’s demand for more powerful 
radio technology for its war fleet, which spawned the development of more 
reliable and more advanced shipboard transmitters and transmitter stations. 
FTC, a Stanford ‘startup’, was the first Bay Area company to develop vacuum 
tube technology and was awarded large government contracts. It marked 
the start of a flourishing radio technology industry in the region. World War 
II and the Korean War accelerated the demand for high-frequency radar and 
worldwide networks of radio communications systems. The U.S. govern-
ment quickly became the prime contractor for commissioning military 
research and the funder of innovative defense technologies (e.g., microwave 
technology). This burgeoning military demand for high-tech radar and 
communications systems gave a formidable boost to the development of 
the Bay Area’s R&D and led to the founding of pioneering research centers.
The Cold War resulted in an unprecedented technological rivalry 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, leading to a furious Space Race 
between the two power blocs. This prompted the Bay Area to enter a new 
sector of technological innovation: aerospace and missiles. The region 
greatly benefited from the massive government defense spending at the 
height of the Cold War, which helped to create an advanced and highly 
competitive innovation-based ecosystem. Without these unprecedented 
levels of defense expenditure, Silicon Valley would not be what it is today. 
As historian Stuart Leslie (2000: 49) concludes: “For better and for worse, 
Silicon Valley owes its present configuration to patterns of federal spending, 
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corporate strategies, industry-university relationships, and technological 
innovation shaped by the assumptions and priorities of Cold War defense 
policy.”
The technological developments before and early after World War II 
helped to build an innovation infrastructure that became a fertile basis 
for the semiconductor revolution that transformed Silicon Valley into the 
main region in the U.S. for manufacturing silicon devices. This is what gave 
the Valley its name, and this in turn prepared Silicon Valley for the next 
revolution, which gave way to the PC era and, later, the software explosion. 
The Valley became a vibrant place of pioneering technological innovation 
in which universities, high-tech companies, and research centers greatly 
benef ited from the U.S. government as a driving force of innovation. As 
the Bay Area Science & Innovation Consortium Report concludes: “No 
other region in the United States or in the world has more federally funded 
research centers and laboratories.”55 For example, over 80% of Stanford 
University’s more than 5,300 externally sponsored projects (totaling $1.33 
billion in 2014-2015) is funded by federal money.56
The stereotype of a passive U.S. government in the technological domain 
is not justif ied and needs to be demystif ied. It is rhetoric rather than fact. 
The U.S. government did and does play a leading role in the development, 
diffusion, and adoption of technological innovations. Mariana Mazzucato 
convincingly reasons in her book, The Entrepreneurial State, that: “Despite 
the perception of the U.S. as the epitome of private sector-led wealth crea-
tion, in reality it is the State that has been engaged on a massive scale in 
entrepreneurial risk-taking to spur innovation. (…) The insight gained is that 
other than being an entrepreneurial society, a place where it is culturally 
natural to start and grow a business, the U.S. is also a place where the 
State plays an entrepreneurial role, by making investments in radical new 
areas.” (Mazzucato 2014: 73). The Apple iPhone, the iPod, and the iPad, she 
shows, make use of innovative technologies that were funded by federal and 
military U.S. R&D programs. These smart technologies are the products of 
decades of government investments in fundamental and applied innovation 
research.
But the role of the U.S. government goes further than massive funding of 
innovative technologies and R&D. It has also acted as a launching customer 
of technologies and innovations, as a lawmaker, as a simulator of small 
business participation, and as a supplier of visas for foreign workers. Of 
particular importance was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 that regulated the 
transfer of property rights of federally funded research to the university or 
the research laboratory through the design of a uniform patent policy. This 
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new system of property rights spurred the commercialization of new tech-
nologies, innovations, and knowledge that were acquired via government-
funded projects. The 1981 R&D tax credit law helped companies to f inance 
basic research and development activities. The Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program of 1982 was instrumental in supporting SMEs to 
qualify for early-stage funding and to help them through the tough f irst 
stages of the innovation cycle, allowing them to bridge the feared ‘valley 
of death’.
Immigrants play a major role in Silicon Valley’s ecosystem, both as 
startup founders and as high-tech workers. Allocating quotas for immi-
grants was and remains a tricky business and a much debated issue. The 
Hart-Celler Act of 1965 changed the way the U.S. government set quotas from 
one based on an immigrant’s national origin to one that gives preference 
to immigrants with specialized skills and is still intact today. It led to a 
radical increase in the number of talented immigrants, though many Silicon 
Valley entrepreneurs feel that the procedure itself remains a long and often 
frustrating process. Especially H-1B visas (for non-U.S. scientists with a 
‘specialty occupation’) are a source of chagrin among startup founders 
who want to hire foreign specialists, as demand greatly exceeds supply. 
The Trump administration has announced that it would review the quota 
policy as part of its ‘buy American, hire American’ doctrine.
These four examples illustrate that the U.S. federal government has 
played an active role in stimulating innovation and in ‘regulating’ the in-
novation market. It has provided the startup business community with a 
sense of long-term stability and predictability (with the exception of some 
visa regulations). More recently, the Obama administration introduced the 
2012 JOBS (Jumpstart Our Business Startups) Act, which enables startups 
to raise funding among the general public and not just among accredited 
investors. The new law, according to Silicon Valley author Randall Stross 
(2012: 205), demonstrates that “startups, as a category, had become darlings 
in Washington”.
Startup support infrastructure: Accelerators and legal advice
Silicon Valley and networking have always gone hand in hand. Entrepre-
neurship is embedded in a professional regional system of business support 
and counseling. Accelerators are a vital part of this network support system 
because they offer resources to startup teams to build, scale, and grow 
their new venture. These resources (coaching, mentoring, training, fund-
ing, networks) are exactly why accelerators are given such a prominent 
place in my Silicon Valley Innovation and Startup Model. But there are 
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other actors and agencies in the support system that also exist to service 
startups. The Valley’s ecosystem offers access to lawyers, accountants, 
domain experts, and, as described above, angels and VCs, all of whom help 
startup founders to ref ine, develop, and commercialize their business. 
The ecosystem consists of extensive social networks that link startups 
to corporates, investors, talent, (potential) customers, and stakeholders 
(Castilla et al. 2000). Networking by startup founders can create new busi-
ness opportunities, new market venues, new partnerships, and new deals. 
Networking, according to Van Weele (2016), is the main mechanism through 
which accelerators contribute to startup achievement: “Networking enables 
startups to access missing resources, to eff iciently acquire market, business 
and technological knowledge, to gain legitimacy, to overcome challenges in 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem and to raise investments.” (2016: 213). And as 
I outline in the next section, networking also has a cultural component: it 
is part of the Valley’s entrepreneurial spirit, its social mindset, its business 
mind.
Law f irms play a distinct role in the Valley’s startup economy and 
network support system. Unlike mainstream European law practices, 
they not only offer legal expertise on how to start a new venture but also 
provide tailor-made business advice. Law f irms assist startups in their 
early-stage business development by opening doors to investors, corporate 
stakeholders, and possible partners. They offer contacts and introductions 
that startup founders need. “It is often a lawyer’s ability to make a key intro-
duction to a potential source of funds or corporate partner that a beginning 
entrepreneur values most.” (Johnson 2000: 327). Law firms first and foremost 
help startups with the legal paperwork and technicalities that setting up a 
new venture entails, but their role is much broader in assisting beginning 
entrepreneurs. Their advice may concern startup structure, management 
issues, team formation, f inancing, staff hiring, business strategy and proof 
of concept, stock ownership, patents, tax matters, etc. Lawyers help startup 
founders in addressing dilemmas and pitfalls typically encountered by 
new ventures. In this sense, they are more business advisers than legal 
consultants. According to sociologist Mark Suchman (2000), Silicon Valley 
lawyers serve as dealmakers, counselors, gatekeepers, proselytizers, and 
matchmakers. They are a startup’s consigliere.57 And the legal market is 
sizeable in Silicon Valley. Weinberg & Heine (2014) have calculated that 
there are over 400 law f irms and nearly 3,000 attorneys in Palo Alto alone 
(roughly one lawyer per twenty residents).
An interesting feature of the active involvement of Silicon Valley lawyers 
in mentoring startup teams is that they often work on the basis of the 
58 AccelerAtorS in Silicon VAlley: Building SucceSSful StArtupS 
pay-it-forward principle: billing is postponed until startup revenues come in, 
or law f irms (and sometimes individual lawyers) may take stock ownership 
in lieu of payment.58 Such deferred fee arrangements relieve startups in their 
f inancially most precarious phase: early-stage development and the ‘valley 
of death’ phase in which revenues are still insuff icient to cover costs. This 
payment flexibility means that startups are not deprived of the legal advice 
they need when launching their new business.
There is a f ine line between legal advice, business advice, and entrepre-
neurship, and as a result, roles often overlap. European law f irms generally 
feel more comfortable with a stricter role def inition that separates legal 
advice from business counseling, and indeed, national legislation in Europe 
often requires just such a role distinction. Ethical issues may be at stake as 
well, such as conflicting interests between independent legal advice and 
private benefits.59 Lawyers in the Silicon Valley startup ecosystem pursue a 
broader, more entrepreneurship-based role – a professional self-def inition 
that has made them influential.
As will become clear in the following chapters, accelerators also have a 
key position in the Silicon Valley network support system, as their mission is 
to gear up startup teams for launching their new venture in the marketplace 
and for growing traction and customer reach. Having gone through a high-
profile, influential accelerator program provides a startup with credibility 
and goodwill. And above all: with good funding prospects.
The macro level: Culture, culture, culture
Silicon Valley has an amazing innovation ecosystem that is based on a 
number of powerful institutions, as I have outlined in this chapter. But this 
is only part of the success narrative. Equally important is that the Valley is 
characterized by a shared culture that embraces innovation and applauds 
entrepreneurship – a culture that has inspired generations of startup found-
ers who have combined passion and ambition to create some of the world’s 
most imaginative high-tech companies. The Valley has a pulsating startup 
culture and business community that has a magic appeal to new venture 
founders. Newcomers to the area can almost feel the vibe, the stream of 
positive energy blended with a can-do mentality. To a certain degree, this 
reflects the typical American West Coast frontier state of mind, but the 
Valley appears to magnify this cultural temperament.
The open communication mode and the willingness to share ideas and 
innovations are among the most striking cultural traits of Silicon Valley’s 
startup community. It always fascinates me how frankly startup founders 
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talk about their new business concept: the product, underlying technology, 
business model, market potential, investors, growth challenges, strengths 
and weaknesses of their startup, etc. There seems to be no fear of giving away 
business ‘secrets’. This open attitude is one that many European observers 
f ind diff icult to understand but usually greatly admire. Startup founders 
are willing to share their business idea but in return expect feedback, even 
when their idea is in a very embryonic and vulnerable stage. Sharing can 
strengthen your own ideas – this seems to be the prevailing cultural mes-
sage. You do not ‘sit’ on your business concept, as the mainstream European 
response tends to be, fearing that competitors might run off with your idea.
This open communication style is refreshing: it activates innovation 
feedback, generates new leads, and triggers self-reflection and learning. 
As Chong Moon-Lee and his co-authors observe: “The prevailing business 
philosophy promotes openness, learning, sharing of information, the 
co-evolution of ideas, f lexibility, mutual feedback, and fast responses to 
opportunities and challenges.”60 Networking is an essential part of this 
welcoming business philosophy, as new contacts may produce new business 
prospects. Everybody is willing to grant you time, even if it is only f ive 
minutes, to outline your startup business idea. It is one of the most pleasing 
qualities of the Valley’s business culture.
The entrepreneurial attitude that colors the micro-level of startup crea-
tion discussed earlier in this chapter mirrors the culture of Silicon Valley 
entrepreneurship at the aggregate level, a culture that emphasizes the need 
to think big, to launch disruptive technologies, to change the world, and to 
go for moonshots (projects that address a huge problem, propose a radical 
solution, and use breakthrough technology). In the Valley, one encounters 
grand cultural narratives articulated in grand Silicon Valley jargon. One of 
the most spectacular examples is Elon Musk’s plan to colonize Mars and 
turn the human race into a multi-planetary species – an incredible business 
adventure that is beyond the human imagination but an adventure that 
his company SpaceX is nonetheless seriously working on. Its mission is “to 
revolutionize space technology with the ultimate goal of enabling people 
to live on other planets.”61 This is thinking big to the max.
Risk-taking and the tolerance of failure are among the most def ining 
features of Silicon Valley’s business culture, which directly impact the 
startup economy. Risk proneness is seen as a positive trait that makes 
up the psychological core of entrepreneurial thinking and acting. The 
prevailing maxim is: no risk, no glory. The acceptance of failure is another 
compelling Silicon Valley cultural phenomenon. Startup founders who fail 
are not confronted with the common negative stereotypes that often mark 
60 AccelerAtorS in Silicon VAlley: Building SucceSSful StArtupS 
the European reaction towards new venture failure and bankruptcy. The 
stigmatization of starting entrepreneurs who fail is not part of the Valley’s 
business culture.62 Entrepreneurs frankly discuss why their startup was 
unsuccessful and the lessons they learned for building a new venture.63 
A failed startup is a meaningful learning experience, and VCs even favor 
startup entrepreneurs who have prior experience with a startup that did 
not make it. Failure, of course, remains a painful event and is not admired 
for its own sake. As Reid Hoffman, LinkedIn’s co-founder, noted: “We don’t 
celebrate failure in Silicon Valley. We celebrate learning.” Startup failure in 
Silicon Valley does not equal personal failure. The fact that the tolerance 
of failure is high also adds to a business climate that is optimistic and 
self-confident. It has to be underlined that, unlike most European countries, 
U.S. legislation (e.g., bankruptcy laws, limited partnerships) is such that it 
limits personal liability for startup founders and their investors. It is easier 
to close down a company. Studies indicate that more lenient bankruptcy 
laws positively affect self-employment as well as f irm entry and exit rates 
(Armour & Cumming 2008; Fan & White 2003; Cerqueiro et al. 2017).
Silicon Valley’s business economy never stops; it runs 24/7. Its work 
attitude is unmatched. Building a startup requires unconditional atten-
tion and permanent availability, as you must develop products that will 
shake markets, f ind new customers, pivot, address the many problems that 
startups have to face, and stay ahead of the competition. The drive to excel 
pervades the Valley’s startup community and creates a business culture of 
passionate and committed entrepreneurship. Hard work, perseverance, and 
giving your all are the rule for both startup founders and their employees. It 
is a work culture characterized by an all-or-nothing attitude. Heated debates 
on work-life balance are rare. Complaining about long hours is ‘uncool’; 
building a startup is not a picnic. Startup stress is def initely prevalent in 
Silicon Valley, but it is not a conversation topic. Yu-Kuan Lin, co-founder of 
Everyday.me and a Y Combinator graduate, once said: “Nothing prepares 
you for founding a startup besides founding a startup.” (Deering 2014: 137).
But even all the hard work in the world cannot prevent the fact that most 
startups fail, even in Silicon Valley. CB Insights (2014) investigated the main 
reasons for startup failure by analyzing data from over 100 startup failure 
post-mortems. The top seven causes, in descending order, are: no market 
need for product, running out of cash, wrong team, being outcompeted, 
pricing/cost issues, poor product, or lack of a business model.64 “Fail fast, 
fail often” is a much-heard Silicon Valley aphorism that refers to the need 
for timely startup closing in order to avoid what VCs call ‘the walking dead’: 
startups that go on too long without any serious revenue.
innoVAtion And StArtupS in Silicon VAlley 61
Diversity is a cherished goal in Silicon Valley. It is believed that a highly 
diverse workforce in terms of ethnicity, gender, and nationality is good for 
innovation. It brings multiple perspectives, challenging viewpoints, out-of-
the-box thinking, and global frames of reference, and it broadens the talent 
pool. High-tech companies operate worldwide and therefore need a diverse 
workforce to understand and service global customers (Hunt et al. 2015). 
Though the big high-tech Silicon Valley corporations nourish the ideal of 
diversity, their workforces still show considerable ethnic and gender biases 
(Ester & Maas 2016: 125-129). There is still a world to win: African-Americans, 
Latinos, and women are underrepresented, while whites and Asians are 
overrepresented.
A clear diversity asset of the Valley is the number of highly successful 
immigrant entrepreneurs. One out of two new ventures in Silicon Valley 
is started by immigrants, which is twice as high as the U.S. average. The 
total market capitalization of venture-backed U.S. companies founded by 
immigrants totals $900 billion, and they employ about 600,000 people.65
Culture matters in Silicon Valley. It is a determining factor in explain-
ing why the region thrives on innovation and entrepreneurship, why it 
succeeded in becoming and remaining a global paradise for high-tech 
startups. Silicon Valley’s ecosystem flourishes because it is backed by a 
cultural mindset that is highly competitive, willing to take risks, passionate 
about entrepreneurship, achievement-oriented, and driven by the need to 
make a difference in the world. Accelerators, as I will show in the following 
chapters, explicitly address the importance of working on a startup mindset 
that matches the Silicon Valley way of thinking and takes advantage of its 
omnipresent entrepreneurial culture.
In this chapter, I have analyzed Silicon Valley’s ecosystem and the way it 
perpetuates innovation and feeds startup creation. Understanding this 
ecosystem is necessary for comprehending the role of accelerators in the 
Valley. It provides the bigger picture that is necessary for assessing how 
accelerators empower startup teams to build and grow their new businesses.

3 Unique Selling Points
Accelerator Philosophy, Business Model, and Cooperation
I start my analysis of the 23 accelerators that I interviewed by examining 
their founders’ core philosophy on coaching startups and helping them 
scale and grow, the variety in the scope and focus of accelerators’ programs, 
their business model, and the way they collaborate with external partners 
in Silicon Valley. Some accelerators, as we will see, have a general scope, 
whereas others focus on specif ic technologies or niche markets. Some 
accelerators accept large numbers of startups, whereas others prefer to be 
small. This difference in focus and size corresponds with differences in 
accelerator coaching programs. It also relates to two distinct accelerator 
business models: prof it versus non-profit objectives.
To help us in analyzing the data in this study, I make a distinction 
between two types of accelerators. The f irst consists of general/low-touch 
accelerators that are quite large, cover a wide range of technologies, and offer 
cohort-based programs. The other type comprises specialized/high-touch 
accelerators that operate in distinct markets and coach a limited number 
of startup teams but on a very intensive basis. It must be emphasized that 
“low-touch” is meant in a relative sense – i.e., compared to the intensive, 
personalized, and longer coaching period of high-touch accelerators. This 
distinction is similar to the four accelerator types mentioned by CBIA (2016). 
The CBIA study developed an accelerator matrix with two axes – focus and 
resources – which results in four accelerator types: intense/general; intense/
focused; light/general; light/focused. The general vs. focused dimension 
refers to the nature of the accelerator’s technology domain, whereas the 
intense vs. light dimension addresses the magnitude of the accelerator’s 
support resources.
But f irst we must look at what separates an incubator from an accelerator. 
I posed this question to my sample of accelerator executives.
Incubators versus accelerators
In the f irst chapter I outlined a number of criteria that conceptually dif-
ferentiate accelerators from incubators: entry, duration, funding, program 
intensity, teams, culture, and cohorts. It was emphasized that these 
differences are gradual, and that in practice incubators and accelerators 
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show considerable overlap (Bay Area Council Economic Institute 2016). 
In fact, one may even argue that accelerators are advanced, next-phase 
incubators. The two growth models are ideal types – theoretical construc-
tions – that cannot be observed in their purest form. Reality, as I will show, 
demonstrates less robustness and more heterogeneity. Several accelerator 
executives accentuate this variance in growth model functions and op-
tions, though elementary differences are clearly recognized. A majority 
of executives point out that incubators focus on very early-stage business 
ideas, whereas the primary goal of accelerators is to grow new ventures that 
already have a product, a business model, and even some traction. As Prem 
Talreja, vice president of marketing at The Fabric, explains: “Incubators 
offer limited but essential support: a little amount of money, off ice space, 
and infrastructure. It’s like a hotel. (…) Accelerators help you succeed by 
putting in management support, by giving you access to customers, by 
creating events where customers come in, and get yourself exposed to the 
marketplace. (…) They have a venture arm.” Harm TenHoff, founder and 
CEO of BayLink (Santa Clara), reiterates this point: “The term incubator is 
much older than the term accelerator. An incubator is about very early-stage 
companies or propositions: sometimes there even is no company yet, but just 
an idea. An accelerator is about companies that have a product, a beginning 
of a market, but want to accelerate and expand their market.” This is further 
corroborated by Cindy Klein-Marmer, associate director of the Babson 
College Butler Venture Accelerator Program: “I think in essence you tend to 
incubate ideas when they are earlier stage and accelerate something that is 
already up and running.” Naomi Kokubo, co-founder and COO of Founders 
Space, agrees: “An incubator helps teams to redefine their business idea into 
a real product; an accelerator helps startups to grow their business and bring 
it to the next step. (…) But a lot of people don’t strictly go by this definition.”
Quite a number of respondents believe that incubators are f irst and 
foremost real-estate-based startup facilitators, whereas accelerators go 
much further in their support services. Prashant Shah, managing director 
of TiE LaunchPad, explains: “The primary motivation of incubators early on 
was to rent or lease off ice space by the desk, by the cubical. They may offer 
value-added services, such as access to mentors, investors, and customers. 
But those are all value-added above and beyond the fact that they are getting 
rent. Accelerators are not necessarily real estate based. They often provide 
office space for free for their program participants. Most of them are making 
money by equity or by a mandatory fee.”
Most executives use the terms ‘incubator’ and ‘accelerator’ rather loosely. 
As Brian Hoffman, vice president of revenue and director of legal affairs of 
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StartX, points out: “The two words have kind of lost meaning. Originally, an 
incubator is more ideation trying to f ind f it. An accelerator is a little further 
down the pipeline: companies already have a business idea, they are looking 
to scale the idea.” Sean Randolph, Silicon Valley expert and senior director 
of the Bay Area Council Economic Institute, adds that both terms are often 
used interchangeably and lack clear descriptions. Sean defines incubators 
as: “The place for very early-stage companies, typically providing some kind 
of space or facilities, and maybe some mentoring. Accelerators are more 
often a notch or two more advanced in terms of a resident company’s stage 
development. There may be some kind of direct investment, in return for 
equity. The level of service may also be more advanced, with more specif ic 
advice and support on market development for the company’s products, 
and possibly introductions to investors.” Matt Walters, former CEO of the 
Runway incubator, feels that incubators and accelerators “overlap quite a 
bit”. He notes that: “One of the core differences is that accelerators usually 
have set a def ined period of time in which they are running programs. 
Three months is more or less the standard. The other thing is we [Runway] 
are not providing any investment for the companies who are with us, while 
an accelerator usually comes with an investment.”66
Accelerators are closer to commercialization and to bringing a startup’s 
product to market. But accelerator mentor and Silicon Valley expert Susan 
Lucas-Conwell believes that “the lines have really blurred. (…) I would 
say that the only distinction to be made is that you don’t generally have 
incubators with no off ice space.” Gary Coover, head of global operations at 
Samsung NEXT, has his own take on the subject: “Truthfully, I think that 
the distinction between the two has been so convoluted, not just here in the 
Valley but in all ecosystems, that the issue no longer matters. You can call 
us an incubator, you can call us a seed fund, you can call us an accelerator, 
it doesn’t really matter. What matters is the value we provide to startups 
beyond investment dollars.”
Core philosophy and focus
What differentiates Silicon Valley accelerators in terms of their mission 
and target technology? There is a clear distinction between prof it and 
not-for-profit accelerators. The primary goal of the f irst group is to grow 
startup companies for investment purposes, and taking equity in promis-
ing new ventures is a dominant acquisition strategy. The second group of 
accelerators are primarily mission-driven and typically focus on creating 
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societal value. The profit-driven larger accelerators are generally based on a 
high-volume/low-touch business model, while mission-driven accelerators 
tend to be smaller. It has to be added, however, that the reverse logic does 
not apply: quite a number of smaller accelerators are profit-driven as well, 
particularly those that focus on specif ic technologies. Consequently, the 
general/low-touch and specialized/high-touch dichotomy does not coincide 
with this distinction between profit and non-profit business models.
Let’s f irst examine the larger, general/low-touch commercial accelerators. 
Plug and Play is a large accelerator, based in Sunnyvale. It houses about 400 
startups and offers three-month business development programs. Plug and 
Play is a general accelerator but focuses on several ‘verticals’ (i.e. targeting 
a specif ic industry, trade or customer type) such as f inancial technology, 
retail, health & wellness, new materials, mobility, food, insurance, the 
Internet of things, supply chain & logistics, sustainability, and travel and 
hospitality. Saeed Amidi, Plug and Play’s founder and CEO, had a clear vision 
when he started his accelerator: “It is an investment vehicle. I get a chance 
to meet all these startups and I may have a chance to invest there. The next 
Google, the next PayPal, the next big thing. Our primary goal is to invest 
in promising startups. I would say that is 90% of our focus.” Saeed truly 
believes in the power and impact of technology: “I feel that innovation and 
disruption are going to radically change the industrial world, the corporate 
world, banking, insurance, automobile industry, the retail industry, etc.”
500 Startups, another large commercial accelerator, strives for fast 
startup growth through its four-month seed programs. Partner Elizabeth 
Yin explains: “We’re trying to scale venture capital. This is something that I 
don’t think anybody has done before. A traditional VC might invest in maybe 
ten companies a year and the f irm is relatively small. We’re investing in 
hundreds of startups around the globe on all six continents, and we have 
over a hundred people who work here at 500 Startups. Our focus is growth 
acceleration of startups in a slightly later seed stage. We’re teaching them 
about how to optimize their customer acquisition and how to raise funds.” 
500 Startups is a general accelerator as well, taking on startups in areas 
ranging from consumer commerce to food technology, from cloud services 
to education, from f inancial technology to the Internet of things/drones/
hardware.
The Alchemist Accelerator (San Francisco) is centered on growing start-
ups that earn their revenues from enterprises rather than consumers – both 
business to business (B2B) and business to business to consumer (B2B2C). 
COO and partner Danielle D’Agostaro explains: “We built Alchemist around 
accelerating the sales process and the fundraising process because that’s 
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what it’s going to take in order to get an enterprise company to scale.” The 
Alchemist is deliberately sector-agnostic. As Danielle clarif ies: “Because we 
are so broad in enterprise, we get startups that are building technologies in 
all realms, including space, quantum computers, rockets, human genome. 
Along with the software and the hardware and drones and computer vision, 
the possibilities are really endless, and we f ind that actually really exciting 
because we get a wide breadth of founders that come through here.”
Naomi Kokubo of Founders Space (San Francisco) needs just a few words 
to summarize her accelerator’s unique selling point: “The international 
scope and the strong educational focus.” She continues: “A lot of accelerators 
wait for startups to come to Silicon Valley because the Valley is a magnet, 
people come from everywhere. We have a different philosophy, we partner 
with governments, universities, tech centers and other organizations in 
China, Korea, Taiwan, Europe, and they like to send their startups over here.”
TiE LaunchPad, a general B2B accelerator based in Sunnyvale, is linked 
to TiE, which is a well-known mentoring and networking organization in 
Silicon Valley. In its earlier years, the primary focus of TiE was on empower-
ing Southeast Asian immigrants to help them launch businesses of their 
own. Prashant Shah elucidates: “To support people from India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan to help them become better entrepreneurs, to become accepted 
Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. It started as a mentorship driven kind of 
organization, non-prof it, and the model just exploded.” Given the great 
number of Asian entrepreneurs and companies in the Valley, it def initely 
appears that TiE’s mission has succeeded. As Prashant proudly concludes: 
“It has been a phenomenal success.” Now, membership in TiE’s accelerator 
program is more open, and it no longer focuses exclusively on Southeast 
Asian founders. TiE LaunchPad started in 2014 as an accelerator within TiE 
as a way to formalize funding, mentoring, and workshops in a format that 
today’s entrepreneurs are familiar with. I asked Prashant what the secret 
of LaunchPad’s accelerator formula is: “We provide this deep mentorship, 
deep access into the entire ecosystem, deep access to all of these execu-
tives in our organization and have them help us help these companies. 
The cornerstone of our philosophy is that entrepreneurship is a great way 
of actually creating wealth.”
HAX is a San Francisco hardware accelerator. Cyril Ebersweiler, the 
founder and managing director of HAX, has an interesting perspective. He 
does not applaud the Silicon Valley mantra on failure – on the contrary: “For 
me, an accelerator is the exact opposite. Nine out of ten startups should suc-
ceed. Why would you build something that just doesn’t get you to market? 
At HAX, the goal is to get a hundred percent of the products go to market 
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and we have 200 startups. We have reduced the part of shipping failure to 
close to nothing. We are well on our way to revolutionizing venture capital.” 
HAX is focused on the consumer hardware space, but also B2B and robotics.
BootUP (Menlo Park) developed an almost holistic vision on what a 
good accelerator should be. As co-founder and partner Marco Ten Vaanholt 
explains: “We started BootUP to create a micro-ecosystem around entrepre-
neurialism. We believe that entrepreneurialism transcends race, religion, 
color of skin, and is the only way to avoid wars and to create prosperity. 
Our intent is to create a repeatable ecosystem that we can apply not only in 
Silicon Valley but also abroad. The idea is to elevate entrepreneurialism as 
a whole and that’s why we started it.” BootUP is a commercial venture, but 
its mission goes deeper than that. As Marco points out: “All of the partners 
in BootUP have done favorably well, they are well off, and we feel it is time 
to give back; that is one of the basic drivers. Our time to give back is really 
about trying to elevate our learning and help startups and scale-ups to go to 
the next stage.” BootUP attracts startups from various sectors but tends to 
focus on new energy software, new generation aerospace big data, medical 
technology, and next-generation communications. As will be shown in 
the next chapter, BootUP creates its micro-ecosystem through a variety of 
services which are all about “reducing the risk of failure and improving the 
success rates of startups. That’s the core philosophy at BootUP.”
Samsung NEXT Start – which was previously called the Samsung Ac-
celerator – invests in seed-stage startups and entrepreneurs-in-residence. It 
offers co-located spaces with funding, expertise, mentoring, and access to a 
growing alumni community. It is most similar to a corporate accelerator but 
has multiple models available to support founders and startups in achieving 
the perfect product-market f it. NEXT Start has offices in San Francisco, New 
York, and Tel Aviv. It is looking for software startups that develop innovative 
technologies in the f ield of augmented reality/virtual reality, the Internet 
of things, mobility (connected car, drones), data and analytics, machine 
learning and artif icial intelligence, mobile health, payments, and smart 
cities. And NEXT Start is all about scaling and driving entrepreneurial 
excellence. As Gary Coover emphasizes: “We really focus on recruiting 
experienced founders and bringing them the best resources Samsung has 
to offer. We bring them unparalleled access to the ecosystem and the assets 
that help them scale and help them achieve their goals.” In many cases, this 
is measured by helping a seed-stage startup get into a series A and beyond. 
Gary adds: “We also have an in-residence program where we will internally 
incubate startups either acquired by a Samsung business unit or spun out.”
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What about the core philosophy of the two university-linked accelerators, 
StartX and the Babson College Accelerator? StartX (Palo Alto) began as an 
initiative of Stanford students and recent alumni to create a central place 
on Stanford campus where starting entrepreneurs could get quick and 
trusted advice with respect to all sorts of new business challenges – where 
people in the Stanford ecosystem – students, faculty, alumni – could turn 
to in trying to scale their business, f ind product-market f it, raise money. A 
place where they could go for help,” as Brian Hoffman puts it. Brian explains 
that StartX is all about pooling people and matchmaking between Stanford 
startup entrepreneurs and Stanford experts and mentors. “Our philosophy 
is to collect the best people from the Stanford ecosystem and bring them 
in, identify who is very good at what, and match them with our startup 
founder teams.”
The Babson College accelerator focuses on supporting students and 
alumni to build, launch, and grow their business. It is based on a long tradi-
tion, as Babson is one of the best U.S. colleges teaching entrepreneurship 
and has been so for many years. Says Cindy Klein-Marmer: “Most students 
come to Babson because of an interest in entrepreneurship. A lot of students 
start a small business. Our main goal is to help them scale. Our program 
is on traction, on sales and marketing, on spirit and passion.” The Babson 
accelerator targets both technology and industry indifferent startups can 
be both high-tech and low-tech.
The smaller, for-profit specialized accelerators have a different invest-
ment logic. They focus on coaching a (very) limited number of promising 
startups and bringing them to market. Usually the focus is on domain-
specif ic technologies, and mentor programs tend to be very intense and 
hands on. They generally do not work with cohorts or batches. The Hive, the 
Palo Alto-based co-creation studio, is a good example. T.M. Ravi, The Hive’s 
co-founder and managing director, frames mainstream general large-scale 
accelerators as follows: “They tend to be high-volume, they have classes of 
large numbers of startups, they tend to put in small amounts of money in 
these companies, they give them space, they give them tools, teach them 
entrepreneurship, and they are out in a few months. They are best suited 
for budding entrepreneurs in the consumer space.” Ravi had a different 
concept for his accelerator: “The Hive is a venture studio which is low-
volume; we do four to f ive startups a year. We’re high-touch, we are very, 
very actively operationally involved with our companies. The Hive works 
with these companies to bring them to the next stage, not just by giving 
them money, but helping them f ine-tune their business idea, helping put 
the team together, building early customers and partners, and getting them 
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to the next round of f inancing, which is typically a series A round.” The 
Hive’s startups focus on specif ic technologies that are for the most part AI, 
context computing, autonomous agents, ambient intelligence, blockchain, 
enterprise, IoT, security, and f inancial services.
The Fabric (Mountain View), is another example of a specialized/high-
touch accelerator approach. Its particular interest is in infrastructure and 
networking technologies. According to Prem Talreja: “We’re not creating 
the next Airbnb, we’re not creating the next Facebook, we are helping cre-
ate companies that will transform the data center infrastructure. (…) We 
help six or seven companies flourish under our thinking; that’s really what 
The Fabric is about. We don’t just fund companies, we collaborate with 
entrepreneurs to co-create them.”
Tandem, a smaller, for-prof it accelerator, located in Burlingame, was 
founded by a couple of successful former entrepreneurs who get satisfaction 
out of coaching and investing in startups. Managing partner Sunil Bhargava 
recounts the story of how Tandem started. “I’d done a couple of startups, I 
just sold my last company and I was kind of wondering what to do. I didn’t 
really want to found another startup, because of family reasons, my kids 
were still young. So, initially I thought I’ll take a year or two off and just 
be an angel investor and advisor. I tried that for three or four months and 
I found that it wasn’t very gratifying. I think when you don’t have enough 
time or money in a startup, you tend to treat it as a part-time job and you 
are not really understanding the early chaotic stages of a new venture. I 
wanted to be more deeply involved in startups but I didn’t want to be a 
founder.” Tandem focuses on mobile applications. Sunil puts Tandem’s 
strength down to the following: “We basically work with our companies 
and we enjoy that process. We help them with the most important thing: 
getting traction. Each Tandem partner becomes a champion of the startups 
we coach. We mutually inject each other with our enthusiasm.”
These three smaller, for-profit accelerators have in common that they 
focus on specif ic technological domains (artif icial intelligence, mobile, 
cloud infrastructure), whereas the core philosophy of the next four smaller 
accelerators I will discuss focuses on particular target groups and problem 
areas. I refer to these two groups of low-volume/high-touch accelerators as 
domain-specif ic accelerators and niche accelerators, respectively.
Women’s Startup Lab (Menlo Park) is a niche accelerator with a very 
outspoken mission: to empower female founders and to create strong 
startups that make a difference in the world. As founder and CEO Ari 
Horie states: “Our bigger goal is to make the world a better place with 
women leaders influencing through technology advancement. We need 
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female leaders to shape the world. There is so much need for women 
to be part of technology growth and opportunities, to make a positive 
impact by driving a scalable, ethical, and sustainable business world. 
Not having women participating is like reaching our business potential 
only halfway.” Women’s Startup Lab has an interesting philosophy: “We 
focus on the entire founder’s growth and collaborative mindset, what we 
call ‘hitology’. It’s about the founder, the founder’s performance, and the 
startup’s growth through community and collaboration. Our program is 
very person-centered.” She def ines hitology – derived from the Japanese 
concept of ‘hito’ (meaning ‘human’) – as people supporting and holding 
each other accountable for extraordinary results. Women’s Startup Lab 
is not only about accelerating the startup’s core business but also about 
transforming the startup’s founder herself.
Powerhouse is an Oakland-based niche accelerator that aims to grow 
solar energy startups and help them to go to market. Co-founder and CEO 
Emily Kirsch has a clear Silicon-Valley-style vision for Powerhouse: “Our 
philosophy is that solar will become the most abundant and affordable 
resource in the world in our lifetime. Our mission is to make solar the 
go-to energy source for everyone in the world.” Big thinking, that’s for sure. 
Powerhouse is mission-driven “but for-profit,” as Emily adds.
Imagine H2O, San Francisco, another niche accelerator, is mission-driven 
too but non-profit. Its objective is to turn water challenges into opportunities 
and to offer promising water entrepreneurs and startups a path to market 
and an opportunity to scale their businesses. Its USP is that it operates 
as a virtual network accelerator with online remote mentoring as well as 
some physical interaction. Tom Ferguson, vice president of programming, 
explains to me that “network is everything in the water industry, and we 
have the networks. We have a solid understanding of the vagaries of the 
industry itself, we know the stakeholders and they know us.”
Cleantech Open is a non-prof it niche accelerator focused on growing 
early-stage startup companies that offer solutions to environmental and 
energy problems. Its ambitious mission, as executive director Ian Foraker 
puts it is: “To f ind, fund, and foster the most promising cleantech startups 
on the planet.” Cleantech Open operates globally; in the U.S. it works with 
a mentor and support force of over 2,000 volunteers who implement the 
coaching program. Ian defines its unique selling point as follows: “We have 
a very clear focus: clean technology. We have a community that we have 
built over ten years, a lot of great people are in our network. We have a 
very robust network, connected with leading organizations, and leading 
social professions.”
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Accelerator platforms are slightly different from accelerators in that they 
are platforms that help startups to grow by offering co-working space and 
a community of practice and peers. In this study, I interviewed people at 
f ive accelerator platforms: Runway, GSVlabs, Prospect Silicon Valley, Hacker 
Dojo, and RocketSpace.
Runway is a co-working space and accelerator for high-growth startups 
that is housed in the San Francisco Twitter building. Its primary goal and 
philosophy according to former managing director Matt Walters is as 
follows: “We want to create a community of startups, we want them to 
collaborate, we want to engage with them. When it’s done authentically it 
creates great results.” Starting a new business is natural to this generation 
of young people, Matt observes: “Especially here in Silicon Valley it’s almost 
peer pressure, like ‘if you are not starting a company, what is wrong with 
you?’”.
GSVlabs is a co-working space based in Redwood City. CEO Marlon Evans 
explains its unique selling point as follows: “Our niche is focusing on seed 
to series A companies. The majority of our companies can stay here for 
12 months, they can stay for 18 months. It’s not cyclical. And we have real 
focus on subject matter expertise across our verticals. We look at mobile, 
big data, education technology, sustainability, and entertainment.”
Prospect Silicon Valley, San Jose, describes itself as a non-profit demon-
stration center and innovation hub specialized in promoting the adoption 
of practical solutions to mobility, transportation, energy, and the built 
environment. Founder and former CEO Doug Davenport describes what 
differentiates Prospect Silicon Valley from other accelerators: “Our unique 
approach is in assisting startups that are trying to solve a practical problem 
to link with the stakeholders in that very problem area, both in the public 
sector and corporate agencies.” This stakeholder approach is interesting 
because it creates a distinct focus. As Doug explains: “We are focused on 
markets where the customer is a cloud of various interests, relationships, 
roles that are being played by various stakeholders. We navigate out startups 
through this stakeholder system and partner network so they can give 
them their f irst real demonstration which can possibly give them their 
f irst customer.”
Hacker Dojo did not start as the co-working space it is has become; it was 
much more loosely and informally “organized”. As executive director Jun 
Wong clarif ies: “It was really just a place where like-minded people, mostly 
software developers working at various companies in Silicon Valley met 
together after work. Over time, makers, hardware enthusiasts, and startups 
discovered they could hack the system and use us as the most affordable 
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co-working space in the Valley.” In 2016, Hacker Dojo moved to its present 
location in Santa Clara where it rents a 16,600 square-foot community center 
and hacker space. It is non-profit and wants to stays that way: “Silicon Valley 
becomes more and more expensive to live. The ability to incubate things 
becomes quite expensive and so Hacker Dojo does provide one of the only 
places where you can have workspace at a really affordable price. We want 
to be as affordable as possible to the public.” Jun’s point of view is quite 
uncommon in an area where money rules and where the cost of living is 
one of the highest in the world.
RocketSpace is a large and well-known co-working campus in San 
Francisco. Duncan Logan, the founder and CEO, articulates what makes 
RocketSpace special: “I think the difference at RocketSpace is that everyone 
here is so deadly serious about building a billion-dollar company. We want 
to create a really brilliant environment for entrepreneurs to succeed. We’re 
kind of co-working on steroids.” Duncan developed a ‘disruptive’ philosophy 
on letting startups into RocketSpace: “It was one of the f irst co-working 
spaces that had a selection process. And the harder we selected, so the more 
exclusive we became, the more people wanted to be here.”
The analysis above clearly shows the main differences between ac-
celerators in how they def ine their core philosophy, their focus, and their 
unique selling points. A main taxonomic difference is whether accelerators 
are technology-agnostic – i.e., not focused on a particular technological 
domain – or concentrate on tracing high potentials in specif ic techno-
logical domains. But even the larger, more general accelerators use some 
segmentation format, for example by introducing verticals. The smaller 
accelerators typically focus on particular markets corresponding to specific 
technological or societal problems. These smaller, domain-specific accelera-
tors and niche accelerators are the ones in which executive team members 
signif icantly invest in hands-on coaching of admitted startups, personally 
working with them to bring them to the next level.
Business model
Accelerators differ in their business purpose, the venture achievements they 
seek, their scaling philosophy, and their investment goals. Most accelera-
tors are for-profit, but some are non-profit, mission-driven organizations. 
But they all share the determination to scale and grow startups and bring 
them to an advanced stage. In this section, I examine the various business 
models Silicon Valley accelerators are based on, particularly regarding their 
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investment strategy, equity policy, and startup numbers, in order to provide 
insight into the way these accelerators operate from a business point of 
view. How much do they invest in the startups they admit? Do they take 
equity, and if so, how much? Are they backed by a venture fund? What are 
the business metrics they look for? The statistics that will be mentioned are 
from the executive interviews and from the accelerators’ websites.
500 Startups is one of the largest general accelerators in Silicon Valley 
and is based in Mountain View and San Francisco. It has invested in over 
1,800 startups and more than 3,000 founders from over 60 countries. It 
manages over $250 million in assets. How much does 500 Startups invest 
in its companies? Partner Elizabeth Yin: “Technically, we invest $150,000 in 
each accelerated company but we do hold back $37,500 dollars for fees – to 
pay for the off ice, to pay for the coaches, to pay for mentorship, etc.” Startup 
500 offers the $150,000 gross investment for 6% equity.
Plug and Play’s business model is also based on high volume. It is probably 
the world’s largest accelerator with over 20 locations worldwide. Plug and 
Play has accelerated more than 2,000 startups since 2006, from pre-product 
to series A. Investments range from $25,000 to $500,000; equity varies but 
is typically about 5%. It claims that its startup companies combined have 
raised over $5 billion in additional funding. Plug and Play is all about return 
on investment, about picking winners at an early stage. CEO Saeed Amidi: 
“Last year I invested in 160 companies. Our business model is to invest in 
startups like Dropbox when it was only two people, Lending Club when it 
was two people.” Both post-unicorn startups became tremendously suc-
cessful companies. These are the kinds of investment darlings that Plug 
and Play is looking for.
The Alchemist Accelerator is dedicated to enterprise startups and 
seeds about 40-50 new ventures per year. It is backed by investors such 
as Cisco, Draper Fisher Jurvetson, Foundation Capital, Khosla Ventures, 
Siemens, and Salesforce.com. Since late 2014, 30 of its companies have 
raised on average $2 million, and 12 of its companies have been acquired. 
Danielle D’Agostaro explains the Alchemist’s investment policy: “We 
give about $60K to our startups from which they pay a tuition of around 
$24K. So they are left with about $36K and we take around 5% equity, 
but that is negotiable. It’s really not meant as an investment vehicle, we 
just want to make sure we are taking each other seriously. The investors’ 
fund does not pay out our organization fee, so this way Alchemist is 
able to sustain itself.” Danielle emphasizes that the Alchemist backers 
are not primarily involved for ROI. “They are not looking to get their 
money back, they are looking at it from a strategic point of view. What 
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are the new technologies that are going to help keep them special in the 
future? Through our accelerator they have an opportunity to tap into 
those companies.”
Founders Space invests in seed and early-stage ventures and has partners 
in over twenty countries with a strong presence in Asia. It offers an online 
incubator program as well as live classes in its accelerator program. The 
business model is based on tuition fees and on equity. Naomi Kokubo: 
“Equity ranges between 0.5% and 5%; it depends on the startup team. 
We don’t guarantee investment but we do ask every startup who joins 
our program to give us participation rights for future investment rounds.” 
Corporate programs, Naomi adds, are based on individual contracts.
TiE LaunchPad is a smaller accelerator for enterprise startups that takes 
f ive to eight companies per batch. It is backed by a TiE charter member 
VC fund of about $5 million. LaunchPad provides a $50,000 investment in 
convertible notes and charges a 4% equity fee. Accepted startups are asked 
to allow TiE charter members to invest up to 10% of the next funding round. 
Dedicated startup team mentors receive 0.25% of the equity fee. Prashant 
Shah of TiE LaunchPad, f inds that this formula works well. “The fact that 
we have a fund gives us a f iduciary responsibility. We have to try to return 
money for our investors as well, so we have to be careful about where we 
invest. We want to invest in good founders, good companies. We know it is 
going to take a while before they get to some kind of exit and we are up for 
that challenge. We know it takes time.”
Hardware accelerator HAX in San Francisco focuses on finalizing startup 
prototypes; teams need to relocate to HAX’s off ice in Shenzhen, China for 
about four months. Shenzhen is called the ‘Silicon Valley of Hardware’ or 
even the ‘World Capital of Hardware’.67 HAX does not charge fees but offers 
seed capital: $25,000 for 6% equity, $100,000 for 9% equity (6% common 
stock, a credit-linked note (CLN) which converts to 3% equity at the next 
f inancing round in exchange for participation), and up to $200,000 extra 
in matching funds. HAX is backed by SOSV, an investment company that 
has funded over 500 startups (150 per year) with seed, venture, and growth-
stage funding. SOSV has $250 million in assets under management. Cyril 
Ebersweiler, partner at SOSV and managing director of HAX, clarif ies the 
business model: “We call ourselves ‘the accelerator VC’. We will exit when 
our startup companies exit, that is the only agenda here. That is the only 
thing that is going on.” Running an accelerator is like running a startup, 
according to Cyril: “Accelerators are extremely time consuming, resource 
consuming, exhausting. What people don’t understand is that people run-
ning accelerators are entrepreneurs. It is a startup.” Recently, SOSV founded 
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two new accelerators: Food HAX in New York City and the synthetic biology 
accelerator IndieBio in San Francisco.
BootUP is a miniature ecosystem aiming to grow startups. It rents 
co-working off ice space, provides mentorship, invests in high-potential 
startups, and gives access to high-caliber network facilities. It has invested 
in over 120 startups that have raised over $400 million and have an overall 
valuation of $4 billion. The off ice space business model is straightforward: 
rent. As Marco ten Vaanholt states: “Space is just a box. We look at the 
business idea and if it’s complementary to any of the other startups in 
our building. But there’s just rent to be paid.” BootUP’s investment policy 
is based on revenue sharing or equity. It depends on the team and the 
company. “Smart entrepreneurs don’t like to give up equity but are willing 
to give revenue share. That’s the starting of a relationship. We often work 
on master-based revenue share if we can get a deal from them. That’s how 
we get a portion of the pie.” BootUP does a lot of matchmaking between 
corporates and startups. “And only then we take equity.” Marco’s investment 
math is simple: selectivity. “I would rather have 25 startups of which 15 or 20 
do well, than 100 of which f ive do well. That’s really the difference between 
a standard accelerator or incubator and what we try to do here at BootUP.” 
How much equity do Marco and his partners take? “It depends on the stage 
of the company. If it’s an earlier stage company we take between f ive and 
ten percent. If it’s a later-stage company it can be between two and f ive 
percent. It depends on what the value of the company is as well as how 
much work we are going to do as a team.”
Samsung NEXT Start, the corporate accelerator, focuses on experienced 
entrepreneurs and offers two models: a seed funding model and an in-
residence model. In the f irst model, startup teams are provided with stage-
specif ic resources and expertise “to go from seed to series A and beyond”. 
The second model is a program “where we internally incubate companies 
that when successful are either acquired by Samsung or spun out” (Gary 
Coover). The seed funding model offers funding of between $100,000 and 
$1 million, co-location for three-plus months, and a host of other resources 
like access to alumni and mentor networks. The in-residence program has 
a longer runway due to the involvement of Samsung – anywhere from three 
to 18 months.
Now let’s take a look at the business models of the two university and 
college-linked accelerators. StartX, the Stanford-University-aff iliated ac-
celerator, is all about activating the notorious Stanford ecosystem in order 
to allow new ventures and innovative business ideas to grow faster. As 
executive Brian Hoffman says: “StartX is about bringing the best Stanford 
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people together and making them more successful faster. We don’t take 
equity, we are structured as a non-profit, because the very best people we 
want in our community are not going to join an accelerator where they have 
to give up a sizeable amount of their company for a small seed check.” StartX 
has 12,600 square feet of off ice space, 2,000 of which is lab space, which it 
rents to startup companies. Brian also emphasizes that the real value of 
StartX is the Stanford community network. “That’s what people are coming 
for, not for off ice space.” StartX gets its money from corporate sponsorships 
(such as Microsoft, Panasonics, Johnson & Johnson, Ford), who want early 
and preferential access to talent and technology. These partnerships are 
based on the corporate understanding that “to stay competitive, they need 
access to early-stage innovations.” The larger tiered corporate partnerships 
may involve contributions of between $100,000 and $200,000 a year. StartX, 
Stanford University, and Stanford Health Care have a joint investment 
fund (SSF) since 2013, which has invested over $100 million in 200+ StartX 
companies, available only to Stanford-aff iliated founders.
The Babson College venture accelerator program centers on students 
and Babson alumni. According to Cindy Klein-Marmer: “We support them 
in many ways. We pay for their housing, on-campus housing if they select 
to live on campus. We provide them with meals throughout the program 
summer period. We provide them with workshops or what we call ‘lunch and 
learning sessions’.” The accelerator program works with limited overhead. 
“We run very lean: just two staffers that run it on a daily basis, and we have 
one or two interns. Faculty is paid in an equivalent of course exemptions. 
So it will count as part of their class, and not separate from the program. 
Moreover, it gives them exposure to the corporate world.” Cindy under-
lines the two-way process of faculty involvement: it gives them access to 
early-stage entrepreneurship, and they can use these practical examples in 
their teaching. When asked whether Babson offers funding to its student 
ventures, Cindy responds: “We do have a seed funding opportunity. We give 
money through which I like to think of as a ‘prototyping fund’. It’s smaller 
dollars, anywhere from a few hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars. 
Our cap right now is f ive thousand dollars. We are not an ATM machine, 
but if you are awarded it, you are not expected to have to pay it back.”
The Hive is a smaller, high-touch, for-prof it, domain-specif ic venture 
studio that takes in about f ive startups a year but on a very intensive coach-
ing basis. The Hive provides smart money and cash investments. As T.M. 
Ravi clarif ies: “We typically invest between $2 million to $3 million in our 
startups. That’s signif icant money for such an early-stage company. But 
we work with our companies, help them f ine-tune the business idea, help 
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them put their team together, and develop the product. We do so for 12 to 
15 months. We get joined at the hip with our startup founders.” The Hive’s 
investment goals go hand in hand with its high-touch involvement with its 
startups. “We are very hands-on with the company till it gets to the next 
round of f inance, which is usually a series A round and they would generally 
raise anywhere from $10 million to $20 million.” And what happens after 
this round? “Much like the other VCs, we will be a part of the company’s 
board, provide high-level guidance, insight, and introductions but not day-
to-day operation.” Does The Hive take equity? If the company is based on a 
business idea developed by The Hive, then The Hive becomes a co-founder. 
If the company is already founded, then The Hive receives equity for its 
investment. As T.M. Ravi spells out: “This equity is at a very early stage 
where the risk of failure is high. We come in at a high-risk stage and with 
the hands-on guidance of our team, as well as the capital we provide, we’re 
putting them on the path to success.”
The Fabric is a similar co-creation new venture accelerator. It works with 
only one or two startup companies at any time. The Fabric actively works 
with the founder entrepreneurs to refine their idea and then provides seeds 
f inancing of $1 million to $1.5 million per company. The investment goal 
is to prepare the startups for high-quality series A funding by providing 
them with a viable business model, a prototype, market validation, and 
by developing the team. The Fabric is backed by an investment fund of 
roughly $10 million, and investors own equity in The Fabric. It is clearly a 
for-profit model, as Prem Talreja emphasizes: “We are doing it for the return 
on investment, we are doing it for the responsibility we have toward our 
shareholders.” But The Fabric team members, all seasoned entrepreneurs, 
are also personally motivated to create successes, as is clear from the way 
Prem frames his motivation: “What is exciting for me is that I’m still able 
to give back. I’m still relevant to the industry that created me, the industry 
that has given me so much. After all, this is Silicon Valley.”
Tandem is another smaller, for-profit, domain-specif ic accelerator that 
seeds hardware and software mobile startups. It is now a $100 million 
investment fund that puts in an initial investment of $200,000 to $2 mil-
lion and substantial follow-on investing. Tandem is a co-creation studio 
accelerator that does two types of investments. Sunil Bhargava explains: 
“We do traditional seed investments, like an investor. We put in less time. 
But a proportion of our deals during the early phase of a new fund is where 
we use our studio, where we are actively involved with growing startup 
companies over a 6-12 month period. Help them to build their company 
and help them getting traction. We call this active or early seed.” I ask Sunil 
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whether Tandem takes equity: “Sure. We take equity for the money we put 
in. In the six-month active seed deals, we take up to 10% common equity. 
We do not take common equity in the later-stage seed deals.” Tandem has 
scaled up its acceleration program since it started in 2007: it has moved 
from doing 10 startups a year to 20 startups over two years, to 80 startups 
over four years.
What about the business economics of the four niche accelerators that are 
part of my sample? Powerhouse and Women’s Startup Lab are two smaller, 
specialized, high-touch accelerators, about solar energy and empowering 
women entrepreneurs, respectively. What do their business models look 
like? Powerhouse offers $10,000 cash investments to startup companies in 
its six-month accelerator program as well as free off ice space, non-dilutive 
grant opportunities, and the right to invest up to $50,000 in exchange for 
a convertible note and warrant. Powerhouse takes up to 5% equity in its 
startups. Emily Kirsch underlines that her for-profit business model has a 
clear purpose: “We think that by having a business model that is dependent 
on success or failure of our companies, we will have better rates of success 
with our startups. We don’t continue to survive unless our companies do 
well.” Powerhouse also has an incubator which is based on a monthly recur-
ring revenue model, and it does sponsored events. The $10,000 initial cash 
investment is “just to show some skin in the game. To give them a jump 
start into their fundraising process. Our role is to help them raise capital 
for the next seed round.”
Women’s Startup Lab is a founder development niche accelerator based 
in Menlo Park. The program’s fee is $10,000, but as founder Ari Horie 
self-consciously adds: “It’s $85,000 worth of content.” If Women’s Startup 
Lab invests in startups, it takes about 6% equity. Ari emphasizes that her 
revenue model differs radically from standard VC business models: “We care 
about the education part of our program, we are founder-centric, we offer a 
holistic approach, we do founder development.” The educational program 
at Women’s Startup Lab for startup founders as well as its sponsorships 
and corporate entrepreneur programs generate enough revenue to sustain 
its operation.
Imagine H2O and Cleantech Open, located in San Francisco and Redwood 
City respectively, are two non-prof it, mission-driven, niche accelerators 
that focus on strengthening startups marketing practical solutions to 
environmental problems. Tom Ferguson explains Imagine H2O’s funding 
model, which is definitely not about taking equity in startup companies. Its 
business model is based on remote support through its virtual accelerator. 
“We keep our overheads low. It allows us not to be the kind of accelerator 
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that says: ‘We take f ive percent of your business for $20K’. To me that is an 
uncomfortable proposition, especially if you require them to relocate for 
a certain amount of time.” Tom continues: “If you were to really be serious 
about looking through the lens of the startups, something like $175,000 is a 
different thing. You can hire two excellent people with options for one year 
that get you further down the road. That, I think, is worth giving up that 
portion of your company.” Director Nimesh Modak explains that Imagine 
H2O is entirely grant supported (Wells Fargo is the head sponsor) and is also 
involved in some consultancy work. This allows the accelerator program 
itself to be free of costs for admitted participants, apart from a modest 
nominal application fee. Startups compete for a yearly total of $25,000 prize 
money for the best water problem solution idea. But as Tom says: “The real 
value of our program is in our network.”
Cleantech Open is a volunteer organization providing support to 
startups that address sustainability issues. “Because of that”, Ian Foraker 
points out, “we have a very low price point. We don’t take equity, we just 
have an application fee of $150, and when companies are accepted into 
the program, it’s a participation fee of $1,200. And that’s all. We’re able 
to deliver value without a huge overhead. Over 90% of our operations 
as an organization is pro bono.” Cleantech’s startup awards are funded 
by its corporate sponsors, and they organize showcasing events. Neither 
Cleantech Open nor Imagine H2O offer in-house off ice space to their 
participating startup companies.
Harm TenHoff, CEO of BayLink, is very critical about the practice of 
taking equity in startups. He argues that: “Taking 5% or 8% equity for 
$50,000 to $100,000 is a lot of money for startups to give away. There is a 
downside to it. If you have been in an accelerator and don’t get funded, 
you’re sort of blacklisted. Nobody wants to touch you anymore. No serial or 
seasoned entrepreneur will go into such an accelerator because they don’t 
want to give up that amount of equity.”
Finally, I have a look at the business models that Silicon Valley platform 
accelerators work with that get their revenue from renting co-working space, 
from creating dynamic and entrepreneurial environments for startups to 
thrive and grow. GSVlabs is a large 72,000 square-foot campus in Redwood 
City that houses 170 startups and whose companies have raised over $250 
million. It is backed by the GSV Financial Group, a merchant bank. Marlon 
Evans explains that companies pay a monthly fee per desk: “It’s all included: 
your IT, your printing, your coffee, your mentorship, your events, your 
workshops.” GSVlabs also gets revenues from sponsored events, corporate 
partnerships, accelerating programs for international clients.
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Until recently, Matt Walters ran the 30,000-square-foot co-working space 
and startup hub Runway in downtown San Francisco. Runway is home to 
about 85 startups and 200 startup team founders. Matt explains that its 
main revenue is rent, “But the other thing we do is consulting for major 
corporations. They look for technology advice, for startups to partner with – 
in FinTech [f inancial technology], for instance. And we have corporate 
sponsorships and partnerships.”
Hacker Dojo has a membership-based revenue model. It offers co-working 
space and maker space in its 16,000-square-foot non-prof it community 
center and hackerlab. Its startup philosophy, as director Jun Wong tells me, 
is “to really offer inexpensive incubation time. We try to run at a low budget 
as possible so that we can still be as affordable as possible to those who 
need it.” Hacker does not use the accelerator business model of investment 
and equity. “Once you start to offer such services, you have to rank your 
companies, right? We don’t want that. We avoid ranking the people that are 
here. We want this to be a safe haven. Hacker Dojo provides a very unbiased 
and a very open space where people can work.” Besides membership fees, 
Hacker receives donations from both individuals and organizations, and 
from high-tech corporates.
Prospect SV is an innovation hub and 23,000-square-foot demonstration 
center in San Jose with a focus on transportation, energy, and the physical 
environment. Prospect is a non-profit organization. Doug Davenport: “There 
are non-profit business accelerators that will take ownership stakes in their 
companies. We don’t do that.” Prospect’s business philosophy is to focus 
on public sector problems in the built environment by aligning multiple 
stakeholders regarding practical commercial solutions. “Equity is not part 
of our income model because we want to be able to work with the public 
sector as an impartial solutions-oriented group. That reputation is very 
important to us.” Prospect SV’s funding mainly comes from corporate spon-
sors, a modest monthly fee from its startup clients, and from non-diluted 
government grants. It has helped 25+ startup clients with demonstration 
and scaling projects, and these startups have raised over $145 million in 
capital investment, attracted $50 million in community f inancing, and are 
collaborating with 50 city partners.
RocketSpace, to conclude the description and analysis of the accelerator 
business models, is a large co-working space and accelerator in San Fran-
cisco’s f inancial district. It has hosted over 800 startups since 2011 and 
houses 200 startups on campus. Its business metrics include 16 unicorn 
alumni companies, 1.5 startups per week that secure funding, and an aver-
age total of $18 million in funds raised by its startup members. RocketSpace’s 
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revenues come from rent paid by startups, corporates from around the 
world, consultancy projects, and industry acceleration programs. “We prob-
ably have four or f ive executive teams from corporations here every week,” 
says Duncan Logan. Some of RocketSpace’s alumni have been extremely 
successful, including Uber, Spotify, and Supercell, which are now worth 
billions. When I ask Duncan whether he regrets that his co-working space 
and accelerator has a no-equity policy, his response is prescient: “Maybe 
analysts who look at RocketSpace in twenty years’ time will conclude: ‘If 
only they took equity, they’d be the best performing investment fund in 
the world.’ But the truth is, if we took equity, we wouldn’t attract the very 
best companies here in Silicon Valley – because, you know, the very best 
don’t need to give equity.”
As is clear from the above, Silicon Valley accelerators differ signif i-
cantly in business model and revenue policy. The investment policy of 
general/low-touch, for-prof it accelerators is to f ind early-stage startup 
diamonds. Their ‘spray and pray’ business strategy is all about spotting 
scalable startups with massive market potential, based on the belief that 
the few winners will make up for the many losses. For these reasons, they 
favor software startups. The smaller specialized/high-touch, for-prof it 
accelerators have an investment policy in which accelerator executives 
work hands-on with just a few, carefully selected startup teams. Getting 
traction is the main focus, and teams are mentored by executives who are 
experienced entrepreneurs.
For-profit accelerators are typically backed by investment funds, often 
institutional investors. By contrast, non-profit accelerators’ business mod-
els are usually based on (combinations of) participation fees, corporate 
donations, foundation grants, or consultancy projects. Rent, obviously, is a 
main source of revenue for co-working spaces. But all business models are 
inspired by f inding ways to connect startup teams, mentors, stakeholders, 
and investors in order to successfully market new ventures.
External cooperation
There is growing interest within the academic literature and the literature 
on applied innovation in understanding how cooperation facilitates in-
novation or, more precisely, the way successful innovation trajectories 
are strengthened by effective business cooperation models (Bauwen 2013; 
Koster 2016; Barringer & Harrison 2000; Fjeldstad et al. 2012; Gal et al. 2014). 
As I outlined above, cooperation is a structural feature of the Silicon Valley 
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innovation and startup ecosystem and has been so for many decades. It is 
an intrinsic characteristic of the Valley’s entrepreneurial mindset.
How important is collaborating with external partners in the Valley’s 
ecosystem for accelerator executives? When I ask The Hive’s CEO T.M. Ravi 
whether cooperation is a high priority on his accelerators’ network agenda, 
his reply is unequivocal: “Absolutely. We do three types of collaborations. 
One is with venture capitalists, because they are long-term capital partners 
for our companies. The second is with universities: faculty members at 
Stanford, Berkeley, Carnegie Melon, MIT. We explore to see if we can create 
companies out of their research. We bring in their summer students. And 
the third is with corporations. They are great as go-to-market partners and 
they have deep domain expertise.”
Networking is elementary. Danielle D’Agostaro of Alchemist expounds: 
“We do a lot of external outreach. We talk at meetings with potential 
startups, have relations with international schools. We have created a 
very diverse network of people around the world, which makes our brand 
pretty strong. Our founder and managing director is a Stanford University 
business professor.” Alchemist also has partnerships with service providers 
in cloud hosting and legal banking, and even arranges gym memberships 
for its participants.
Investors are indispensable partners for accelerators. Saeed Amidi of 
Plug and Play underlines this: “We review over 1,000 startups per industry 
and we choose 50 of them to pitch to us and to our partners. In our FinTech 
vertical, for example, we have 16 out of the top 20 banks in the world as 
our partner. We have the two biggest Japanese banks, we have Deutsche 
Bank, we have Santander, we have BNP Paribas, we have Credit Suisse. And 
we love universities. We have 50 great universities we work with, such as 
Stanford, MIT, Carnegie Mellon.” Plug and Play also actively collaborates 
with universities: “We are very close to their engineering schools and 
business schools. We participate in their business plan competitions and 
their labs. A lot of innovation happens in university labs. And that’s where 
we come in. We come in to seed fund their startups and to bring them 
additional funding and additional growth. Our main objective is to f ind 
great technology and great entrepreneurs. I would say at least 50% of our 
investments are f irst-time entrepreneurs straight out of the university.” Plug 
and Play, moreover, has a very engaged international corporate program in 
which it partners with over 180 major corporations.
StartX in Palo Alto closely works with Stanford University and its 
faculty members, an obvious partnership given that StartX spun out of 
the Stanford Student Enterprise lab. Recently the relationship between 
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StartX and Stanford has become more formalized. StartX’s Brian Hoffman 
elucidates: “Now we have two contracts: one with the university and one 
with Stanford Hospital. They contribute an annual grant to us for our opera-
tions; two-thirds from the university, one-third from the hospital. They also 
operate an investment vehicle with us and have board seats. So in some 
way we ourselves are a startup, with Stanford and the hospital as the series 
A investors and with the Stanford community as mentors and advisors.”
Domain knowledge is important in the accelerator partnership models 
and external networks. Cleantech Open works with numerous individual 
energy and environmental experts, mostly as volunteers. But they also 
have more structural collaborations. Ian Foraker: “We work with climate 
change groups at Berkeley. We have a partnership with the United Nations. 
We are active in eight regions in the U.S. and in many countries across the 
globe. We have a close relationship with the U.S. Department of Energy 
and with the State of California through its California Clean Energy Fund. 
Moreover, we partner with MassCEC and NYSERDA in the Northeast and 
the Colorado Cleantech Industries Association. And we are involved in 
organizing the Cleantech Open Global Ideas Competition, taking place as 
part of the Global Entrepreneurship Week.”
Prospect Silicon Valley, the non-profit urban-tech innovation hub, works 
with several corporates including Cisco, Ford, Microsoft, Hyundai, Hitachi, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo. Doug Davenport remarks: “I f ind they all 
share a fascination with the future of the market. They like the idea that we 
are bringing people together. They like that they get to see things that are 
way beyond what their current offerings can provide. I found that some of 
them are very easy to convince because they see the value immediately, they 
see how this is aligned, see how they can take advantage of what we have.” 
Sponsors get various things in return, according to Doug. “Our standard 
offer of corporate underwriting includes logo inclusions and other ways of 
recognition. We do preferential things like blog posts and publications. We 
do events that sponsors get to speak at. We connect them with other cities 
and we do engagement side work.” Prospect also works with San Jose State 
University and won a grant with the Berkeley transportation sustainability 
center for advanced transportation technology. In addition, it makes part 
of its space available for its students to work on innovation projects.
GSVlabs partners with Google. CEO Marlon Evans describes it as: “A 
great partnership. They are bringing in all their mentors and executives 
to work with our startups.” GSVlabs also partners with law f irms and HR 
companies to assist their new businesses, “But what we don’t want is that the 
companies are just selling into our community, so we structure where they 
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come in. They will provide a seminar on hiring your f irst f ifteen employees, 
or something like that. We invite our community to participate and the 
company might then host off ice hours for companies to go into a little 
bit more.” GSVlabs sees the value of strategic partnerships with universi-
ties. Marlon: “My ultimate goal is to have a couple of universities that are 
based here in the Valley that are sending us students and be interns for 
our startups. These students could be a main resource who in turn get a 
f irsthand experience of what it is like to work in a startup.”
The Fabric focuses on corporates rather than on universities. Prem Talreja 
explains: “For us, the university is Cisco, VMware, HP, and other leaders 
because that’s where the people are that value the problems and challenges 
we are working on. And for acquisition and partnership as well. These 
leaders like us because they might acquire one of our startups; they like to 
keep an eye on what we are doing.”
What about a corporate accelerator such as Samsung NEXT? Do they 
work with outside partners? Gary Coover: “Sure, but nothing that we have 
formalized. We have quite a few relationships with other accelerators, 
investors, and universities that we will sometimes co-host events with 
and share pipeline. The broader Samsung NEXT organization also provides 
investment, partnership and acquisition opportunities for the startup com-
munity, which helps generate strong relationships with the VC community.”
The Silicon Valley support system is widely used by my sample of accelera-
tors, for example with respect to legal and HR facilitators. Imagine H2O is a 
good example. Tom Ferguson notes that: “We have a fantastic legal partner 
who has supported the last two cohort intakes. It’s all about relationships, 
also with their other clients. That’s a really interesting secondary network 
effect.” Emily Kirsch of Powerhouse shares this view: “The legal side is 
essential. We built a relationship with DLA Piper, one of the most famous 
law f irms in the world. They have been absolutely incredible. They did a ton 
of work with our f irst cohort on a pro bono basis and were willing to take 
the early risk lawyers are not known for.” Being connected to the venture 
community is fundamental as well: individual angel investors, small and 
large venture funds, and family businesses are important in this respect. 
Having solid external networks in the energy f ield is crucial for Powerhouse 
in regards of its technology focus. As Emily states: “Those partnerships 
are indispensable. We f irst and foremost have relationships with the solar 
incumbents as we call them – even so, many of them are less than 15 years 
old. SolarCity [a Silicon-Valley-based full-service solar provider] is one of 
our main partners and so are the thousands of small solar installers across 
the country. That’s who our startups are serving.”
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Runway partners with Fenwick & West, which Matt Walters describes as: 
“One of the biggest law f irms in Silicon Valley. They meet with our startups 
teams, e.g. with respect to IP issues. We are partnering with IBM, with 
AT&T, and with stakeholders in the EdTech f ield. We are talking to the 
CITRUS Invention Lab of Berkeley and we work with the University of San 
Francisco. But universities is one of the areas I think we could do a better 
job. It’s a great talent pool.” Samsung NEXT aims to provide its startups 
with options for resources. Gary Coover highlights a few of these options: 
“Amazon Web Services has an agreement with us to provide all of our teams 
with $100,000 free credits for the f irst year. We negotiate deals like that and 
provide preferred vendors and resources for them to access. The biggest 
value added is probably the recruiter we have on staff who is helping the 
startup teams hire engineers. One of the top problems for every startup is 
identifying and attracting great technical talent.”
Lawyers play a valued role in the Silicon Valley world of accelerators. 
As Tandem’s founder Sunil Bhargava expounds: “Lawyers are generally 
very good here in the Valley. We have a handful of those lawyers who we 
recommend to our startups, and they can choose whoever they want. 
We also have a number of lawyers that they can consult if they just need 
a one-on-one. Finding a good lawyer is not a problem.” Founders Space 
also brings in lawyers regularly, as Naomi Kokubo explains: “We have lots 
of lawyers come; they give mentorship sessions on different issues such 
as IP, International Corporate Transaction, licensing issues, cap tables, 
etc. They don’t charge any fees immediately but the startup teams may 
become future clients. Lawyers are also willing to forego payment until 
startups are funded.” This is another example of the deferred fee system 
that is part of the Silicon Valley startup support structure helping new 
ventures in their early stage of development when revenues are minimal. 
This is also a stage in which startups are most in need of professional 
legal counsel and business advice. The deferred payment practice gener-
ally works f ine and is seen as a smart solution to an otherwise diff icult 
f inancial issue.
There is general agreement among the accelerator executives I inter-
viewed about the strength and value of the support structure of Silicon 
Valley’s ecosystem. Cooperation is and has been an elementary feature 
of this ecosystem for a long time. Linkages are informal but its goal and 
execution are highly institutionalized. Cooperation is an intrinsic part of 
Silicon Valley as a networking society and its culture of collaborating and 
sharing.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyzed the differences between accelerators in terms 
of their startup growth paradigm and domain focus, business model, and 
cooperation strategy. The distinction between general/low-touch accelera-
tors and specialized/high-touch accelerators turned out to be instrumental. 
The f irst type of accelerator is based on investment metrics that bring in 
several batches of startups per year in their permanent search for startups 
that combine rapid scalability and potentially large markets. Investing in 
such high potentials is the main investment strategy of these accelerators. 
Their ROI is founded on future traction and market penetration. The second 
type of accelerator does not take a cohort approach but helps to grow a 
limited number of startups in targeted technological or social domains 
and does so in a very intensive way. They are domain-specif ic or niche 
players. Their de-risking strategy is based on day-to-day coaching by highly 
experienced serial entrepreneurs. A successful exit is what they opt for.
The analysis also revealed that the distinction between incubators and 
accelerators is instrumental rather than conceptual. This conclusion was 
confirmed in a recent study by the California Business Incubation Alliance: 
“The proliferation of [incubator and accelerator] programs has blurred the 
traditional lines between these two types of support for entrepreneurs.” 
(2016: 7).
Most Silicon Valley accelerators are for-profit businesses. Their goal is to 
invest in promising startups with scalability potential in return for equity 
or other forms of f inancial participation. These might be larger general or 
smaller specialized accelerators. Corporate accelerators may have seed 
investment funds, but their main purpose is to stay on par with major 
technological innovations that keep them competitive. Accelerators help 
corporates to track innovative startups. As Aiaz Kazi, who heads Google’s 
Platform Ecosystem, points out: “I always say that startups are the lifeblood 
of innovation. Let them bubble up from the ground, give them a structure, 
give them a way that allows them to come through, and they will imagine 
and build solutions on your platform that you simply can’t.” But there is also 
another incentive, as Aiaz explains: “Some of these startups will grow and 
become big customers of tomorrow. You can bring startups into the mix to 
add on to your product, and that’s a win for both.”
Commercial co-working spaces are based on a rent business model but 
also provide access to their network of investors. The mission-driven, non-
profit accelerators want their startups to grow because of their potential 
solutions to pressing social issues such as f ighting climate change and water 
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problems or promoting the adoption of clean technology innovations. Their 
revenues come from foundation grants, corporate sponsorships, government 
support, and consultancy. These accelerators may not themselves invest in 
their startup companies, but they often do have structured relationships 
with investors.
Have accelerators achieved success in launching viable startups? Ac-
celerators like to brag about the funds raised by their startup alumni in later 
investment stages, which may easily run into the hundreds of millions and 
sometimes even billions of dollars. Their websites proudly present these 
funding f igures. But the performance math is a bit more complicated then 
these statistics suggest. It is unclear whether there is a causal relationship 
between accelerator program participation and startup success. Startup 
performance is a complex phenomenon and depends on many factors, of 
which accelerator participation is only one (Hathaway 2016b; Van Weele 
2016; Hallen et al. 2014). It is extremely diff icult to disentangle success 
factors (CBIA 2016). As Sean Randolph, senior director of the Bay Area 
Council Economic Institute, states: “It is not necessarily the case that if 
a startup company gets venture investment, this is because they were in 
an accelerator. There may be a connection, but it shouldn’t be assumed.” 
Silicon Valley accelerator expert Susan Lucas-Conwell emphasizes that 
received funding is a meager indicator of startup performance success: 
“Raising money doesn’t mean you are a successful business, it just means 
you have a longer runway.”
Accelerators are embedded in the Silicon Valley network of support 
agencies, though the degree of cooperation varies. Some networks are 
institutionalized, while others are more loosely organized. Linking the 
outside world of investors, corporates, and technology stakeholders to the 
inside world of highly talented startups is a quality that all accelerators 
share, independent of their domain area, technology focus, or business 
model. It takes two to dance the Silicon Valley startup tango: investors 
looking for talent and talent looking for investors.
4 Strong Teams Will Win
How Accelerators Select and Coach Startup Teams
In this chapter, I examine how Silicon Valley accelerators recruit startup 
teams and the criteria they use to select new ventures. Is there consensus 
about the latent and manifest qualities that startup founders need to have 
to market their business idea and develop their company? Do accelerator 
executives favor founder teams over solo entrepreneurs? Furthermore, 
I present my main f indings regarding the way accelerators make use of 
external mentors in coaching startups that participate in their programs. 
As will be shown, mentorship is a core characteristic of Silicon Valley’s 
ecosystem.
Selection procedures
The way Silicon Valley accelerators recruit startups to participate in their 
growth programs varies but is generally highly selective. This is true for both 
general accelerators (high-volume/low-touch) and specialized/niche accelera-
tors (low-volume/high-touch). And even most office-space-based accelerators 
apply rather strict admissions procedures. In this section, I outline the various 
admissions methods that accelerators use in taking on the most talented and 
promising startup entrepreneurs. An overwhelming majority of accelerators 
prefer startup teams over single startup entrepreneurs, as we shall see.
The larger, general/low-touch accelerators apply highly structured and 
routinized intake and selection methods that are online-based. 500 Startups 
accepts four batches per year (two in San Francisco and two in Mountain 
View) and receives 2,500+ startup applications per batch. “We do interviews 
with about 400 applicants, of which we accept about 40. So our acceptance 
rate is around two percent.” (Elizabeth Yin). As the accelerator’s website 
concludes: “It’s tougher to get into 500 Startups than Harvard, MIT or 
Stanford.” In terms of how startups are selected, Elizabeth explains: “We’re 
looking for a complete team. A team that consists of what I call a ‘hacker’ 
and a ‘hustler’. One is good in product development and one in customer 
acquisition. Secondly, the product is usually complete and there must be 
some traction. A typical startup that gets invited to interview is doing 
around $10K per month in revenue, recurring revenue.” Roughly 30 percent 
of the selected startup teams are international.
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Plug and Play, another large accelerator, reviews over 2,000 startup ap-
plications each year per accelerator program and invests in over 100. Saeed 
Amidi has a particular interest in f irst-time entrepreneurs “straight out 
of college”. Why? “Because of a couple of reasons. One is they don’t have 
much baggage, they don’t have a house payment, they don’t have kids to 
put through college. So they can work 70, 80 hours a week. Generally, they 
are more passionate, smarter I would say. And the third thing is: if you are 
younger, you can deliver it better. They don’t think about failure as much. 
Failure is no option. Which is not to say that they don’t fail but they are so 
optimistic and proactive, and that’s what I enjoy the most.”
About 400 startups are housed in the Plug and Play building in Sunnyvale, 
of which a substantial number are international teams. Saeed also prefers 
teams over solo founders: “The f irst two, three, four years are hard, very 
hard for a startup. I think you need the team spirit and give-and-take to go 
through this roller coaster phase.” The strength of the team is Plug and Play’s 
main selection criterion: “The team, the passion, the capability of building 
what they want to build, and the talent to pivot, to change as they go on.”
The Alchemist Accelerator takes three batches of startups per year, 
receives about 300 applications per cohort, and accepts approximately 17 
startups per batch, so their acceptance rate is about f ive to six percent. They 
make use of a panel of judges (composed of alumni, mentors, and CEOs) 
to validate the startups’ business proposals. The selection criteria it uses, 
according to Danielle D’Agostaro, is “primarily team, technology and market 
opportunity, and whether a VC would back them or not. It’s very rare that 
we take solo entrepreneurs. Startup life is very hard and it is extremely 
diff icult for one person to take on all the roles that are associated with 
it. The team needs to be technically strong and business savvy.” The age 
of team members varies but on average is late twenties and early thirties. 
“They tend to be in that early range where they are old enough to be wise and 
young enough to be dangerous. They are at that point in their lives where 
they think: ‘if I’m going to do something I need to do it now’ and that f ire, 
that drives them.” The Alchemist Accelerator also has a strong international 
outreach, with 40 percent of its startup classes coming from outside the U.S.
Founders Space in San Francisco admits startups on a rolling basis and 
gets over 1,000 applications a year. Co-founder Naomi Kokubo recounts: “We 
usually accept somewhere between 10 and 20 startups in our program here 
in Silicon Valley, two to four times a year. But we also bring our program over 
to various countries such as Taiwan, Korea, China and other countries. We 
also have our co-branded space in Shanghai. In those countries our partners 
will do most of the selection.” Regarding the qualities that Founders Space is 
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after: “Team is important, and we definitely want to have some technology 
element. The business has to be scalable, the market has to be big, and 
ideally there is already some traction.” Naomi emphasizes the importance 
of team composition. “In the team we want someone who understands 
the business inside out, who knows their market, their customers, and is 
able to carry the company through. That’s usually the CEO. We also want a 
technologist in the team, who understands the current technology and can 
actually build the product; and we want a design expert in the team who 
can make their product shine with greater user experience. And f inally, it 
would be good to have someone who knows how to take their product to 
the market. It doesn’t necessarily have to be four different people; the CEO 
could take on more than one role.”
HAX aims to grow hardware companies and receives over 2,000 applica-
tions a year from which it selects 30 startups (spread over two batches). 
Selecting the best startup candidates is complicated according to Cyril 
Ebersweiler: “Because the hardware venture requires a very different scale 
and requires strong technical skills. But these skills are not what is going to 
make the venture successful. Our startup engineers will have to deal with 
suppliers, with manufacturers, with distributors. The communications 
aspect of the business is very important.” The recruitment procedure is 
further complicated by the fact that participants spend almost six months 
in HAX’s accelerator lab space in Shenzhen, China, to f inalize their proto-
type and grow the business. Cyril notes that HAX seldom accepts solo 
entrepreneurs: “It is very rare; especially in the hardware industry you need 
teams. You have to deal with design, mechanical engineering, marketing, 
sales, communications, etc.”
TiE LaunchPad receives over 200 applications per batch for four to six 
slots. “We probably end up meeting with roughly 20 of those,” according 
to Prashant Shah. In describing TiE’s selection criteria, he says: “We are 
looking for the right idea, with the right market, and with the right team. 
We are investing money so we are looking for people who are dedicated 
to making the startup a success. We are doing enterprise, this generally 
requires some experience in industry. Most of the founders we talk to are 
f irst-time founders who left their jobs and somehow developed a great 
idea that might be an extension of what their company was doing or 
even something completely different.” Prashant also prefers teams over 
solo entrepreneurs. “And they know that they need help in all aspects of 
company building, everything from just the basics to how to run a board 
meeting all the way to how they f ind customers, how they f ind investors 
and crossing that.”
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BootUP prides itself in creating a micro-ecosystem that combines all 
the good ingredients from the larger Silicon Valley ecosystem – “kind of 
the Amazon.com for startups” according to Marco ten Vaanholt. Finding 
startups that best f it the BootUP system is a major challenge. “So, we 
make time for everybody because that one ten-minute session could 
change their lives forever.“ Marco aims for a smart ratio of 70 percent 
serial entrepreneurs and 30 percent f irst-time entrepreneurs, the un-
derlying idea being that the f irst group can transfer knowledge to the 
second group. BootUP also invests in post-seed startups “based on the 
core philosophy of does the project enhance life, would you use it in 
your home, and does it change the way you and I live?” Marco also favors 
teams. “Teams are very important in the startup world. The earlier the 
startup, the more important team is. What we are investing in is basically 
team and idea. And the main question is: is the team going to execute 
the idea or not?”
Accelerator expert Lucas-Conwell points at the role of team composi-
tion: “I think the most successful startup teams are balanced in terms of 
experience and profiles, knowledge of the industry they are in, and deep 
understanding of what the problem is that they are solving. (…) I think that 
just guys isn’t healthy, just engineers isn’t healthy, and just twenty-year olds 
isn’t healthy either.” Susan is a mentor to company teams that participate in 
StartX, the Stanford-aff iliated accelerator. Executive team member Brian 
Hoffman tells me that StartX gets about 1,000 to 1,200 applications a year 
and its acceptance rate is between eight and twelve percent. The rate of 
what Brian calls “intentional sourcing” of later-stage Stanford startups 
is higher and close to 50 percent. The regular admissions procedure is a 
lengthy online application involving many questions about the founders, 
their background, funding raised, accomplishments, etc. Applications are 
screened by a panel of judges from the StartX mentor and alumni com-
munity and corporate partners. About half of the applicants survive the 
f irst round and are interviewed in eight-minute sessions, where the focus is 
on the founders’ profile: “Are they passionate, are they committed, are they 
real entrepreneurs, will they walk through a wall, how does the founding 
team solve problems, what about team dynamics?” Half of them will come 
down again. The second round of interviews concentrates on the fit between 
the startup founders and the StartX community and culture, as well as 
the technical skill set. Like the other accelerators, StartX has a preference 
for founder teams. “We do take solo founders but anyone that applies as a 
solo founder there would at least be a flag raised and we will dig into the 
founder’s track record as an entrepreneur.”
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The Babson College Summer Venture Program is very selective too, and 
accepts a maximum of f ifteen teams. Applications are open to undergradu-
ate and graduate students as well as to Babson college alumni. Recently, the 
program was expanded to Babson’s branch in San Francisco. The acceptance 
rate is lower than 25 percent. Cindy Klein-Marmer adds: “We actually have 
created side programs to help support those entrepreneurs that did not get 
into our summer venture program because it is so selective.” In evaluating 
applications, Cindy says: “We look at overall viability of the business idea, 
we look at traction, but at the core we look at team. We do accept solo 
entrepreneurs, which is unique compared to a venture-backed accelerator. 
In a way, our program is a precursor to such accelerators. We often will 
f ind folks building up their team while in our program, so having that 
ability for them to move with us and to understand who are the right team 
members and not just because they are classmates. So f inding those folks 
who complement them, who feel their weaknesses.” Among the teams is a 
considerable number of female-led startups.
Samsung NEXT’s selection procedure directly f lows from its growth 
philosophy “to f ind world-class entrepreneurs and help them grow their 
business from idea to product to scale”, according to Gary Coover. Their 
recruitment focus is on experienced entrepreneurs “who have gone through 
startups before and have hit familiar barriers that they either weren’t able 
to overcome or that they found to be incredibly diff icult to overcome, and 
we can help them with that. Distribution is probable the best example. 
Samsung can really help here, as it provides access to the largest distribution 
platform in the world.” Samsung NEXT does not do cohorts or running a 
formal curriculum. Samsung NEXT’s chief selection criteria are: “Founding 
team, focus area, and market opportunity. Team: we want them to have 
experience together and success having built products before. Focus area: 
you can roughly call it frontier tech, e.g. AR, VR, machine learning, AI, data 
and analytics, autonomous vehicles and drones, IoT, that is probably a good 
start. And it is all software-focused. Finally, market opportunity: there 
must be a scalable market.” There is no standardized application process, 
but the process itself is akin to the seed funding model of any other Silicon 
Valley investor.
Some of the smaller high-touch, domain-specif ic, and niche accelerators 
are even more restrictive than their larger counterparts. The Fabric is a good 
example: “We are selective, very selective. We often deal with founders that 
we already know, who maybe work for large companies. They might be in 
their early forties, have gone from engineer to a director, and suddenly 
have this urge and say: ‘I have seen this done and my founders previously 
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made money, I am doing very well, I’ve reached this stage and my kids 
are in college and my bills are paid, I would love to do something on my 
own.’”(Prem Talreja). For The Fabric, a good team and team culture are key 
too. “I’ll tell them: you will spend more time together than you will with 
your spouses. You better demonstrate that you like each other, you better 
demonstrate you are complementing. You better sign up to this that divorce 
is not an option.”
The Hive operates in a specific market with a strong focus on data-driven 
technologies. As a co-creation growth studio, it is not interested in massive 
numbers of applicants. Co-founder T.M. Ravi elucidates: “We are theme- and 
content-oriented. The main question is: what is the concept and is this a 
breakthrough concept? Does it lead to a large market? In The Hive, we 
build companies. We have the ability and resources to go out and f ind the 
best people in a particular domain and ask them to become a founder. 
Ultimately, we look for a unique concept targeting a large market and sup-
ported with a strong team with the ability to execute the concept.” In terms 
of the qualities The Hive looks for in team members: “Our entrepreneurs 
need to have that scrappiness, that passion and zeal to succeed, it is part 
of their psyche.”
Imagine H2O, a non-prof it niche accelerator, deliberately chooses to 
focus on a limited number of startups per year – ten to twelve – out of 
some 90-100 applications. Besides written material, applicants also submit 
a three-minute video in which they pitch their idea, team, and market 
strategy. Water experts are brought in to act as judges to look for evidence of 
market share, market segmentation, the pain point the team wants to solve, 
product-market f it, and the startup’s go-to-market policy. Tom Ferguson 
expounds: “One of the big things in water entrepreneurship is that there 
are lots of engineers who are fantastic at engineering but aren’t brilliant 
in the nuts-and-bolts kind of building and selling a business.” And it is 
precisely the ability to communicate that is extremely important. To which 
Tom’s colleague Nimesh Modak adds: “Because if you can’t sell your idea, 
no one is going to do that for you. Founder sales are incredibly important, 
especially in this business.” Imagine H2O takes solo entrepreneurs but, as 
Tom emphasizes: “Solo is tough and should be tough. It sure is tough to sell 
to investors if you are a solo entrepreneur. Team is critical.”
Powerhouse is another high-touch, niche accelerator, one that is focused 
on accelerating solar startups. It takes four companies per cohort, and 
two cohorts per year. The selection procedure is invite-only. Emily Kirsch: 
“We invite about a dozen startups out of about 40-50 that are on our radar 
and have expressed interest, and we bring that down to four companies 
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that will do the program.” Powerhouse’s selection criteria are based on the 
‘three T’ model: total addressable market, team, and technology. The order 
is vital according to Emily: “Because you can have the best team and the 
best technology in the world, but if nobody is going to buy your product, if 
there is no market opportunity for it, then it doesn’t matter.” Innovativeness 
is what Powerhouse is looking for, or what Emily calls “startups that are 
ahead of their time.” The ideal setup, according to her, is a CEO and a CTO, 
“and then, as they are with us, they can grow further teams from there.”
Cleantech Open receives between 200 and 250 applications a year and 
uses similar selection criteria. Ian Foraker notes that: “We look at team, 
technology, and market, and we have panels of volunteer judges who evalu-
ate the applicants.” He estimates Cleantech Open’s rejection rate to be about 
50 percent. And experience has taught the accelerator not to accept solo 
founders: “We have a rule that individuals are not allowed in our program. 
We found that among individual entrepreneurs, the chance they drop out 
or fail is much higher.”
At Women’s Startup Lab, a good example of a niche accelerator, the mis-
sion is to grow female entrepreneurs and help them build their business. 
It accepts nine women per cohort and runs three to four batches a year. 
Total applications are between 170 to 200 a year, although at the moment I 
interviewed CEO Ari Horie the accelerator was in the midst of a rebranding 
process and those numbers had fallen to around 80. Ari clarif ies the target 
group of her lab: “As we are founder-centric, it is important that female 
entrepreneurs who want to participate in our program are open, coachable, 
super-talented, stand the power of our hito philosophy, want to be part of our 
collaborative, believe in giving back to the community, and see themselves 
as role models for the next generation.” Ari underlines the importance of 
founder qualities such as tenacity, coachability, and authenticity to drive 
ideas, performance, and success. “We don’t believe in just money.” With 
regard to teams versus solo founders, Ari has an interesting perspective. 
“We at Women’s Startup Lab want to be the founders’ champion; we want 
to be the village to support female entrepreneurs. There are unique invis-
ible challenges that women founders face, and we relentlessly try to f ind 
solutions. We train our founders to overcome these challenges so that they 
can focus on building their startups rather than dealing with societal and 
cultural issues that hold back women leaders to succeed. The whole point 
is creating the formula that works for women.” The Startup Lab focuses on 
empowering individual female entrepreneurs rather than on teams.
In my interviews, I also asked accelerating platforms how they select 
their tenants. GSVlabs’ startup selection process is network-based. Marlon 
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Evans: “We do no outbound marketing. All of our startups come to us from 
referrals through our mentor network and our investor network. We are a 
little bit later stage and look for companies that have some seed funding, 
some traction in the market, which gives us external validation of their 
product. We look at the people, the product, the potential, the opportunity, 
and the predictability of the revenue.” Mindset is critical, too. “We are only 
as strong as our community. If you don’t have that kind of open willingness 
to share with others, then likely you are not going to be successful here.” 
GSVlabs’ entry policy is a rolling admissions and selection process that boils 
down, according to Marlon, to two questions: “Do we think the startup is 
a good f it and do we have space?” It recruits internationally, with over 20 
countries represented.
Runway, the San-Francisco-based incubator and co-working space, looks 
at f it and entrepreneurial qualities. Matt Walters notes, “We have to be 
very successful about who we bring in here because they are affecting 
everyone else. People with a good attitude because we are all working 
at open spaces. We look for entrepreneurs we think are going to be suc-
cessful. Team, attitude, background, product, traction, investors, are all 
important criteria.” Regarding teams versus solo entrepreneurs, Runway is 
very explicit: “Usually it is individuals who have ideas but teams who have 
businesses.” Runway gets about f ive to ten applications a week and admits 
around ten percent of its applicants.
Prospect Silicon Valley is a technology demonstration center that receives 
about 75 applications a year; the rejection rate is around 60-75%. Founder 
Doug Davenport points out that his clients “need to have credible technol-
ogy, f inancial stability, leadership skills. (…) We’re not evaluating them 
as potential investment but on how compelling their solution is, how this 
is going to be perceived by stakeholders, by venture investors, and by the 
public. Is it a company we can work with? Can we help them? We don’t do 
batches or program cohorts. Each of our companies is unique.” Prospect’s 
admittance policy applies three selection criteria: applications must f it their 
area of focus and have a prototype ready for customer demonstration, and 
the technology must be focused on B2B or business-to-government markets.
Hacker Dojo’s model is based on co-working space and low-cost mem-
bership. True to its image and cultural background, it has an open non-
restrictive admission policy, as Jun Wong emphasizes: “There is no selection 
process or judgment. You just sign up online. It’s a self-service system. It’s 
an open source, it’s a shared space. We don’t even have f ixed desks.”
At RocketSpace, founder and CEO Duncan Logan was forced to pivot 
the admissions policy in order to cope with the abundance of startups 
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approaching the accelerator. “We get over 35 applications a week, so we 
needed to make the selection process a lot easier. The rule is: ‘if you haven’t 
raised funding, then you’re too early’. So if you are invested in by Andreessen 
or Sequoia or Greylock, great VCs or great angels, then we’re like: ‘well, 
that’s easy, you’re straight in.’” RocketSpace clearly leans towards selecting 
startup teams over solo founders: “It’s all teams. (…) You need an impressive, 
exceptional CEO. You need an impressive leader. You need an exceptional 
team, a very motivated team.” Or, as written on RocketSpace’s website: 
“Isolation is not an option.”
To conclude, Silicon Valley accelerators are very selective in their 
admissions policies. This holds true for for-profit as well as non-profit ac-
celerators, for general as well as domain-specif ic and niche accelerators, 
and for low-touch as well as high-touch accelerators. In most cases, the 
recruitment criteria are clear: strong team, strong technology, ample market 
opportunity. Having traction also helps. There appears to be a general 
consensus about the importance of teams in startups ventures. Startups 
that lack a strong team will simply not survive, even with great technology, 
even with great market prospects. As Reid Hoffman, co-founder and former 
chairman of LinkedIn, summarizes: “Everyone in the entrepreneurial com-
munity agrees that assembling a talented team is as important as it gets.” 
(Hoffman & Casnocha 2012: 83)
Mentoring
The coaching offered by Silicon Valley accelerators is one of their most 
salient and most consistent features. Mentors are typically serial entre-
preneurs – often former startup founders – who have the right experience, 
competences, and networks to coach startup teams in the early and very 
challenging phase of their new venture. They know the pitfalls and frustra-
tions of founding a startup and its numerous trials. Effective mentors 
speak the startup’s business language and are able to identify with the 
founders’ way of thinking. They have “been there, done that”. They know 
the hard times.
Nearly all of my interviewees are startup mentors in their accelerators, 
either as executives of their mentoring programs or as one-to-one mentors 
to the startups participating in their accelerator. This last role is particularly 
prevalent among the smaller accelerators. A good example is Tandem, the 
hardware and software accelerator focused on mobile. Sunil Bhargava 
describes it thus: “You can think of us as extending your team; we’ll be 
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part of your team. It’s not only about advice, it’s about execution; we get 
our hands dirty.”
The same is true for The Hive, where T.M. Ravi explains: “We collaborate 
with our entrepreneurs to really add management and entrepreneurial 
bandwidth to the startup team. It is important that the startup founders 
become the soul of the company. They are the ones that have to run the 
company 24/7 for the next many years, and we can only advise, mentor, and 
guide them. That’s our role.” Prem Talreja at The Fabric, compares startup 
team mentoring to the parent-children relationship: “It’s like children, right? 
Initially they are dependent on you for everything, and then they get to the 
age that they want to be on their own and leave home.”
Experienced startup mentors are the pillars of an accelerator’s micro-
ecosystem, and there appears to be no shortage of them. The Silicon Valley 
mentor pool is impressive. C0-founder and managing partner Marco ten 
Vaanholt of BootUP reveals: “We have access to over 800 serial entrepre-
neurs. They are always on the lookout for their next grade and get to work 
with the startup for about six months. They might complement the team if 
they feel there is a good match and that they can help scale up the company. 
We also look at how we can complement the startup with additional execu-
tive talent. To beef up the executive team is good for two reasons. One is 
the experience and knowledge factor; the second is on becoming more 
investable. It’s all about ‘de-risking’ the investment at all times.”
TiE LaunchPad also makes use of a large supply of mentors: “We have 
roughly 350 mentors in our organization. Part of our six-month curriculum 
is that we allow our startups to pick their mentor. During the time they are 
in the program they have a dedicated one-to-one mentor they can rely on. 
Between the mentor and myself we f igure out what the resources are to 
draw through the TiE network.” (Prashant Shah). Mentors may be former 
entrepreneurs but also former investors. Says Prashant: “A lot of our mentors 
were actually investors themselves, either as angels or as VCs. TiE has been 
doing mentorship for 20+ years.”
The Alchemist Accelerator also draws from a substantial mentor pool. 
Danielle D’Agostaro: “We have over four, f ive hundred mentors in our 
network. Most of them are all doing it pro bono; they are doing it because 
they want to give back, work with the startups, get their name out there as 
a tough expert to the startup community, and so they use the Alchemist 
as that channel.”
StartX recruits its volunteer mentors from Stanford faculty and alumni: 
“Our optional mentoring programs take at a high level with different forms. 
One is that we called our lead mentors. These are serial entrepreneurs that 
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have seen the arc of at least two companies as a founding member. They 
are startup team coaches that are there to help with co-founder issues, 
the loneliness of starting a new company, and with coping with day-today 
business pressure. It’s the closest type of mentoring. The second type of 
mentoring we do is company mentoring. Startups get a mark board of 
advisors during the 10-week program period and they meet with them in 
board style. Members are called advisors. So, mentors are here to help you 
as a person, advisors are here to help you as a company. And the f inal type 
of mentoring is experts: people in our Stanford network that are domain 
specialists.”(Brian Hoffman).
The Babson College accelerator is embedded in a f irm coaching environ-
ment. Says Cindy Klein-Marmer: “We have dedicated mentors and dedicated 
advisors at each stage in our accelerator and those are traditionally adjunct 
faculty or full-time faculty here at Babson, very much on a part-time basis 
but it’s an active role that they are playing.” Internal Babson advisors are 
f inancially compensated; mentors are not. External mentors play a signif i-
cant role in the Babson accelerator. As Cindy clarif ies: “Mentors are not paid 
and so we end up getting a lot of external mentors who are volunteering 
both because of their own interest, intrinsic value and reward that they 
are getting out of it but also because of a desire to get more engaged with 
Babson.”
Startup 500 has an interesting internal coaching scheme. Its program 
is on accelerating development and growth, and it creates an in-house 
‘distribution team’ consisting of previous marketers and sales people. 
Elizabeth Yin explains: “We pair every company with someone from this 
distribution team for setting up, for instance, an outbound sales process, or 
we pair them with an online marketing expert. We give every startup two 
coaches: one on customer acquisition and one on fundraising. These coaches 
are paid for, they are on our payroll, but they can be f ired at any time. The 
idea is that these coaches help our companies to grow during the four-month 
program. Ideally, a company comes in here and they can double or triple 
their revenue in this period. That’s a great story for fundraising, of course.” 
Careful pairing, according to Elizabeth, is essential. “Not every coach is 
going to be a good f it for every company.” A good accelerator reputation 
also helps, of course, to attract mentors. Naomi Kokubo of Founders Space 
admits that “it is very fortunate that Founders Space is well known. We get 
a lot of people asking to be a mentor.”
Finding the right match between mentor and founder teams is crucial. 
As accomplished startup mentor and Silicon Valley expert Susan Lucas-
Conwell asserts: “There needs to be a match in personality. There needs 
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to be an openness on the part of the startup team to be really interested 
in mentorship, otherwise it is a waste of time. There needs to be mutually 
agreed-upon added value. Where I can generally provide value is around 
business strategy, strategic partnerships, and working place culture. I have 
mentored consumer goods companies, digital health companies, not-for-
prof its. And I have a long history of mentoring women’s startups.” Why 
is mentoring important to Susan? “I am interested in new developments. 
Keeps you sharp. Interesting startups that maybe one day will grow. (…) It 
is not necessarily about raising money, it is about ‘wow, they’ve got their act 
together’. They have actually moved forward, they have progressed. So, from 
whenever I started and wherever I ended, they’ve actually moved forward.” 
Seeing startups grow is clearly a gratifying experience.
Ari Horie of Women’s Startup Lab emphasizes the need for the right 
match between her mentors and the mission of her accelerator. She focuses 
on building a team of advisors and mentors with real-world entrepreneurial 
experience. “Some consultants only have a theoretical understanding by 
being around startups but they have never been an entrepreneur. Nine out 
of ten of our mentors and advisors are serial entrepreneurs or investors 
themselves. They understand how hard it is to start and run a business and 
the challenges that founders face. They also have an amazing network and 
they mentor female founders because they want to make a difference. They 
want women to be successful. They believe in you.” Women’s Startup Lab 
has both female and male mentors. Ari shares an intriguing observation 
in this respect: “I noticed that 95% of our male mentors have a daughter.”
The mission-driven Cleantech Open accelerator works with assigned 
mentors from a pool of about 250 volunteers. Ian Foraker, executive director, 
states that “we have a great mentorship culture in the Bay Area. The value of 
the mentorship is proportional to the richness of the ecosystem. It’s really 
robust. So it’s easier to get volunteer mentors here. They are contributing, 
giving back, helping an important cause.” Much of Cleantech Open’s mentor-
ing is by mentor calls coupled with one-to-one business clinics, bootcamps, 
and webinars. “Mentors may be nearly retired, subject-matter experts; they 
may be in current transition; they may be consultants. They are asked to 
sign up between two to four hours a week over the course of the summer 
to meet with their startups teams.”
For Imagine H2O, mentoring is a crucial part of their accelerator program; 
“coachability is key” according to Nimesh Modak. “We have a core group 
of mentors that have been doing it year after year. They have very specif ic 
skill sets that match up to our mission. They dedicate probably ten to twelve 
hours a year. It all comes back to our mission. They look at what we are 
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doing and say: you know what, you are right. Water is crazy, diff icult, but 
terribly important. We get constantly requests from people to join our 
judging panel.” Colleague Tom Ferguson explains what it is that mentors 
offer: “They take the process of starting a company very seriously. And that’s 
everything from improving your pitch act, to how you are feeling as head 
of a new company, and let’s talk through some of the human stuff that’s 
going on, the pressure, cash flow issues, the need to deal with investors, 
making diff icult hiring decisions, f iring people. All the stuff that keeps 
startup founders up at night.”
Powerhouse, another niche accelerator, has a mentorship model based 
on facilitating linkages through network events. Emily Kirsch: “By orga-
nizing workshops, signature events, guest speaker presentations, we give 
our startups every opportunity to meet a potential mentor, and we let the 
mentor decide who they want to work with. There is a lot to be said for 
people self-selecting who they want to engage with on an ongoing basis. 
Everyone is adult, everyone is really ambitious, and that’s why they are 
here in the f irst place.”
Accelerators that are primarily focused on creating an inspiring environ-
ment for startups and some basic facilities – e.g. based on an off ice-renting 
model – have a looser, more informal mentor approach. Hacker Dojo is a 
good example. Jun Wong notes that “the process is quite organic, similar to 
how Sand Hill Road or downtown Mountain View came about. We try to 
make this an open space where people can come in. Mentors will naturally 
be around. We are very early stage. When teams are ready for the next 
stage, they’ll use other services in the Valley. There is a lot of mentorship 
in this area.”
Marlon Evans of GSVlabs calls volunteering mentorship “the secret sauce 
of Silicon Valley”. He goes on to explain: “We have 130 mentors that have 
all signed up to volunteer. They are not being compensated for their time, 
they just want to pay it forward because somebody helped them along their 
career too and they want to help others. We ask for two or three hours per 
month.” It is not all altruism, of course. “Some of them have gone to spend 
a lot more time, become advisors, get equity in the company. But that’s all 
up to them.” Mentor recruiting is not a real challenge for GSVlabs: “We have 
no issue in f inding mentors. For some niche areas, we may need to do some 
scouting. In fact, companies come to us and say, hey, we are an IT company, 
and we have employees that would love to be helpful to your community.”
Runway has similar experiences. Matt Walters relates that “I f ind it is 
relatively easy to get someone to be a mentor. A lot of it comes down to 
commitment level. Some mentors have a dedicated station here in Runway 
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and they are helping teams organically. Some come in once a month, stay 
with us for some time and have off ice hours. We post it on to everybody, 
and startup teams sign up for meeting with the mentor and work with 
them. I think it works well. We are not over-burning the mentors. It’s all 
on a voluntary basis.” Matt is a mentor himself, for example as a coach for 
startups teams that are fundraising. “We will sit down, go through their 
pitch deck, slide by slide. (…) VCs see so many deals that are constantly 
pitched that you really need to get to the point of your value proposition 
immediately. In the f irst 30 seconds you earn the next f ive minutes of their 
attention.”
Pitching is important in the early stage, while sales determine a startup’s 
survival chance. Effective accelerator mentorship centers around customer 
response and take-up. Sunil Bhargava of Tandem is clear about what he 
thinks is the most important factor: “In one sentence: it’s all about getting 
traction. The f irst thing is to sit down and really def ine some clear metrics 
that are going to be measured, to try some experiments that will lead to 
proof or disproof of the thesis whether to go to market. We f irst try to estab-
lish demand. Often what we f ind is that the cost of acquiring customers is 
too high or the experiments aren’t quite right. Then we have to go back to 
the drawing board and say okay it is a small change or it is really short and 
does not work.” Sunil’s mentoring method very much resembles the lean 
startup model developed by Eric Ries described in chapter 2.
Silicon Valley accelerators, in short, are all about mentoring. This conclu-
sion is aptly put by Duncan Logan of RocketSpace: “The Valley ecosystem, 
you know, is such that here everyone, everyone is a sort of mentor.”
Conclusion
Taking a helicopter view, it becomes clear from my f indings that stringent 
selection and close mentoring are key ingredients of the success formula 
of Silicon Valley startup accelerators. The admission bar is set high, and 
founder coaching is pivotal. Selectivity and mentor involvement are funda-
mental accelerator characteristics. The smaller, for-profit accelerators are 
most selective in their admissions policy, and they excel in hands-on startup 
coaching. Getting into a highly selective and reputed accelerator is a great 
launch pad and increases a startup’s chances for next-stage funding. How do 
accelerators select? The short answer is: team, technology, and market. Most 
accelerator executives look for strong teams with complementary founder 
skill sets as well as passion, drive, energy, and perseverance. Accelerators 
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favor founder teams over solo entrepreneurs, as they believe that growing 
a startup is a team effort. A good f it between technology and market is 
absolutely imperative. The better the scaling opportunities, the higher the 
startup’s chances of being admitted to the accelerator program.
The smoothly operating mentor system at Silicon Valley accelerators 
amazes many European visitors. Giving back to the community, in this case 
to the startup community, is part of the Valley’s DNA. All my interviewees 
state that f inding mentors is not a problem. Most of them are experienced 
entrepreneurs, many of whom have founded several startups. The large pool 
of mentors and coaches is remarkable, and in the early startup phase they 
offer their services for free. It would be naive, however, to conclude that the 
mentor system is purely altruistic. Mentors have an incentive to be linked 
to promising startups with scaling potential. Still, the entrepreneurial 
force of the prevailing Silicon Valley culture of voluntary mentoring is 
extraordinary.

5 Working on a Dream
Accelerator Startup Programs
In this chapter, I describe and analyze the main features of the Silicon Valley 
accelerator programs, particularly with respect to their nature, content, 
and structure. I take a closer look at the frequency, intensity, and duration 
of the different accelerator programs and the way they are organized. The 
descriptions and analysis provide a broad insight into the operational fun-
damentals of a wide variety of accelerator approaches and programs. As in 
the previous chapters, I f irst look at general/low-touch accelerators before 
moving on to the more domain-specif ic and niche/high-touch accelerators, 
and f inally accelerating platforms.
In spite of obvious differences in approach, focus, and strategy, all Silicon 
Valley accelerators underline the importance of selective admissions, strong 
founder teams, passion, the ability to think big, scalability, and growth.
General accelerators
500 Startups is one of the most renowned high-volume, cohort-based general 
accelerators in Silicon Valley. It offers a four-month program to admitted 
startup teams. Classes work with designated mentors on business strategy, 
product development, business growth, investor pitches, and customer 
acquisition. 500 Startups runs four classes a year, with 40-50 teams per 
cohort, and is now into batch 20 (as of spring 2017). It offers programs and 
in-house working space in Mountain View, San Francisco, and Mexico City. 
Startup teams come from over 20 countries, and more than 500 companies 
have graduated since 2010. Elizabeth Yin sums up the program’s essence as: 
“Traction and scalability. Our programs focus on optimizing prospective 
customer interaction and how to scale up the existing process. Successful 
growth is really about managing the details of these approaches.” These 
details are highly operational and functional. “Do teams write the right 
emails to customers? Do they send ‘cold’ emails? Do they make enough 
phone calls to potential customers? Do they try different interactions?” 
These are important practical questions that are systematically raised by 
founder team coaches, according to Elizabeth. So is sharing and feedback. 
“We ask our founder teams in our weekly batch meetings to share their 
problems, their fears – issues that keep them awake. Being a founder is very 
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lonely. The teams in their batch are the best people for them to rely on, as 
they are going through the same challenges.”
Plug and Play also organizes cohort-based programs for startup teams 
but over a 12-week period. Cohort size differs somewhat, depending on the 
technology vertical. In 2016, it accelerated over 300 startups. This high-
volume accelerator houses over 400 teams, many of which rent longer-term 
off ice space. Programs focus on business development, on f ine-tuning 
business models and marketing challenges, and on connecting startup 
teams to entrepreneurial experts and VCs. Plug and Play provides admit-
ted startups access to its infrastructure and on-site data center, logistical 
support, networking events, mentorship, corporate introductions, startup-
corporate engagement sessions, executives-in-residence, and introductions 
to investors. Achieving a good team-product-customer-investor f it is an 
essential part of Plug and Play’s accelerator programs. Saeed Amidi, Plug 
and Play’s founder and CEO, explains: “After we choose the best team, 
the best ideas, the best startups, we will introduce them to the corporate 
partners and venture capitalists in our network.” Plug and Play puts a lot 
of effort into creating a dynamic entrepreneurial vibe in its Sunnyvale 
accelerator off ices. Visitors from all over the world come and go. After my 
interview with Saeed, the CEO of a large Japanese electronics company and 
his entourage came in to say hello and shake hands.
The Alchemist Accelerator offers six-month programs, three times a 
year (overlapping classes), to a maximum of 17 teams. As of early 2017, 
it had organized a total of 14 batches. The Alchemist’s primary focus is 
on seed-stage enterprise startups, and its accelerator program centers on 
business model innovation, leadership, customer development, direct and 
online marketing and sales, market validation, and fundraising. There 
are weekly gatherings, lectures, workshops, roundtables, networking 
events, and brokered customer meetings. Program events are optional 
(except Demo Day). The gatherings organized are based on input from the 
Alchemist’s advisor faculty, guest lectures, VCs, and customer networks. 
Teaching skills and mentoring startup teams are standard elements of 
the program. Partner and COO Danielle D’Agostaro: “We do put [startups] 
in front of VCs, we do put them in front of customers, teach them how to 
pitch to both.” The Alchemist’s unique system of overlapping classes has 
advantages, as Danielle clarif ies: “Learning during overlapping classes 
changes. In the beginning, teams are learning about sales, and at the 
end, teams are learning about fundraising. While they are learning about 
fundraising, a new class is starting to learn about sales. We are constantly 
going through these stages back and forth. The teams coming in can see 
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what the future looks like, and the ones going out can coach the incoming 
teams. So there is a bit of internal mentoring. Big brother, big sister kind of 
thing.” Demo Day is the apotheosis of many accelerator programs. In the 
case of the Alchemist, it includes startup team pitches of a maximum of 
four minutes and a one-minute introduction by a lead customer, given to 
a large audience of investors.
Founders Space has a different philosophy and offers a combined in-
cubator and accelerator program. The program is an intensive two-week 
program f illed with classes, workshops, and lectures every day, culminat-
ing in investor Pitch Day. Its online incubator program provides three 
months of remote access to hundreds of startup video lessons and business 
materials. The accelerator program includes mentoring and training that 
zero in on participating startups’ business model, product-market f it, 
launch and marketing plan, traction, scalability, and pitch presentations. 
When asked if two weeks might not be a little short, Naomi Kokubo 
responds: “We have done a four-week program many times but we found 
that a two-week program works well, especially for our overseas teams. 
It is a very demanding, dynamic, and interactive program, with lots of 
one-on-one feedback moments.” The program ends with Pitch Day, where 
startup teams pitch to an audience of investors that includes angels, VCs, 
and corporate investors. Founders Space works with batches of about 10-20 
startup teams.
Samsung NEXT has coaching activities similar to a corporate startup 
accelerator. Their approach is to grow early-stage software startups into 
scalable businesses that impact the Samsung ecosystem and can ultimately 
help Samsung foster an energetic corporate startup culture. The broader 
Samsung NEXT organization has a single focus: to build, grow, and scale 
software startups. It has a strong preference for experienced founders, which 
Gary Coover, head of global operations, justif ies by explaining: “Part of that 
is we are not rigidly programmatic. When startups come in here, it is not 
like we are running a curriculum with classes all the time. We have a series 
of resources and a pool of deep domain experts that they can leverage. But 
the resources are there for each startup to leverage as they see f it. We offer 
services that are customized to f it the startup, not a rigid program. We 
are flexible and focus on the individual teams.” As mentioned in chapter 
3, Samsung NEXT Start offers a seed funding model and an in-residence 
model. Collectively, the models aim to boost innovation for Samsung. “Our 
mandate”, says Gary, “is to invest in areas that might be a couple of years 
ahead of where Samsung currently is, to stay in tune with groundbreaking 
new technologies and partner with tech innovators.”
108 AccelerAtorS in Silicon VAlley: Building SucceSSful StArtupS 
TiE LaunchPad is a smaller general accelerator for enterprise startups. 
Mentors are charter members of TiE Silicon Valley. It accepts four to eight 
B2B startups per batch for a f ive-month program. Mentors work on a weekly 
basis with founder teams during the program. The program consists of 
a curriculum of workshops, events, and speaker sessions covering sales, 
marketing, hiring, f inancials, and fundraising. There is a strong emphasis 
on pricing models and business strategy. Mentoring is a major program 
feature, as managing director Prashant Shah points out. “One of the unique 
things that we do is we allow startups to pick their mentor from the 350 
mentors we have. We work with a dedicated mentor model.” The program 
itself is very one-on-one – a workshop-oriented curriculum. “The basics, 
really. How to position your company, how to do presentations, how to get 
customers. And there is a lot of practice, a lot of interaction. We videotape 
founder presentations and pitches, and give them immediate feedback.” 
TiE LaunchPad organizes a Demo Day at the end of the program, but this 
should not inhibit participating startups from raising funds earlier on in 
the program.
Hardware accelerator HAX admits a total of 30 startups per year in two 
batches. The accelerator’s technology focus is on lifestyle and consumer 
electronics, robotics, health, infrastructure, and new materials. It offers a 
program where admitted teams relocate to HAX’s off ice and lab space in 
Shenzhen, China to f inalize their prototype and learn how to scale their 
business. Why the relocation? Founder and managing director Cyril Ebers-
weiler argues that there are a number of unique competitive advantages. 
In Shenzhen, startup teams are close to in-house prototype production, 
which is critical for hardware development. The metropolitan area (with 
a population of over 18 million) provides access to a massive pool of very 
cost-conscious and experienced engineers. China, furthermore, represents 
a huge B2B and B2C market, and HAX is located right in the heart of global 
electronics and manufacturing: Hua Qiang Bei. And going to Shenzhen, 
f inally, is an exceptional cultural experience. Cyril, who lived in Asia for 
more than 15 years and speaks Chinese fluently, illustrates these advantages 
with a telling example: “Say you build a robot. Robots can have 10,000 pieces 
inside, it needs to be manufactured. If you manufacture a robot anywhere 
else in the world, it is going to cost you millions of dollars; in Shenzhen, we 
build robots with 1,000 bucks and we sell them for 2,000 bucks. What do 
we do? We create new markets because we managed to reduce the cost; 
but it is not costing alone, it is using the scale of existing elements, the 
supply chain of manufacturing.” A different economy of scale is, in short, 
one of the main advantages of being relocated to China. “The other thing 
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that happened was that because we’re in ‎Shenzhen, our alumni started to 
come back to do the manufacturing and then to do the second product. It 
became some kind of a base where people were gravitating around, and 
that was perfect. Our alumni became our mentors. And we grew. That is 
why we’ve moved our off ice actually every year.” In just four years, HAX has 
expanded from a 100-square-meter off ice to 4,500 square meters.68 HAX is 
all about solid mentoring. Founder teams meet weekly with their mentors 
to discuss strategy, prototype, supply chain management, distribution, etc. 
The f inal two weeks are spent in San Francisco on perfecting the investor 
pitch at HAX Demo Day Showcase.
BootUP offers three types of accelerator programs as part of its eco-
system-based range of startup growth facilities and services: the general 
accelerator, the vertical accelerator, and the customized accelerator. The 
general accelerator is a three-month program aimed at launching and 
growing U.S. and international startups through educational sessions, 
tech talks, workshops, hands-on mentoring, site visits, and Demo Day 
pitches to VCs. The vertical accelerator links startups to specif ic corporate 
technology interests. Its program length varies but depends on the stage 
of proof-of-concept integration with sponsoring corporate partners. The 
customized accelerator, f inally, is a two-year targeted growth program for 
selected startups and is a follow-up to the general and vertical accelerator. 
The program is high-touch, with f ive to ten mentors “bringing different 
expertise along a startup’s growth journey,” as the program description 
states. These targeted accelerator programs service a wide variety of startup 
and corporate needs. As Marco ten Vaanholt claims, “For each one of them 
we have different kind of avenues to educate them appropriately. (…) The 
teachings that we provide to help startups accelerate can simultaneously 
be taught to corporates, can be taught to the innovators, can even be taught 
to foreign trade delegations that visit Silicon Valley.”
StartX and the Babson College Butler Venture Program are two, not-for-
prof it, general accelerators developed within universities. StartX offers 
a ten-week program three times a year to accepted founder teams from 
the Stanford University network. The program consists of four pillars: 
community, mentoring, education, and resources. The community pillar 
is based on building trusted professional relationships. Brian Hoffman, 
vice president of revenue, explains the vocabulary and approach: “Every 
other week we bring in our startups for two events. One is what we call our 
industry ‘neighborhoods’: we separate our startups by industry and stage. 
We surround them by their peers from that space (e.g., hardware, medical, 
enterprise). The space itself is run by Stanford alumni. The prime focus is 
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on getting people together to work on shared problems. This flows right into 
the second ‘neighborhood’ which is topic-centered, e.g., marketing, sales, 
technical challenges.” The idea behind the two neighborhoods is profes-
sional network building, problem sharing, and solution identif ication. It 
empowers starting entrepreneurs and enhances their social capital through 
access to the Stanford community. “To force people to come together is the 
only thing we force. To come together and share their struggling so that at 
the end of the program they are like, wow, I have all these Stanford people 
that I can call on, and they stay engaged with their community for the rest 
of their professional lives.” StartX does not offer a structured or manda-
tory curriculum, but through its Stanford mentor system and embedded 
neighborhood models it provides a one-to-one approach as well as targeted 
workshops to meet specif ic founder needs.
The Babson College Butler Venture Accelerator Program helps Babson 
students and alumni to build, launch, and scale their new business. The pro-
gram recently expanded to Babson’s San Francisco campus. Fifteen teams 
are selected to enter the Summer Venture Program, a ten-week intensive 
experience to accelerate startup growth from ideation to launch, from 
minimum viable product (MVP) to scale. The program offers housing, work-
space, meals, hands-on mentoring and advice, a speaker series, workshops, 
lunch and learn sessions, and other resources. “The ten weeks are incredibly 
intensive,” according to Cindy Klein-Marmer, associate director of the ac-
celerator program. “There is a constant focus on traction. The program is 
really about sales and marketing. The other pillar is a strong emphasis on 
community and accountability. We teach them how to lead and manage. We 
are training for real life.” Students get regular feedback from angel investors 
during the program. “Students love that – a highly sought experience.” The 
program culminates in the Summer Venture Showcase at which founder 
teams present their new business, their accomplishments, and their results 
to investors, industry innovators, and the Babson community.
Specialized accelerators
The domain-specif ic, smaller, for-prof it accelerators provide intensive 
(‘high-touch’) launch and growth programs but not in the cohort-structured 
way that is typical of high-volume, low-touch accelerators. The Hive, the 
data-driven co-creation studio, is a good representative of such high-touch 
accelerators. As T.M Ravi explains: “The Hive is a venture studio that creates 
companies. There are three ways in which we do that and we call them 
working on A dreAm 111
co-creation models. In the f irst case, we come up with a concept or idea and 
we validate that concept. We decide to fund this concept and we recruit 
co-founders and the rest of the startup team. A second case is that we 
embrace an early-stage founding team, typically less than f ive people, and 
work with them to build their company. The third case is that we collaborate 
with a partner corporation (e.g., GE, Verizon, EMC) to develop companies 
from scratch.” In each case, The Hive works very closely with founding teams 
in a hands-on operational way until the startup gets to the next round of 
funding (typically a series A round). “We lend our expertise, our experience, 
and our networks to drive momentum and value in these companies.”
The Fabric has a comparable vision but a different technology focus: 
cloud-based networking technologies. Prem Talreja, vice president of 
marketing, underlines the active and one-on-one way in which The Fabric 
coaches admitted startups and entrepreneurs, which has two sides: “We may 
own a significant part of the companies we fund, but we are absolute equals. 
We will roll up our sleeves to reduce the risk of failure. We are mentor, 
coach, and partner. We want to make sure that founder teams make use 
of us. If not, we will step in. We owe that to our shareholders.” The Fabric’s 
hands-on approach is to accelerate the process from an initial concept to 
a company, helping the new company to polish its product, to validate it 
with prospective customers and partners, and to develop a viable business 
model. Through this collaboration model, it works towards bringing the 
company to the next funding stage.
Tandem is another smaller, high-touch accelerator targeting both hard-
ware and software startups particularly in the f ield of mobile technology. 
Its accelerator studio and hardware prototyping lab is also based on the 
principle of active involvement to help startups grow. Tandem’s founder 
and managing partner Sunil Bhargava summarizes the philosophy: “To 
take whatever business they have and ref ine it, take whatever product they 
have and ref ine it. To go from a plan for traction to actually demonstrated 
traction.” In Sunil’s long experience as an entrepreneur, mentor, and coach, 
accelerated early startup growth is all about product-market fit, f ine-tuning, 
execution, traction, and team skills. And those keywords are the core of 
Tandem’s accelerator activities. In Sunil’s words: “The biggest thing is the 
importance of looking beyond your product. What is your business, what 
is the problem you are solving, who are your users, who are your custom-
ers, who is going to fund the product? It’s not about taking risk, it’s about 
understanding and removing risk.”
I next move to the four smaller (non-profit and for-profit) niche accel-
erators that center on specif ic problem areas or target groups: Cleantech 
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Open, Imagine H2O, Powerhouse, and Women’s Startup Lab. Cleantech 
Open’s mission is to launch and grow early-stage clean technology busi-
nesses by organizing a six-month training program (May to November) for 
accepted startup teams who spend about two to eight hours per week on 
program activities. The program is run by volunteer mentors, backed up by 
Cleantech Open’s regional and national professionals, and involves business 
clinics, webinars, workshops, speaker sessions, investor meetings, startup-
corporate matching, a three-day boot camp, and showcasing. Activities 
vary in focus, specif icity, and f it. Ian Foraker: “The business clinics, for 
instance, are very one-on-one; they are about expanding your network, get-
ting insight into particular startup issues. The workshops are more didactic, 
e.g. on marketing, customer profiling, funding.” Some events are regional, 
others are national. Ian compares Cleantech Open’s accelerator program 
to a multilayered cake consisting of different coatings. Data collection 
(customer discovery) is the foundation on which everything else is built. 
Structured dialogue (mentoring) is next and leverages the information 
collected through customer discovery. This is followed by clinics and 
networking events that offer additional perspectives and connections to a 
broad community. Webinars and workshops provide instruction in the key 
questions and issues that startups have. And the top layer is the showcas-
ing – the expo, connections with investors (investor speed-dating), and the 
pitch competition. At several f ixed moments in the program, startup teams 
will meet up. This allows them to become a group of peers – “a Cleantech 
community with a shared feeling that continues way after the program 
ends.”
The core activity of Imagine H2O, another non-profit, is to help its ac-
cepted startups bring to market their smart, data-driven solutions to short 
and long-term water issues. It offers a virtual, ten-month global program 
that provides water startup founder teams access to industrial, agricultural, 
and municipal customers, stakeholders, and investors in the water industry. 
Programs have topics that vary on a yearly basis such as water conservation, 
wastewater, food and agriculture, water eff iciency, and water data. The 
focus is on building and scaling successful water startups. The program 
starts with a weeklong boot camp in San Francisco, and over the next 
months mentors help teams remotely with product ref inement, marketing, 
funding, visibility, cash-flow management, organizational pressures, and 
team issues. Customer introductions are a salient part of the program, as 
Tom Ferguson notes: “We are very explicit about that. We offer our startup 
companies access to an expanding network of industry customers who 
agreed to have a look at our listed companies. If there is a f it, they will meet.” 
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Later on in the program, similar introductions will be arranged with the 
investor community. When asked whether remote support isn’t by def ini-
tion limited, director Modak responds: “Not at all. You can have almost as 
much impact remotely as you can do in person. Besides, we see a company 
three times during the program. Sticking to ten to twelve startups a year, we 
are able to offer a personalized approach.” There is no structured Demo Day, 
but showcasing occurs at the annual conferences of the American Water 
Works Association and the Water Environment Federation.
Powerhouse is a for-prof it, high-touch, niche accelerator focused on 
launching and growing solar startups. What are the main ingredients 
of its six-month program? Emily Kirsch, co-founder and CEO, answers: 
“Promotion, technology, and money. Powerhouse is building a brand and 
reputation space, which opens doors for our startups. Solar is a very specif ic 
niche technology that will change the world. Funding is obviously essential; 
we offer our startups access to a variety of investors.” Powerhouse organizes 
signature events, workshops, guest lectures, and investor speed-dating 
and brings in industry leaders, angel investors, VCs, and seasoned serial 
entrepreneurs. Startups work from Powerhouse’s 24/7 co-working off ice 
space in downtown Oakland in the East Bay area. Mentors and experts 
provide feedback on the startups’ progress and business strategy. Milestones 
and deliverables are standard program requirements. Emily: “I will meet 
with the startup teams every week to go over deliverables for that week to 
hold them accountable and provide some structure in running a company. 
Running a startup is a very amorphous endeavor.” Powerhouse works hard 
on creating a dynamic accelerator culture, for example by hosting a weekly 
Open House event for founder teams. “We talk about what they are working 
on, anything they are struggling with that the group might be able to help 
with. It really builds camaraderie and willingness to collaborate.”
The motto at Women’s Startup Lab is: “Together we rewrite the code for 
female entrepreneurial success.” This is quite a statement. Ari Horie, founder 
and CEO, argues that Silicon Valley traditionally is a very male-dominated 
culture, with subtle and not-so-subtle gender prejudices. She wants to 
address these preconceptions by empowering female business founders. 
“As a startup lab for women, we speak the same language, have common 
experiences. Having female founders together approaching a business in the 
way that matters to women creates a lot more confidence about launching 
and growing a company.” As mentioned earlier, the Startup Lab’s approach 
is based on the Japanese hito philosophy, which stands for support and 
accountability. Women’s Startup Lab accepts three to four batches a year, 
each with about nine startup founders. The one-year program starts with 
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an intensive, two-week, live-in accelerator immersion and ends with a 
two-week stay focused on funding activities. The program offers “trans-
formational” CEO coaching, 120 hours of startup evaluation and strategy 
sessions, customer leads and introductions, networking, connecting, VC 
pitching, lectures, and how-to workshops. The program activities are very 
much centered on the startup founder. As Ari summarizes: “Women’s 
Startup Lab is all about founder performance, about you as the founder. 
Do you come across persuasively? What is your mission? What is your story? 
Is your presence charismatic or timid? Are you confident? What about your 
f inancial knowledge and management style? All of these are necessary 
founder skills and part of our program.”
Accelerating platforms
I conclude my analysis in this chapter by looking at accelerators that pri-
marily offer off ice or exhibition space and that mainly get their revenue 
from rent or memberships, but on top of that may offer services that help 
startups to grow. Prospect Silicon Valley operates a non-profit technology 
demonstration center that focuses on the commercialization of new urban 
technologies to build smart, sustainable cities. It supports 16 to 18 startup 
companies at a time through a variety of support mechanisms: work and 
lab space to develop and exhibit new urban technologies, stakeholder con-
nections, corporate partnering, investor referrals, network events, and 
innovation showcasing. Doug Davenport refers to these companies as his 
“startup clients”, and the employees within Prospect who work with clients 
as his “champions”. “Our champions”, Doug tells me, “ are really working 
with our startup clients to help them connect to the right people, to the 
right networks and stakeholders, and help them to develop their project or 
help get them advice.” Prospect’s role is to activate the urban ecosystem 
that a startup company seeks to innovate and to assist the founder team 
with product development, ref inement, partner development, and going-
to-market strategy.
GSVlabs houses over 170 startups in its 72,000-square-foot campus facil-
ity. As mentioned previously, it focuses on f ive verticals: big data, sustain-
ability, education technology, entertainment, and mobile. CEO Marlon 
Evans asserts that: “One of our competitive advantages is that, because 
we focus a little bit later-stage, the programming that we offer can be very 
much tailored to that growth phase. We have specific programming around 
the f ive key vertical areas, and then we have general programming that is 
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designed to prepare companies for this next phase of growth. We sit down 
with each of the startup companies at the beginning of each month and 
say ‘How can we be helpful to you, how about your milestones?’” GSVlabs 
employs about 18 staff people to support the 170 startups divided over 
the f ive verticals. Marlon is very enthusiastic about Pioneer Accelerator, 
an intensive three-month program on startup acceleration that GSVlabs 
recently co-designed with Google Launchpad. The program consists of 
a boot camp on product development and marketing within the Google 
ecosystem; remote learning sessions on market validation and growth 
strategies; skills workshops on pitch coaching, brand building, and customer 
traction; mentorship and progress tracking; investor intros; and a Demo 
Day for invite-only investors.
Runway is a technology hub that provides co-working space for entre-
preneurs, corporate innovation services, and innovation events. Runway 
is not just about off ice space, as Matt Walters explains. “We have partners 
that specialize in e.g. IP law, sales tactics, public relations, or HR. We do 
meet-up groups on connected cars, FinTech, augmented reality. We host 
panel discussions with successful entrepreneurs; we do corporate introduc-
tions.” Matt emphasizes the importance of having a vivid co-working off ice 
culture: “We are a community because of our culture. I think about culture 
a lot. You really need to spend a lot of time creating a strong community 
culture and tend to it. If we feel our teams are not collaborating enough, 
we will organize special events like matchmaking, like introductions, like 
happy hours. We want to create a community where startups are helping 
each other and where we are engaging with the startups.” Runway also 
offers a special accelerator program on EdTech, together with the Michelson 
20MM Foundation. The four-month, cohort-based virtual program supports 
innovations that improve the access and affordability of higher education. 
The program consists of targeted content and feedback via phone/video 
meetings, web-based presentations, and online collaboration.69
Hacker Dojo markets itself as a tech hub in the South Bay that is one 
part working space, one part events venue, and one part maker space: “The 
place to launch a software startup or build a robot.” It does not offer a 
structured curriculum or formalized accelerator program to startup classes; 
instead, it is primarily a place where like-minded people work and meet 
and sometimes hang out. But it also offers a wide range of events, lectures, 
BarCamps, parties, and hackathons. A random sample of event titles from 
Dojo’s early 2017 agenda includes: ‘PixelHacks’; ‘Bay Area’s First All-Female 
High School Hackathon’; ’Learn JavaScipt’; ‘Self Driving Car Study Group’; 
‘Discussion of Patents/IP’; ‘IBM HackNight’, ‘Eight-Week VR Development 
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Class & VR Boot Camp’; ‘Coder Dojo Silicon Valley: Advanced Coding for 
Youth’. These events are organized by Hacker Dojo’s members. As executive 
director Jun Wong states: “Members are part of our volunteer community. 
Most of our events are run by members. This way, the Dojo stays mean and 
lean. We’re not a traditional accelerator.” Hacker Dojo, which is open 24/7, 
is attached to its co-working culture. “We try to make this an open place, 
we don’t have too many formal rules, we’re open to feedback, we’re flexible, 
we depend on volunteers. All this happens naturally.”
RocketSpace is one of the most prominent Silicon Valley co-working 
platforms, with a large San Francisco campus and with new locations in 
England, China, and Australia as of 2017.70 It enables multiple corporates 
and later-stage startups to collaborate in an ongoing innovation and growth 
platform. Besides its 24/7 co-working space portfolio, RocketSpace organizes 
accelerator programs around a number of industries: food & agriculture, 
logistics, mobility, insurance, healthcare, retail, telecom, and media. The 
core of the programs is about connecting startups with leading industry 
mentors, product validation through pilot testing with corporate partners, 
feedback sessions, and investor introductions. RocketSpace takes on two 
startup cohorts a year per industry, with six to ten startups per batch. It 
holds a wide variety of weekly workshops and seminars on marketing, 
social media, sales strategies, tax issues, and IPOs, to name a few, and 
monthly so-called Trend Talks with industry leaders and entrepreneurs. 
RocketSpace’s main selling point as a co-working space and as an accelerator 
is, according to Duncan Logan, “Connections. Our big thing for our startup 
clients is access to capital, access to corporates, access to each other, and 
then education around that. One of the things RocketSpace does very well 
is connecting founder teams to the marketplace. So, we might have teams 
come here and part of their business model is using Facebook as a platform. 
Well, we have great connections into Facebook, we can get to some of their 
key people in a day.”
Conclusion
General/low-touch accelerators share a number of characteristics in terms 
of their programs. They admit larger numbers of startup team applicants 
(after strict procedures), are organized in batches or cohorts, and have a 
broad scope of technologies they are interested in. Most of them take equity, 
and their programs typically concentrate on relatively short periods (three 
to four months or shorter) and lead up to a Demo Day where prototypes 
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are pitched to investors. Plug and Play, 500 Startups, and the Alchemist 
Accelerator all f it into this accelerator category.
Although their scalability and growth philosophy is technology-agnostic, 
these general/low-touch accelerators may introduce technology ‘verticals’ 
covering more specif ic sectors such as mobile, f inance, media, Internet of 
Things, and health. Plug and Play is a good example. These accelerators do 
not admit startup teams on a rolling basis but work with classes of teams 
that participate and graduate as a cohort. The programs that are offered are 
structured almost as a standard school curriculum, with a clear beginning 
and a clear end. They include milestones, time frames, working towards 
a marketable product prototype, getting traction and f irst customers, 
structured team-investors meetings, and even graduation ceremonies. Their 
focus on classes or cohorts is based on the philosophy that startup teams 
all face similar challenges and that working with peers who go through 
comparable new-venture cycles makes a great difference.
Specialized/high-touch (domain-specif ic and niche) accelerators have a 
different growth philosophy. They believe in active co-creation through a 
hands-on approach. Accelerator executives work closely with their startup 
teams. Such an intensive, individualized method of company building is 
only possible when a limited number of startups are admitted to an accelera-
tor. Some of these accelerators that do not provide in-house off ice or lab 
space have introduced smart methods of remote education and mentoring. 
All of these specialized accelerators – whether profit or non-profit – focus on 
business model ref inement, product technology development, marketing, 
traction, targeted customer and investor introductions, and team building. 
The main goal of both general/low-touch and specialized/high-tech ac-
celerators is to bring startup companies to the next level of funding through 
the development of a marketable and scalable product. Marketability and 
scalability are the magic words in the accelerator dictionary.
Accelerating platforms – “off ice space plus” accelerators – focus on 
providing co-working and/or lab space but also offer customer and inves-
tor introductions and organize event programming including workshops, 
seminars, guest lectures, and in-house startup happy hours. Silicon Valley 
accelerating platforms are not to be compared with traditional shared 
off ice buildings, as is customary in Europe. These platforms are much more 
entrepreneurial because they offer services that help startups to accelerate 
and link them to strategic networks of investors and customers.

6 Accelerator Darlings, Challenges, and 
Future Plans
All accelerators have their showcases of startups they see as their greatest 
successes. In this chapter, I analyze these accelerator darlings and the 
reasons they were nominated by my respondents. What is their underlying 
def inition of success? Is it mainly related to the funds raised by accelerator 
startups or their social impact as well? The other side of success is, of course, 
failure. Do my respondents see a pattern in why startups fail? Does it come 
down to team, product, or market? It will become clear from my analyses 
that there is a multitude of factors related to startup success or failure. 
Predicting startup performance is a poorly developed discipline, much to 
the chagrin of accelerator CEOs and investors. But it is clear that traction 
is indispensable for a startup to grow to the next level.
I next examine the greatest challenges that accelerator executives 
face – challenges they need to address, challenges that are returning issues, 
challenges that dominate their management agenda. The chapter ends with 
a grander view and even some speculation. I asked respondents to share 
their dreams for the accelerator they run. How does the future look for 
their accelerator and which changes to their program are they planning?
Success, failure, and showcases
I asked accelerator executives why some startups are successful whereas 
others fail and which startups that graduated from their accelerator they are 
particularly fond of. Let us f irst examine some of the general accelerators. 
Predicting startup success is a tricky business, according to Elizabeth Yin 
of 500 Startups. Her accelerator has invested in over 1,800 startups, “But the 
funny thing is you just never know how things will go. You don’t really know 
until it’s over either way.” For her showcases, Elizabeth nominates a number 
of stellar startups that participated in 500 Startups’ seed and accelerator 
program, most of them B2B: Twilio (pay-as-you-go cloud communications 
platform), Credit Karma (credit and f inancial management platform), and 
Intercom (business messaging services). Twilio went public (IPO) in 2016, 
while Credit Karma raised $368 million and Intercom $115 million.71
Picking early winners is a major challenge faced by accelerators. Investor 
math is a matter of continuous trial and error. Saeed Amidi of Plug and 
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Play admits: “We all make mistakes. I had the opportunity to invest in 
Airbnb but we backed out. We had the opportunity to invest in Facebook 
really early. But all in all, we have around 20 startups that are close to half 
a billion valuation.” Among Saeed’s showcases are Dropbox (a cloud storage 
service), Lending Club (a peer-to-peer lending marketplace), SoundHound 
(audio recognition), Prevedere (business performance forecasting), and 
NatureBox (a healthy snacks delivery service). The funds that have been 
raised by these showcase examples are impressive: Dropbox raised $607 
million, SoundHound $75 million, Prevedere $9.5 million, and NatureBox 
$58.5 million, while LendingClub went public in 2014.72
Danielle D’Agostaro of the Alchemist Accelerator pinpoints what makes 
startups successful: “The companies that hustle. They know how to execute, 
they know what they need to get done, and they do it. They don’t let hurdles 
slow them down. If they can’t get it in the f irst way, they try a hundred 
other ways to do it. They persevere, they are determined, they want to 
make this happen. I would say the successful ones tend to be the ones that 
are the hustlers.” While the Alchemist is too young to have any graduates 
that have gone public, there have been about 13 acquisitions. For example, 
Assemblage (a cloud-based collaboration platform) was acquired by Cisco. 
Other showcase examples include Oomnitza (IT asset management), which 
raised $2.6 million; MightyHive (data-driven marketing), which raised $2.8 
million; and Rigetti (quantum supercomputing), which raised $3 million.73 
With regard to Alchemist startups that Danielle herself gets really excited 
about, she says: “Honestly: the ones that are just world-changing.” One 
of them is Positron Dynamics, which develops anti-matter rockets that 
would power the fastest spacecraft ever created and could eventually enable 
interstellar travel. Thinking big in optima forma. Positron is funded by a 
consortium of visionary investors that includes Peter Thiel, Tim Draper, 
and Ravi Belani.
At BootUP, Marco ten Vaanholt recently looked into just how successful 
his startups have been: “I was asking myself how many startups did I have 
over the last two years since we have this building? Ninety-eight companies, 
of which about forty graduated. None of them has failed. They have raised 
over $280 million already, and that’s not because of us only, but because of 
the plays of good JuJu: their current valuation is at $3.5 billion. That’s great. 
That’s an amazing statistic.” Marco believes that their success is related 
to BootUP’s family-style and connectivity-style approach on how it does 
business. “It’s a really personal relationship that we are building. It’s more 
focused on giving back and doing the right thing. It’s not always focused on 
making the most money. So it goes back to the DNA of BootUP: furthering 
AccelerAtor dArlingS, chAllengeS, And future plAnS 121
entrepreneurialism. It’s the ecosystem at work.” Among Marco’s personal 
favorites is AppMachine (creating mobile business apps), a Dutch company 
that was accelerated by BootUP. “Within ten months, we showcased real 
results with real pipeline, with real revenue, and real value. AppMachine 
was invested at an enormous amount by one of the largest website hosting 
companies in the world.”74
When asked whether he could observe a pattern in factors that cause 
a startup to fail, Prashant Shah of TiE LaunchPad, replies: “I think the 
question you’re asking is the million-dollar question. The question is simple 
but the answer is not. It’s not just team or market conditions. That’s too 
easy. Failure is very hard to predict.” LaunchPad’s high-risk profile makes 
it susceptible to failure. “Our plan is that over the life of our fund, we will 
invest in 40-50 companies. Maybe f ive of them will be the ones that actually 
make the fund profitable. Because we invest in early-stage startups with 
teams that are really f irst-time entrepreneurs, we know that the risk profile 
is very high on the fund. We have done three batches now, and in every batch 
there is always one company that seems to move ahead of the rest of them.”
Gary Coover of Samsung NEXT weighs the difference between what 
makes a startup a success or a failure: “A lot of it has to do with the founders. 
Experience, tenacity, and knowing how to de-risk the startup are important 
success dimensions. Failure is often a result of being unable to prioritize 
efforts, to focus on the wrong things, which reduces the ability to drive 
real customer traction.” Samsung has acquired a number of startups via 
its in-residence accelerator program, of which Gary gives two showcase 
examples: Mapzen (an open-source mapping platform) and StickiBoard (a 
shared family dashboard).
Asking Brian Hoffman about his favorite StartX startups evokes an 
understandable reaction: “It is like asking parents what their dearest child 
is.” It could be about the founder, the team, the company’s mission, its 
f inancial performance. Brian gives three examples of successful StartX 
companies: Periscope (a live video streaming app), which was acquired by 
Twitter; Life360 (a GPS family locator and messaging app), which raised 
$73 million; and Lily (drone cameras), which raised $15 million.75 These are 
highly visible consumer brands, but as Brian indicates, some of the really 
big tech Stanford innovations – for example in the medical sector – are 
contributions to deep science that do not become consumer market startups 
but will be part of high-end enterprise technology. They are successful in 
terms of their contribution to society but not in terms of their mass visibility.
Cindy Klein-Marmer of Butler Venture Accelerator of Babson College 
notes that it has had successful student startups in its portfolio. “We have 
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undergraduate students who come in and they have run businesses in their 
high school, they make f ive f igures basically. They are very excited because 
they are sitting there with 10, 20, 30,000 dollars in revenue. It’s not a million 
in revenue, it’s not $100,000 in revenue, but some have come pretty close.” 
Cindy gives an example of a student who ran a webhosting business that 
he started when he was 13, which earned a few million in revenue. This 
business later became his side business when he decided to launch a startup 
creating a f ile-sharing platform.
Specialized prof it and non-prof it accelerators all share the belief that 
traction is decisive. Traction determines whether a startup is on the right 
path; it also reflects product-market f it and team performance. Sunil Bhar-
gava of Tandem believes very strongly that “traction is the key to success. A 
good team generates traction, and traction makes a team stronger.” Sunil 
estimates that at least six out of ten startups will fail. “A lot of companies fail 
because they don’t get traction for a variety of reasons. Because the founder 
is not seeing things in the right way and sometimes it is just the wrong 
thesis. Companies may have a good team, may have a good product, but they 
aren’t able to crack the traction problem.” Although Tandem is a relatively 
recent accelerator and investment fund, Sunil is proud to point to some 
successes. ZumoDrive is a cloud-based f ile synchronization and storage 
service that came to power HP’s recent CloudDrive technology. Tandem 
helped ZumoDrive to pivot its initial product strategy. BashGaming, the 
casual game maker for social and mobile platforms, is another example. 
GSN later bought BashGaming for about $165 million.76 Tile, a Bluetooth 
item tracker, is a third successful example and was Tandem’s f irst hardware 
company; it raised $34 million.77
The Fabric, another recent accelerator, has built up a number of compa-
nies of which VeloCloud is the most shining example. It is a B2B providing 
software-defined wide area networking (SD-WAN) that raised $49 million 
in two rounds, with Cisco as an investor.78 Prem Talreja is proud of The 
Fabric’s role in accelerating VeloCloud: “It was the f irst startup we did and 
became a home run, a market leader. They could achieve north of $500 
million to $1 billion validation. It has turned into a rock star market leader, 
our poster child so to speak.”
The Hive, the co-creation studio, has seen over twenty startups go 
through its program since late 2012, four of which have successfully ex-
ited. Kosei, a startup that specializes in recommendation systems, was 
acquired by Pinterest in 2015; Deep Forest Media, a programmatic mobile 
marketing company and demand-side platform (DSP), was sold to Rakuten 
Marketing in the same year; Jobr, which developed a mobile job search 
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app, was acquired by Monster Worldwide in 2016; and Nurego, a business 
operations platform for industrial internet applications, was acquired in 
early 2017.79 T.M. Ravi explains why he gets so much personal satisfaction 
from coaching startups: “We play with cutting-edge technology: building 
software robots that automate customer support and customer software. 
We are playing with augmented reality and virtual reality. We are working 
on the frontiers of how we will be living our life in the next 25 years. We are 
creating something from nothing, and seeing it blossom and succeed. (…) 
There is no other thrill that is as fulf illing. You personally made it happen 
and it wouldn’t have happened without you.”
Niche accelerators have their share of successes and failures. Tom Fer-
guson of Imagine H2O, has an interesting view of what makes a startup 
stronger: storytelling. “The biggest lesson is the importance of storytelling. 
You have to tell your story as a startup. It’s not just marketing visibility, it’s 
about understanding and communicating exactly what your business is 
about. Your company narrative and the way you tell it is absolutely critical.” 
Nimesh Modak, Imagine’s director, adds that startup failure is often related 
to underestimating the business importance of knowing your customer, 
of unlocking the market, which directly links to the topic of storytelling: 
“The better you know your customer, the better you know which story you 
need to tell.” Three startup graduates Tom and Nimesh are particularly 
proud of are Valor Water Analytics, which transforms water utility data 
f lows worldwide into actionable decision-making through innovative 
software; Nexus e-Water, which develops B2B water recycling hardware; 
and WaterSmart Software, which uses mobile and online tools to help water 
utilities educate and engage their customers to save water and money. These 
three Imagine H2O darlings reflect a breadth of hardware and software 
technology in different water sectors. Valor Water Analytics was able to 
raise $2.8 million, Nexus-eWater $4 million, and WaterSmart Software 
$13.3 million in funding.80
Cleantech Open accelerates quite a number of startup companies 
throughout the U.S. Ian Foraker names two companies that rank high 
among his personal favorites. One is PowWow Energy – Cleantech Open 
2013 winner – which provides Software as a Service (SaaS) solutions for 
increasing water use eff iciency in the agricultural sector. It raised over 
$3 million in funding, including a grant from the California Energy Com-
mission.81 Ian: “One of the things they do is using the power signature of 
electric pump systems to tell whether there are leaks in agricultural f ields. 
Fascinating technology, excellent founding team, great traction.” The other 
favorite is Vartega – winner of the Cleantech Open 2015 national emerging 
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technology prize – which specializes in carbon f iber-reinforced recycled 
plastic for mass use applications. “This has real signif icant implications 
for the growth of the whole recycling industry”, Ian claims. Vartega raised 
$57,600 in equity funding and $250,000 in grants.82
Powerhouse CEO Emily Kirsch selects her f ive showcase examples 
based on a variety of reasons: innovation, mission, funding, traction, and 
diversity. Mosaic, which provides residential solar loans and f inancing, 
was what inspired the creation of Powerhouse and recently managed 
to raise $200 million in loan capital.83 Powerhive is another of Emily’s 
favorites because it supplies affordable micro-grid electricity for rural 
homes and businesses in developing countries around the globe, having 
f irst launched in Tanzania. PVComplete is a B2B platform for automat-
ing solar system design, and UtilityAPI provides instant access to utility 
bill data that can be used for solar company quotes. Both startups have 
substantial traction and were able to receive funding from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy along with private capital (UtilityAPI raised $972,000).84 
And f inally, Sunswarm is a community shared solar farm marketplace 
that Emily is especially proud of because it was one of the f irst movers 
in a huge market. Diversity is also key for Powerhouse: PVComplete and 
UtilityAPI have female co-founders and CEOs, and Sunswarm has an 
African-American founder and CEO. “At Powerhouse, it is important that 
not just our employees but also our founder teams ref lect the diversity of 
our city [Oakland].” Empowering female startup founders and diversity 
is a major concern of Emily: “Because the bottom line for any company 
increases when women serve on boards in leadership positions. Less than 
four percent of U.S. venture capital goes to women, which is pathetic. 
What’s even more pathetic is that one percent of venture capital funding 
goes to African-Americans and Latinos.”85
Empowering female startup founders is the core business of Women’s 
Startup Lab. Ari Horie notices that, after completing her accelerator pro-
gram, founders gain a new level of confidence, have better networks, receive 
referrals, have access to funders, and have the right mindset and skills to be 
successful. Red Clay, a platform that connects brands to freelance industrial 
designers to turn product ideas into manufacture-ready technical f iles, has 
a prominent place in Women’s Startup Lab’s showcases. “We helped the 
founder with introductions to the circuit, and all those people were like, 
wow, she’s great. She got a lot of attention, referral after referral, and she just 
took off.” Red Clay raised $1 million in equity funding.86 Another success 
story is Babierge, a platform that connects travelers with baby gear rentals 
(for example in airports), which has expanded to almost 30 locations in the 
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U.S. and Canada. In this case, too, the founder’s increased confidence and 
network introductions made the difference.
I conclude this section by evaluating the five accelerating platforms. Pros-
pect SV is a young innovation hub and demonstration platform launched in 
2014. Founder Doug Davenport nominates ConnectMyEV, which provides 
smart and hands-free conductive chargers for electric vehicles, as one of 
Prospect’s showcases. “This startup client is developing prototypes and is 
working with one of the largest car companies in the world. It’s very, very 
interesting stuff.” Thomas Power is another case. It works on retrof itting 
transit diesel busses in their mid-life stage by sustainable energy software 
and power management systems that transform them into hybrid and 
electric means of transportation. Doug reveals that the founder “is a really 
smart person who’s got incredible experience and is leading a team in three 
countries. This startup client has gotten a couple of investment rounds and 
is starting on multi-million-dollar pilot projects.”
Established in 2012, GSVlabs does not have a long track record, but Marlon 
Evans tells me that a few companies have already done very well. “A good 
example is an Australian company, LIFX, that raised over $15 million. We 
just had another company acquired by WeWork. More of those stories will 
be coming up, as we are still a young company.” LIFX distributes Wi-Fi 
enabled, multi-colored LED lights controllable via a smart device.
When asked about his favorite successful startups, Runway’s Matt 
Walters does not need to think long. One is Atomwise, which develops 
artif icial intelligence systems for drug discovery: it raised $6.3 million.87 
“This is really cutting-edge data modeling using super computers and deep 
learning to simulate the effects of drugs from a compound of thousands of 
approved medicines that might, for instance, cure Ebola or MS. They partner 
with Merck, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world.” His 
second pick is Skycatch, which develops drones to analyze the progress at 
large construction industry sites delivering precision aerial mapping and 
3D models. It managed to raise over $41 million.88 “This, too, is fascinating 
technology. These drones are fully autonomous and self-charging, so they 
provide 24-hours continuous coverage.” Skycatch partners with Komatsu, 
the world’s second-largest construction equipment manufacturer.
Hacker Dojo’s Jun Wong has a two-part answer to my question on the 
successful startups that came out of the Dojo. “What would the def inition 
be? Well, I’ll answer it the easy way and the hard way. In terms of market 
valuation, Pinterest is one of our showcases. But there are much smaller ones 
that launched good projects, creative projects, projects with an impact. We 
had a group here that was able to make a self-driving robot which you can 
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drive around, recognizes people, and knows how to navigate. They were 
able to make this prototype out of $500 worth of material.” Pinterest, the 
popular visual bookmarking tool for saving and discovering creative ideas, 
is in a different league: it raised total equity funding of $1.3 billion and is 
currently valued at $11 billion.89
RocketSpace’s founder and CEO Duncan Logan attributes the success of 
his accelerator to its competitiveness, its infectious environment, and its 
entrepreneurial drive, in addition to the rigorous selection process. “This 
is Real Madrid [one of the most successful professional soccer clubs in 
Europe].” As a consequence, Duncan adds, “We’ve had an incredibly low 
failure rate. Of the 750 or so startup companies that have been through 
RocketSpace, the failure rate is about 15%.” Uber, Spotify, and Zappos are 
among RocketSpace’s famed alumni that went on to disrupt traditional 
markets and have a tremendous impact on consumer behavior.
To summarize, f inancial performance is a major element of how ac-
celerator executives evaluate their startups’ track record, particularly in 
terms of the amount of funding raised, whether or not they were acquired 
by a larger company, and whether they went public. Traction appears to 
be a determining factor in whether a startup will be successful or end in 
failure. Traction makes or breaks a startup. But this is not the whole story: 
innovation impact, social leverage, and market disruption were also named 
as important aspects of startup success. Many of the favorites chosen by 
accelerator executives succeeded in valorizing fascinating applications of 
breakthrough technologies.
Challenges and future plans
In this section, I examine some of the challenges that accelerator executives 
face and the business dreams they have for the near future. What strategic 
issues do they feel they need to address, and what innovations do they want 
to implement? Do accelerator founders and CEOs see a need for pivoting 
their business strategy?
At Plug and Play, one of the challenges and future plan is further ex-
pansion at both the national and international levels. CEO Saeed Amidi 
elucidates: “I want to have an innovation platform and accelerator on top 
of it. We just opened accelerators in China, Paris, Stuttgart, Berlin, and 
Amsterdam, and we may do New York City, London, and others in the 
future. Accelerators provide incredible opportunity for people to meet. 
They might be corporations from an industry that is being disrupted, or 
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they might be from the venture world that is looking for investments.” 
This expansion strategy is part of a larger scheme that Saeed dreams of 
realizing – a dream that consists of numbers and impact – personal impact, 
to be precise. “I have made a positive impact in about 6,000 startups since 
I opened Plug and Play. As I said, we recently opened new off ices in China 
and Europe. My dream is that I would love to make a positive impact in like 
10,000 startups; a 1,000 new ventures per Plug and Play vertical, and really 
change the industry. Half of it U.S., and half international. And then with 
all the startups in Germany, France, Spain, China, etc. we build a bridge to 
the mothership here in Silicon Valley. Their engineering teams could stay 
in Europe or Asia, but they have their headquarters here. That gives them 
access to the $6 billion to $10 billion market cap in the Valley.”
Elizabeth Yin of 500 Startups has no grand plans for her accelerator but 
underlines that the accelerating startup program itself is a dynamic one. 
“It’s a different program than it was a few years ago. And I fully expect that 
in another few years it will change again. I would love to grow our batches. 
But at this moment we are not anticipating building any accelerators outside 
the Bay Area. We may just increase the size of our batches.” And what about 
500 Startups’ international ambitions? “Half of our investment partners 
are located outside of the U.S.: Europe, Asia, Middle East, Latin America. 
They help us with scouting startup companies and bring them here for the 
program. For fundraising, for the ecosystem, Silicon Valley remains one of 
the best places in the world. It makes sense to be here.”
One of the challenges faced by accelerators that do not require man-
datory program attendance is the danger of community erosion, of not 
building a strong startup batch culture. Danielle D’Agostaro of Alchemist 
Accelerator recognizes this challenge. “We need a balance. That’s why we 
also have social events outside of just the educational components as well. 
There definitely is a stronger community between the people that show up 
regularly. We are also a little bit more open towards live streaming of our 
expert talks and founder presentations than we were before. It’s a balancing 
act.” But the majority does participate. They pay for the program, and many 
international founders move all the way out to Silicon Valley in order to 
attend the program. International expansion is on Alchemist’s agenda. 
“We are actually in talks right now with some people who want to take 
Alchemist internationally, and we are looking at possible locations. I think 
in three years, Alchemist is not only going to be a Silicon Valley accelerator, 
and it’s probably going to have its brand expanded, and not just in Europe.”
Founders Space is a general but smaller accelerator. It has an interna-
tional outreach but doesn’t plan to turn the company into a mammoth 
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accelerator. Naomi Kokubo says: “We’ve had investors requesting to invest 
in Founders Space. But we said no. We don’t need the outside investment. 
But we are interested in setting up a good institutional venture fund not 
investing in us but in our startups.” Founders Space would prefer to organize 
its international ambitions by using different templates, for example by 
franchising its model. “Having cobranded accelerators in China, Europe, 
Middle East, Asia, South America, and other parts of the world, with their 
independent organization and staff – this approach works very well.” In May 
2017, Founders Space announced that it was opening a branch in Chengdu, 
with other Chinese cities to follow.
TiE LaunchPad is also a smaller accelerator. Prashant Shah points to 
a challenge that is size-related. “Because we are so highly selective, the 
challenge is whether our present number of startups of about ten companies 
a year is suff icient to keep the program going. If we are only investing in a 
handful of startups, then the returns get longer as well. We are at a slower 
investment pace than most other venture funds, and that means that we 
have to start raising our next fund pretty early on.” Does this self-diagnosis 
imply a pivot of the LaunchPad’s main strategy? “Well, maybe. A solution 
might be that we have to invest in startups directly, even if they are not part 
of our program. See ourselves as angels.” And in fact that is what LaunchPad 
recently decided to do: to continue as TiE Angels.
BootUP’s Marco ten Vaanholt is passionate about the strength of Silicon 
Valley’s ecosystem but also sees a serious challenge. “The climate here is 
that we have so many accelerators, everybody takes an equity position 
in early-stage startups between f ive and eight percent for 50-100K. That 
is a lot of money for a startup to give away– a lot of money for what is 
sometimes not more than a three-month pitch training. And then send 
them out into the world with $50,000. That’s the downside.” It is a model, 
according to Marco, that no serial startup entrepreneur is willing to accept. 
“What startups need is traction. And in traction they are willing to give up 
retainer fees, to give up revenue share, and only then they are willing to give 
up equity. Traction before funding, not the other way around. No funding 
before traction.” This is just one step to Marco’s dream for the future. “I 
want BootUP to become the de facto ‘tractionator’ of the world. I get the 
better startups with better survival prospects. I f ind it ridiculous that such 
a small percentage of startups succeeds.” Part of Marco’s dream is to work 
with European corporate partners and accelerate their startups in Silicon 
Valley. “BootUP built the ecosystem for doing so.”
Does a corporate accelerator such as Samsung NEXT encounter different 
challenges than non-corporates? Yes and no, according to Gary Coover. 
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“We want to make sure that we are leveraging the strengths without also 
suffering from the perceived weaknesses of a large corporate.” Competition 
for talent is a shared challenge. “There is def initely competition for talent. 
It’s hard for good startups to hire great engineers, and it’s hard for great 
accelerators to attract great talent. As a result, we think a lot about how we 
compete, how we can be different.”
Cyril Ebersweiler, founder and managing director of HAX, raises a 
completely different challenge: what exit strategy will accelerators develop 
for themselves, not just for the startups they help grow? “What we soon 
will see is actual liquidity coming out of accelerators. They are creating 
enormous value for themselves. I think that accelerators will either be 
bought or they will go IPO. This really will change the playing f ield.” If 
Cyril’s prediction would become reality, it would certainly affect the way 
accelerators operate, their business model, the startups they seek to grow, 
their investment strategy, and the ROI they are after. It would impact the 
business parameters of accelerators in the future. What about HAX’s own 
future? What are Cyril’s dreams with respect to his own accelerator? “I 
would like to take on bigger projects. One is about building a new city. It 
is a ten-year program, but there are ways to do that. HAX Infra will play a 
major role. In three years, Infra will have a hundred companies that have the 
potential to implement a hundred technologies at the city level. I don’t even 
know how to def ine it, but it is going to be fascinating. It’s going to be big.”
What are the challenges that university-linked accelerators encounter, 
and what are their plans for the future? StartX wants to rethink its business 
model. Says Brian Hoffman: “Our business model has some constraints in 
that we are limited in the number of our partners we can take because we 
are limited in the number of startups, we have a ten-week calendar. The 
assets that we have to provide to our partners do get diluted if we increase 
their number.” This scaling issue is somewhat typical for a non-profit ac-
celerator, Brian states. “When we started in 2010, we had a batch of eight 
companies, everyone was under twenty-f ive, doing it for the f irst time, and 
lived right around here. It’s easy to build a community in a small ecosystem 
where people have so much in common. But as we grew we needed to 
professionalize, set up an organization, hire staff, be relevant to everyone.” 
One of the challenges StartX as a general accelerator is facing is the issue of 
specialization, of f inding the right balance between scaling, added value, 
and support quality. “We don’t have to have that specialist value because 
we are a kind of lifelong Stanford network you can leverage, but we do need 
to have added value to every type of founder. How do you launch verticals, 
how can you be relevant to super specialized PhD teams?”
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The Butler Venture Program of Babson College is a dynamic enterprise. 
“We are constantly changing” says Cindy Klein-Marmer. “I look at the ac-
celerator as our startup, with me and my team members as founders. We are 
continuously tweaking and taking lessons on; there are constant iterations. 
This fall, we will roll out a new level of accountability and community.” 
Cindy tells me that the San Francisco summer venture pilot, which they 
f irst ran in 2016, will be evaluated. Should it be made permanent? Could 
it be done remotely? Does it need to be on the West Coast? Does it need to 
be in the U.S.? These are all questions that come up for an accelerator as a 
learning enterprise, as a startup indeed. The Babson Venture Program also 
has international ambitions. “Through our new Babson collaborative, we are 
looking for a way to have additional accelerators and incubators, essentially 
around the world, based on a pay-to-play model. The opportunities are 
endless right now. It also makes sense with Babson’s centennial anniversary 
coming up in 2019.”
The specialized high-touch accelerators, including the smaller niche 
players, have their own concerns. Tandem, the hands-on mobile accel-
erator, understands that timing is everything. Sunil Bhargava has a clear 
view on Tandem’s main challenge, one that holds for all quality-conscious 
accelerators: “I think the key challenge is f inding the right team at the 
right moment. If the right team approaches us too late, it doesn’t f it our 
model. If they approach us too early, it doesn’t work either.” For the future, 
Tandem is ambitious. Sunil: “My goal, you know, is more of a mission: to 
help out entrepreneurship on a global level. We want to do more startups 
that come from different parts of the world, help them build their company, 
and connect them to U.S. markets. The mission is having an impact on as 
many entrepreneurs as we can get through.”
Prem Talreja of The Fabric defines a set of more practical challenges. “We 
decided that once we commit funding, we have to work with more stringent 
milestones. Funding is not a gift but needs timely accomplishments.” The 
recruitment of founders also raises concerns, particularly with respect 
to mindset and expectations. “We have felt that people left their cushy 
jobs to come to us with the dream of becoming somebody that they were 
not ready for. There is a sense of comfort that they expect from a life as a 
startup entrepreneur, a life that actually is very uncomfortable – lots of 
stress, f inancial concerns, impact on your family and personal life. I’ve 
been there; I know what I am talking about.” Managing growth is another 
issue that The Fabric is working on: “We have to focus more on ensuring 
the startups get future rounds of funding. Their success will help us ref ill 
our fund. Our intention is not to become a large organization. It would 
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mean we have to expand our management team, solve lots of managerial 
problems. We are not like that.”
At The Hive, T.M. Ravi’s plans for the future reflect an energetic mix of 
passion, ambition, and impact: “Continue to create and launch exciting 
companies, help make their dream and the vision around artif icial intel-
ligence and its market potential become real – so real that it changes our 
lives – and see our startups go to greater and greater stages of success.” 
The Hive’s main focus is in Silicon Valley, but as part of its international 
expansion it has created The Hive India and The Hive Brazil. “We have sort 
of put The Hive in a box and made it easily transferrable to other regions. 
Some regions just don’t have the innovation ecosystem, the capital, or the 
talent pool, so I wouldn’t say it expands to everywhere but to some regions 
it def initely is. We are exploring some of them.”
What are specif ic challenges that the four niche accelerators encoun-
ter? What about their plans for the future? Cleantech Open is a pro bono 
volunteer organization, which it believes is a major asset but also one that 
demands further professionalization. A volunteer organization typically 
faces challenges in the areas of structured coordination, less f luid par-
ticipation, the creation of consistency and continuity, and the securing of 
institutional memory. In the words of Ian Foraker: “I think our core model 
is good, but it can be ref ined. We’re always looking at ways we can make it 
more robust and leverage the asset we have. I’m eager to professionalize our 
model. We want to further standardize our main processes.” One of these 
challenges has to do with f ine-tuning Cleantech Open’s admissions policy. 
“We are a mission-driven organization and therefore we want take as many 
viable startup companies in our accelerator program as possible. We have 
no shortage of mentors. In fact, we have mentor pools we can’t leverage 
enough.” The mission of Cleantech Open is to advance the use of sustainable 
resources and market-smart solutions to pressing environmental and energy 
issues. Ian states that the task for the near future is to create more value in 
realizing this commitment. “We need to move from being a passive catalyst 
to becoming an active catalyst. How do we not only educate entrepreneurs 
but actively evaluate the gaps and plug those gaps. We really want to expand 
our global footprint by connecting the dots across the globe. If we want to 
effectively fight global warming and climate change, we need to increase the 
bringing to market of innovative clean technologies by a factor ten or more.”
For Imagine H2O, “The challenge number one is to blow the minds of the 
entrepreneurs that take our program. We want them to be successful and 
our best evangelists possible.” Having made this statement, Tom Ferguson 
points to a number of practical issues such as f inding the right balance 
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between training entrepreneurs and working remotely, and developing 
metrics to monitor the effectiveness of their programs. In terms of the 
future, Imagine H2O’s ambitions include further globalization. Nimesh 
Modak explains: “We want to explore how we can support startup compa-
nies from around the world. So much of the value we offer is through our 
mentorship program. In order to support startups in other countries, we 
need to expand our mentor and partner network. That is something we are 
quite aggressively pushing forward right now. It would really capitalize on 
the values of Imagine H2O being a vertical accelerator.”
In the solar energy industry, Emily Kirsch of Powerhouse reckons 
that “the biggest challenge is that not enough people are applying their 
skills to the solar industry yet. Eventually solar will be everywhere, it 
will power all of our lives, it will be built into our clothes, iPhone, and 
laptop covers, powering our homes and cars. This will all happen through 
innovative ways to produce and manage the distribution and storage of 
energy. And it all requires hightech and funding.” Her greatest worry is 
that in spite of the enormous opportunity that solar presents and how 
big it is going to be in the near future, we are going to need much more 
talent and many more solar startup entrepreneurs. In the U.S., Emily 
discloses, there are 40 million rooftops that are suitable for solar, which 
would expand to 90 million households if apartments and condos are 
included. “We’ve only just begun scratching a tiny, tiny bit of the surface 
of what is possible.” Emily predicts a bright future for community solar 
farms. “It’s even going to be bigger than rooftop solar.” Entrepreneurial 
talents and talented entrepreneurs are needed to make this radical energy 
transformation.
Ari Horie of niche accelerator Women’s Startup Lab tells me that her 
organization is expanding with a venture division and a co-working 
division. She’s moving the startup lab “beyond” the core business of an 
accelerator, thereby moving to a new stage of her lab’s story with much more 
emphasis on lifelong education and platforms for women entrepreneurs. The 
new program will focus on batches of “the nine best and brightest female 
entrepreneurs”. In Chinese numerology, the number nine has a very positive 
connotation and stands for luck, creativity, imagination, dream realization, 
and care. Ari’s dream is to set up the new model in a way that is scalable 
and that makes Women’s Startup Lab into a global entrepreneurship brand 
podium that supports female entrepreneurs in launching and growing 
their companies. She aims for it to be a model that helps women to thrive 
and succeed, where meaningful relationships and new technology bring 
unlimited opportunity.
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And what are the challenges and future plans of the f ive accelerator 
platforms that feature in my study? Prospect SV is an innovation hub and 
demonstration center that works with corporate sector players, innovative 
startups, cities, agencies, and the research community – a complex f ield of 
stakeholders according to Doug Davenport. The challenge? “It’s just incred-
ibly hard to actually make that become a symphony, right? We could teach 
classes on this. At the end of the day, you need momentum. The problem 
is that the market isn’t moving fast enough for there to be any pull of ideas 
in.” Prospect helps Bay Area cities in becoming smart and sustainable com-
munities. “The biggest problem is that 108 cities in the Bay Area are not 
acting as a 108 division region. They’re all individual, independent entities, 
sometimes at cross purposes with each other. Our biggest challenge here is 
to help build the business case in those cities.” Doug’s ideas for the future 
are directly related to addressing these challenges. One is to help elevate 
innovation leadership and early technology adoption amongst certain 
cities and develop cases that other cities can learn from. “That would be 
fantastic.” The other is to promote capability development among industrial 
stakeholders – e.g., the building industry – to help them understand how 
they can benefit from new technologies. “Such a focus on design feedback 
and market intelligence could make a unique program.”
One of the challenges that Marlon Evans of GSVlabs shares is determining 
the basics of his accelerator’s expansion model. Which new domestic and 
international markets are suitable? How do you get there? What are the 
business model implications, and what funding do you need? “If you look 
at a market like China, I think there are like 10,000 accelerators, probably 
a new accelerator a day that’s starting up. How do we play in that environ-
ment, and does it make sense to start a new accelerator or do we service as 
a hub that these other accelerators can use as a resource”? GSVlabs’ model 
will change as markets develop, says Marlon, “but the core will always be 
working with startups. The value added that we could provide is going to 
be more of a platform ecosystem where ideally we support accelerators that 
move into new markets. A kind of retail model. A kind of scaling model.”
Runway is also re-examining its business model. At present, it combines 
co-working incubation space with a specialized EdTech accelerator. Matt 
Walters sketches the challenges and ambitions: “We are considering doing 
additional acceleration programs in other f ields. We are debating whether 
this makes sense, or could we instead just have our incubator and then have 
a fund and invest in the startup companies without having to run additional 
programs.” A more practical challenge is for Runway to track more metrics 
on how their startup companies are doing: monitoring traction, investments, 
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funding, etc. “We want to be more analytic-driven, we want to measure 
impact.” Like GSVlabs’ Marlon Evans, Matt points to the rapidly growing 
number of accelerators. “Every week I hear about another one popping up. 
The challenge for us is to make sure that we are continuing to deliver value, 
that we really provide the services and resources out there.” And as with 
other accelerators, Runway has global ambitions: “The dream is to have 
Runway locations around the world. So we are going out to South America, 
we are going out to East Asia to create a global network. I think there is 
something powerful about being able to connect different geographies.”
The biggest challenge for Hacker Dojo, according to Jun Wong, is real 
estate. “Because we are non-prof it, we want the Dojo to be accessible to 
everyone. But there is a huge cost in operating this place as rents get higher 
and higher.” What is also high is Hacker Dojo’s ambition. “We’re trying to 
raise a really big fund so that we can purchase a campus. That’s our goal for 
the next three years.” Hacker Dojo furthermore wants to refine and expand 
its open model of self-education. “We would like to have a broader approach 
in which our members can learn from others by bringing in people that are 
leaders in their f ield and discuss and share their experiences. That would 
be a very ‘Dojo-esque’ kind of thing.”
RocketSpace intends to go global, as Duncan Logan explains: “We’ve been 
working a lot on this. We started here in Silicon Valley because it’s a kind of 
mecca for technology, but I think there are ecosystems elsewhere around 
the world that would work for us. We might put a RocketSpace in London or 
Amsterdam, Berlin or Tel Aviv, or Singapore or Shanghai. And we just focus 
on the top 200 companies and then we connect them together.” In April 2017, 
RocketSpace opened its f irst European co-working campus in London.90
Conclusion
The success or failure of a startup is hard if not impossible to predict, ac-
cording to Silicon Valley accelerator executives. Forecasting a startup’s 
success is more intuitive than hard science. Predicting startup success is 
a Herculean undertaking. But in every scenario traction is key. Customer 
traction is the conditio sine qua non for startup growth. Scalability is 
essential. The startups that respondents selected as their showcases are 
the ones that raised considerable external funding, which is, of course, 
traction-related. The products or services launched by these favorites are 
believed to have a significant social impact as well. Accelerator founders and 
CEOs are intrigued by cutting-edge technologies that address urgent short 
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or long-term issues and that develop solutions that disrupt markets. Most 
of them are market and mission-driven. Scalability and market prospect 
is what def ines startup potential, and to develop this potential requires 
experience, tenacity, and team prioritizing. But even then, there is no single 
path to success. What are some of the most common mistakes founder 
teams make in this context? Seasoned mentor and Silicon Valley connois-
seur Susan Lucas-Conwell does not have to think long: “The most deadly 
one is when the team is solving a problem that nobody cares about. The 
next one is that the team works on a solution that nobody wants to pay for.”
One challenge was mentioned by nearly all my respondents: talent. All 
accelerators are looking for talented startup teams. Regardless of sector, 
mission, prof it or non-profit status, size or program, an accelerator’s pri-
mary concern is getting access to talent and recruiting talented startup 
founders. Accelerator executives feel that they are all competing for the 
best startup teams. Additional challenges include specialization, further 
professionalization, increasing cohort size, stakeholder alignment, and the 
need for monitoring startup performance by using more advanced metrics.
High tech is essentially global: it is not restricted to geographical markets, 
boundaries, or national entities. It is interesting that so many Silicon Valley 
accelerators indicate that going global is among their priorities in the near 
future. Most accelerators have international ambitions and want to expand 
to other regions and countries. ‘Global branding’, ‘global franchising’, ‘global 
outreach’, ‘global connectivity’, and ‘global platform and hub’ are expressions 
the accelerator executives use to illustrate their international aspirations. 
The typical global strategy of accelerators has been to train international 
startup teams in Silicon Valley. Now they see that other countries and 
regions are becoming interested in developing innovative ecosystems as 
well. This leads to a reverse strategy in which accelerator branches are to 
set up in other parts of the world. The underlying dream is not only based 
on broadening their geo-economic investment calculus but also inspired by 
a deeper mission of having a global impact on fostering entrepreneurship.

7 What Can Europe Learn From Silicon 
Valley Accelerators?
Accelerators can greatly contribute to advancing a dynamic European 
startup economy. This study has examined 23 accelerators in Silicon Valley 
with the aim of inferring some lessons on how to create a stronger and more 
vibrant startup community in Europe. In addition to presenting the main 
conclusions of my study, I outline ten practical decision rules for aspiring 
European accelerators that I believe will ensure their effectiveness. These 
ten rules are based on my chief f indings from this study. I conclude the book 
by sharing some thoughts on the substantial role that accelerators can play 
in boosting Europe’s startup economy.
Main findings and lessons
Silicon Valley’s remarkable track record as a global innovation and startup 
hotspot never ceases to amaze the rest of the world. The region has become 
a paragon for policymakers, innovation stakeholders, ambitious entrepre-
neurs, and hungry startup founders. Its track record is based on a consist-
ent and resilient ecosystem that secures access to talent, venture capital, 
support facilities, and a willing government. Its performance is driven by a 
culture that stimulates big thinking, sharing, competition, and risk-taking. 
Silicon Valley has launched startups that grew into companies that have 
changed our way of communicating, our lifestyle, and even the world. 
Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, Uber, and Airbnb 
are prominent examples. But it is also a region where there is signif icant 
inequality between insiders and outsiders, between high-tech nouveau 
riches and underprivileged social groups. For many members of the lower 
and middle class, Silicon Valley is no longer a place they can afford to live 
in. This is the painful downside of the Valley’s success story.
During the last f ive to ten years, Silicon Valley has witnessed a rapid 
increase in accelerators helping startups to develop and grow their busi-
ness. These ‘schools of startup entrepreneurship’ assist new ventures to 
sharpen their business concept, to calibrate their business model, to get 
f irst customers and traction, to pitch to angel investors and VCs, and, most 
importantly, to scale their venture. Silicon Valley’s math is all about fast 
growth. In this study, I attempt to understand the role that accelerators play 
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in taking startups to the marketplace, in expanding their market impact, 
in helping them to get traction and to scale up, and in bringing them to 
the next round of funding. I do so in the hope that European countries can 
learn from the Silicon Valley accelerator phenomenon in order to bridge the 
entrepreneurial divide and innovation gap between Europe and the U.S.
I interviewed 23 accelerators from all over Silicon Valley, which provided 
me with considerable insight into how these ‘growth engines’ operate and 
how they approach the puzzle of accelerating the life cycle of innovative 
startups. More specifically, I looked at accelerators’ mission and philosophy, 
technology focus and target group, business model, admittance procedures, 
cooperation networks, program content, and mentoring as well as the main 
challenges they face and their plans for the future.
Accelerators are in great demand among startup founder teams, as the 
latter understand that participation in these growth programs will improve 
their market opportunity and investment chances. Accelerators, in turn, are 
highly selective in admitting startups. Only the best and brightest teams are 
accepted, based on stringent selection procedures. The right combination 
of team, technology, and market is paramount. In general, Silicon Valley 
accelerators do not admit solo founders because the risk of failure is simply too 
high. Running a startup is extremely demanding and requires multiple skills 
and competences that are seldom incorporated in one single person. Running 
an accelerator is equally demanding and in many cases resembles launching 
and growing a startup, with all the complexities and struggles it takes.
Accelerators in Silicon Valley vary signif icantly in terms of key features 
such as mission, business model, size, program structure, and mentoring. 
I observed a chief dichotomy between general/low-touch accelerators and 
specialized/high-touch (domain-specif ic and niche) accelerators. This 
distinction turned out to be very helpful in explaining the differences 
between accelerators.
On one side of the continuum, we have large general accelerators that 
do not focus on one specif ic technology or target group but accept startups 
across a broad spectrum of technologies. To add substance, accelerators may 
introduce so-called ‘verticals’ (single technologies), e.g., health, mobility, 
robotics. These accelerators are primarily interested in volume, i.e., in pre-
paring large numbers of startups for commercial take-off. Their investment 
logic is based on the assumption that a few successful startups will raise 
signif icant accelerator revenue that will make up for the losses of most 
others. These accelerators tend to have strong links with the VC community. 
Accelerators typically offer short, standardized growth programs (three 
to four months) to several startup classes a year. Mentoring is part of the 
whAt cAn europe leArn from Silicon VAlley AccelerAtorS? 139
program but on a low-intensity basis (low-touch). The program usually 
culminates in a demo day where startups will present their prototypes 
to investors. Taking equity is a common investment policy among these 
accelerators. In many cases they operate as investment vehicles: their busi-
ness model is to f ind startups that will be mega-successful – the “next big 
thing”. For many outside observers, these general/low-touch accelerators 
represent the mainstream accelerators. Well-known examples are Plug and 
Play and 500 Startups.
On the other side of the continuum, we f ind specialized/high-touch 
accelerators. These are smaller accelerators that focus on bringing a limited 
number of startups to the market. They concentrate on particular technolo-
gies (for example artif icial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, mobile) or 
niche markets (solar, clean technology, water) and actively coach their 
startups in a very hands-on (high-touch) way. The startups are not organized 
into classes, as they are mostly accepted on a rolling basis. They are not 
provided with standardized growth programs, and the length of in-house 
coaching is not f ixed. These accelerators’ ROI strategy and equity policy 
depend on their mission: some specialized/high-touch accelerators are 
for-profit (e.g., The Hive, Powerhouse), while others are non-profits (Imagine 
H2O, CleanTech, and Women’s Startup Lab).
It should be noted that this differentiation between the two accelerator 
types does not necessarily correspond to the distinction between com-
mercial and mission-driven accelerators. Though most general/low-touch 
accelerators are for-prof it companies, there is a mixed pattern among 
specialized/high-touch accelerators. And in any case, quite a number of 
for-prof it accelerators are managed by highly content-driven executives 
who all share a passion for making an impact.
A third category of startup growth facilitators are accelerating platforms. 
They primarily offer off ice or lab space to startups, but they may also ar-
range access to VCs and provide elementary business support. They do not 
see themselves as investors but generally work together with the corporate 
world. These platforms offer startups a stimulating environment in which 
to grow. Examples include RocketSpace and Runway.
Accelerators also differ with respect to their market focus in terms of B2B 
or B2C, software or hardware. These choices obviously directly affect the 
way that accelerators are organized (selection, program, mentors, funding) 
and the resources they need (e.g., engineering expertise, hardware lab, 
suppliers). Hardware accelerator HAX differs completely from software 
accelerator TiE LaunchPad, even though both accelerators target enterprise-
focused startups.
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Mentoring startups is what all accelerators see as their core activity, 
either high-touch or low-touch. The Silicon Valley pool of mentors coaching 
accelerator startup teams is phenomenal. All the executives I interviewed 
stress that there is no shortage of committed and experienced mentors. 
This appears to be part of the Valley’s culture of giving back. Mentors are 
often former entrepreneurs who want to share their expertise and networks 
and enjoy being involved in the valorization of new technologies. They give 
their counseling for free. But their motives are not per se purely altruistic, as 
they may have a personal interest in helping startups go to market. Access 
to gifted startup mentors is what makes an accelerator. In the specialized, 
smaller high-touch accelerators, startups are coached – on a day-to-day 
basis – by accelerator executives. A perfect mentor-startup f it is imperative.
Accelerators offer a range of programs for their startups, depending 
on their mission and focus. Program formulas differ in length, intensity, 
standardization, and coaching offered. Some programs are cohort-based 
(which is usually the case with larger general accelerators), while others 
are tailor-made (which tend to be seen at smaller, domain-specif ic and 
niche accelerators). But all programs and coaching activities share a core 
that is relevant to all startups. Founder teams need to develop their busi-
ness idea, to f igure out the growth and scalability options, work out their 
business model and company strategy, come up with a marketing plan, 
prepare themselves for go-to-market, get f irst customers and sales, pivot 
their product and strategy based on market responses, work out team issues, 
pitch to venture capitalists, and cope with the many practical issues that 
startups face. Accelerators help startup teams in addressing these issues 
and making their business stronger.
Silicon Valley accelerators excel in organizing events, reflecting their 
active involvement in the startup community. Workshops, lectures, speaker 
sessions, seminars, tutorials, roundtables, and founder team presentations 
are all part of the services that accelerators offer to their startups. All this 
adds to a vivid, inviting, and entrepreneurial accelerator culture.
All accelerator executives agree that predicting startup success is often 
more about intuition, hindsight, and lots of luck than about proven quantita-
tive models. It’s not just team, technology, or market that leads to success, 
but it is clear that having a malfunctioning team, weak technology, and no 
traction will more than likely lead to failure.
Accelerators work with outside partners, mostly on an informal basis, 
sometimes in a more structured way. Collaboration with investors is a 
top priority, as it gives them access to funding. And investors have a clear 
interest in being involved with accelerators: it brings them into contact with 
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the most talented startups and promising new technologies. Accelerators 
also cooperate with other agencies within the Silicon Valley ecosystem: 
universities, innovation and industry stakeholders, and the corporate world. 
Lawyers are particular useful in giving legal and business advice to startup 
teams. They often work on the basis of deferred fees, meaning that startups 
will be charged when revenues come in and not earlier. This greatly helps 
startups in the early stages of the business cycle.
A trend can be observed in which large corporates start their own 
in-house accelerators. This keeps them in touch with innovative ideas 
and with new technology that can stimulate their business activities and 
market – maybe not today but probably tomorrow. Moreover, by bringing 
in startups into their labs and research centers, they can energize their 
innovation and entrepreneurial corporate culture. Samsung NEXT is an 
example of a corporate accelerator.
There were a number of similarities in the responses given by the inter-
viewees regarding the challenges they face and their plans for the future. 
They all underline the importance of having a unique selling point that 
separates them from the competition, of getting the right startup teams at 
the right moment, of optimizing the number of startups, and of achieving 
a fair number of winners. Talent is probably the main concern cited by the 
accelerator executives. Mission-driven accelerators feel the permanent need 
to balance purpose and professionalization.
Interestingly, nearly all accelerators are involved in trajectories to 
internationalize their organizations and to reach out to other continents 
and countries. Some have very concrete plans, while others are still 
considering the modalities (e.g., franchising, new branches, co-branding, 
hubs). Pioneering Silicon Valley accelerators that have already entered the 
European market include Plug and Play and RocketSpace. Most Silicon 
Valley accelerators, it has to be stressed, are very international in that the 
startup teams they coach come from all over the world.
A f inal word on accelerator success: most accelerators in Silicon Valley 
are relatively young companies that lack a balanced and validated set of 
performance metrics. They tend to illustrate their success by pointing 
to the funds that ‘their’ portfolio startups have collectively raised after 
leaving the accelerator. This fundraising algebra – also known as ‘vanity 
metrics’ – may look quite impressive but needs some serious debunking. 
This especially holds true for the larger, general/low-touch accelera-
tors. The main issue, naturally, is whether there is a causal relationship 
between accelerator participation and startup success. We need much 
stronger empirical evidence. Developing and reporting solid performance 
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indicators should be a major priority for professional accelerators. This 
is particularly true given that new accelerators are popping up on an 
almost daily basis.
Bridging Europe’s innovation gap
European policymakers agree that, in comparison to the United States, 
Europe is lagging behind in innovation, entrepreneurship, and new venture 
creation. Data indicate that the U.S. outperforms Europe in terms of R&D 
spending, the number of new businesses and f irst-time entrepreneurs, the 
available amount of venture capital, and the number of fast-growing compa-
nies (scale-ups). It also imposes less bureaucracy on startups (Entrepreneur-
ship 2020; Ester & Maas 2016; European Investment Bank 2016; Horizon 
2020). The nature of the entrepreneurial divide between both continents 
is rooted not only in institutional differences but also in cultural factors. 
Europe is more risk-averse, and entrepreneurial ambition is less applauded. 
For many Americans – certainly those living in Silicon Valley – successful 
startup founders and serial entrepreneurs are celebrated role models.
The U.S. ecosystem for startups, and in particular the Silicon Valley 
version, is more elaborate and balanced with respect to access to funding, 
talent, support networks, and government facilitation. It has a much longer 
tradition, too. What is equally relevant is that the system is grounded in a 
strong entrepreneurial spirit; its culture breathes risk-taking and excellence. 
I know that these conclusions sound rather general, but their truth is not 
disputed. Just think for a moment: would it have been possible for Google, 
Apple, Facebook, Uber, or Airbnb to have been European companies? In 
terms of ideas, maybe; in terms of commercialization, probably not.
European policymakers have become concerned about Europe’s innova-
tion gap: compared to the United States, the Old World is less adept at taking 
innovations to market. As Jyrki Kaitanen, European Commission Vice Presi-
dent for jobs, growth, investment and competitiveness, stated: “Europe has 
been good at turning Euros into knowledge, but not that good at turning the 
new knowledge into Euros and jobs.”91 There is a gap between inventiveness 
and marketability, between brilliant ideas and market response, between 
innovation and commercial implementation. American startups are much 
more focused on valorizing their innovations, on bridging the innovation 
gap – in simple terms, to make money out of innovation. As we have seen, all 
the incentives and parameters of the Silicon Valley ecosystem converge to 
help bring innovations to the market. Accelerators play a pivotal role in this.
whAt cAn europe leArn from Silicon VAlley AccelerAtorS? 143
Some Silicon Valley gurus are quite gloomy about Europe’s potential to 
turn the tide. Veteran technology investor and PayPal founder Peter Thiel is 
one of them. Though it has not prevented him from investing considerably in 
high-tech European startups, Thiel was brutally critical of Europe’s lack of 
innovativeness and entrepreneurship in a 2014 interview with the Financial 
Times: “I think people in Europe are generally pessimistic about the future. 
They have low expectations, they’re not working hard to change things. 
When you’re a slacker with a pessimistic view of the future, you’re likely to 
meet those expectations.”92
In his book Zero to one, also published in 2014, Thiel typifies Europeans as 
“indefinite pessimists”.93 Coincidence or not, in the same year the European 
Commission launched Horizon 2020, the largest EU research and innovation 
program ever with nearly € 80 billion of funding available over seven years 
(2014 to 2020).
The main goal of Horizon 2020 is to boost Europe’s global innovativeness 
and competitiveness: “It promises more breakthroughs, discoveries, and 
world-f irsts by taking great ideas from the lab to the market.” (Horizon 
2020: 1). This is a sentence that could have been penned in Silicon Valley. The 
program links research to innovation and is focused on excellent science, 
industrial leadership, and the tackling of major social issues. The program 
aims to re-establish Europe’s position in producing world-class science 
and to remove unnecessary red tape that hinders innovation. Enabling 
funding for premier research is the key pillar of Horizon 2020. The areas 
covered include nanotechnologies, advanced materials, biotechnologies, 
IT, space, health, food, agriculture, forestry, energy, transport, and climate 
action. The number of proposals that were submitted under the program’s 
f irst 100 calls was 36,732; 14% of which were retained for funding. Horizon 
2020 has turned into the main and largest European funder of research and 
innovation, with a strong emphasis on bridging the innovation gap. And, 
importantly, the market potential of innovations is a basic funding criterion.
Just prior to the Horizon program, the EC launched its Entrepreneur-
ship 2020 Action Plan. The new initiative is based on the realization that in 
order “to bring Europe back to growth and create new jobs, we need more 
entrepreneurs.” (Entrepreneurship 2020: 3). The idea is to “unleash” Europe’s 
entrepreneurial potential, remove barriers, and accelerate its entrepreneur-
ship culture. The program consists of three action pillars:
a) Entrepreneurial education and training to support growth and busi-
ness creation (increasing and improving practical entrepreneurial 
learning, especially within higher education);
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b) The creation of an environment in which entrepreneurs can flourish 
and grow (better access to f inance, early-stage investors, and alterna-
tive funding; tax incentives; better use of ICT; easier business transfers; 
making bankruptcy less insuperable for second starters; simpler rules 
for startups; access to incubators and business accelerators);
c) The development of role models in order to reach out to specific groups 
(entrepreneurship promotion; becoming an entrepreneur as a regular 
career choice; and stimulating startups among women, seniors, mi-
grants, the unemployed, and young people).
Each of the three pillars is translated into a number of specif ic policy 
proposals and recommendations for the individual EU member states. It 
is one of the f irst EU documents that mentions the role of accelerators in 
building new ventures, albeit only briefly.
One further EU initiative needs to be mentioned that is allied to the 
Entrepreneurship 2020 program: Startup Europe.94 Its main goal is to 
strengthen the European business environment for tech entrepreneurs by 
providing access to support services such as business advice, networking, 
and legal assistance. Startup Europe aims to inspire the business commu-
nity, acknowledge role models, and celebrate new and innovative startups. 
It launched the Accelerator Assembly, which operates as Europe’s prime 
network for startup accelerators.95 The Assembly is an industry-led network 
to connect accelerators all over Europe and to act as “a forum delivered by 
the accelerator community, for the accelerator community.” The forum 
shares information on key trends in the world of tech accelerators, ex-
changes best practices on startup growth programs, organizes meetings 
and conferences, and publishes guides to European accelerator programs. 
The target group is the leaders of accelerators that help founder teams to 
build and grow their business.
Until very recently, Europe was well behind the U.S. – and certainly 
behind Silicon Valley – in making the transition to a startup economy. But 
in the last few years, Europe has taken a leap forward, launching a number 
of programs designed to encourage entrepreneurship and fuel an entrepre-
neurial culture. Much still needs to be done, and it needs to be done in a way 
that is consistent with basic European values and social preferences. Europe 
must f ind its own way towards a flourishing startup economy; it cannot 
‘copy & paste’ the Silicon Valley model. Individual European countries 
are working hard to build ecosystems that, with the help of accelerators, 
will become fertile environments for startups to blossom. Cities such as 
London, Berlin, Stockholm, Paris, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Madrid, and many 
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others are becoming f ine examples of energetic startup hubs.96 The fact 
that Silicon Valley investors are actively investing in European startups is 
a case in point. But there still is a long way to go, if only because individual 
European countries differ markedly in their approach to addressing the 
innovation gap (Veugelers 2016) and implementing policies promoting 
entrepreneurship and startups. In the next section, I look at the startup 
climate in a European country I know best: the Netherlands.
The Netherlands: StartupDelta
In the last f ive to eight years, the startup scene in the Netherlands has 
developed rapidly and it is now turning into a mature economic community 
that fosters innovation and entrepreneurship. Launching viable startups 
is a high priority on the Dutch economic policy agenda. People in the 
Netherlands understand that startups add to the competitiveness of the 
Dutch economy, particularly if startups are able to make the transition to 
fast-growing scale-ups. Successful Dutch startups with a global significance 
include Ayden, WeTransfer, Booking.com, and TomTom. Some fast-growing 
runner-ups include Catawiki, Takeaway.com, Elastic, Gitlab, and Picnic.
There are a number of f lourishing startup hubs in the Netherlands, 
particularly in the Eindhoven area (Philips High Tech Campus, ASML, NXP, 
FEI), the Rotterdam region (seaport-related innovation, logistics, and clean 
technology), the Wageningen area (food and agriculture), Delft University 
(engineering and hardware), and Amsterdam (the center of Dutch venture 
capital). The 2017 Global Startup Ecosystem Report lists Amsterdam in the 
top 20 of worldwide best-performing startup cities and habitats (Silicon 
Valley being number one). Only four other European cities rank higher: 
London, Berlin, Paris, and Stockholm.
In 2014, StartupDelta was launched to advance, coordinate, and promote 
the Dutch startup ecosystem. It was f irst led by Special Envoy and former 
EC Commissioner Neelie Kroes, followed in 2016 by Prince Constantijn 
of Orange-Nassau – the younger brother of the Dutch monarch Willem-
Alexander – who is an acclaimed aficionado of startups and new technology. 
A publicly backed initiative, StartupDelta’s aim is to make the Netherlands 
the best-connected and largest startup ecosystem in Europe. The initiative 
brings together the government, the corporate world, startups, universities 
and research labs, and investors. The mission according to Dutch Prime 
Minister Mark Rutte is the shared goal of “making the Netherlands an 
ideal location for startups, where young entrepreneurs with futuristic ideas 
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can turn their dreams into reality.”97 StartupDelta has introduced startup 
visas for foreign startup founders, initiated a so-called corporate launch 
pad, and is involved in informing companies from abroad how they can 
grow their business in the Netherlands.98 Recently, it convinced the Dutch 
government to introduce f iscal incentives to invest in startups and to lower 
startup labor costs.
Encouraging close collaboration between corporates and startups is a 
priority of StartupDelta. To further this goal, in 2016 the COSTA (COrpo-
rates and STArtups) program was launched by Special Envoy Neelie Kroes 
together with Jan Kees de Jager, CFO of KPN and former Dutch Minister 
of Finance. “The reasoning is that collaboration between nimble startups 
and corporates that have scale and leverage will accelerate the pace of 
innovation in the Netherlands.”99 As part of this long-term program, 19 Dutch 
corporate giants (including Shell, Philips, ASML, Unilever, Rabobank, KPN, 
AkzoNobel, and KLM) committed themselves to jointly enter partnerships 
with more than 300 startups within a period of less than one year.100 The 
underlying idea of this major initiative was to boost the innovative power 
of the Netherlands, deepen its ecosystem, promote lasting cooperation 
between the corporate world and startups, and accelerate sustainable 
economic growth.
In 2017, StartupDelta introduced a new Action Plan that seeks to con-
nect and promote the Dutch startup ecosystem as one single hub. It also 
published a Startup Manifesto with a number of policy priorities to make 
the Netherlands the startup country in Europe. The plan sets a number 
of objectives: to grow the overall pool of top-tier foreign venture capital 
and ‘smart funding’ by making the Dutch f iscal system more competitive 
internationally, to link Dutch startups to the rest of the world through 
trade missions and international hubs, to connect and improve national 
and international mentoring networks, to link startups and corporates, 
to legally allow for an online procedure for new ventures to start their 
businesses, to make education more entrepreneurial, to enlarge the talent 
pool, and to address the pressing shortage of tech talent. Proposed actions 
also emphasize the need for less stringent regulations on new technology, 
a more active role for the government as a launching customer for startups, 
a more flexible labor market to hire startup employees, and a system to 
challenge and reward universities for launching spin-outs and boosting 
startups. The Action Plan specif ies the new goals as concretely as possible 
and includes targets for operational key performance indicators (KPIs).
The Action Plan and the Startup Manifesto’s focus on attracting 
more foreign venture capital and on enlarging the startup talent pool is 
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understandable. The latest Global Startup Ecosystem Report, mentioned 
above, indicated outstanding performance metrics (e.g., exit values) for the 
Amsterdam-StartupDelta, but as the Report concludes, “it could generally 
improve access to talent and funding” (2017: 76). But, it has to be added, 
it is not merely a case of re-adjusting the institutional parameters of the 
ecosystem. Culture also matters. The Netherlands could do a better job of 
growing new companies with a global impact. As Dutch startup ambassador 
Prince Constantijn makes clear: “We sometimes lack a sense of urgency. We 
need to fuel our entrepreneurial drive, the desire to be the best. At the same 
time, startups often feel they’re left to fend for themselves. Their f inancing 
comes from venture capital funds in the U.S. People over there sometimes 
have a better idea of who’s doing well here than we do!”101
Though StartupDelta is not an accelerator program, it prides itself in 
acting as a gateway to accelerators and other ecosystem facilitators in 
the Netherlands. The country has a number of reputed incubators and 
accelerators such as YES!Delft (2005), Rockstart (2012), Startupbootcamp 
(2010), whose growth programs incorporate many elements of their Silicon 
Valley role models, particularly with respect to startup selection, technology 
focus, team composition, program format, mentoring, access to investors, 
and corporate partnerships. For many new Dutch accelerators, top Silicon 
Valley accelerators are leading examples of how to execute startup growth 
programs.
Accelerator decision tool: Ten basic questions
Accelerators, as we have seen, come in all shapes and sizes. Though they 
all strive for startup development and growth, they are based on differ-
ent philosophies, different investment strategies, and different business 
missions. Accelerators help startups to ref ine and scale their business 
proposition and to def ine their go-to-market options but do so in a variety 
of ways. Their growth programs differ in structure, technology focus, target 
group, size, recruitment, coaching, and mentoring. Accelerators, moreover, 
vary in terms of business model and equity policy. A differentiation that 
turned out to be instrumental in my study is the one between general/low-
touch accelerators, specialized/high-touch accelerators, and accelerating 
platforms. This differentiation clearly reflects these different organizational 
parameters.
Based on my f indings and analysis of the 23 Silicon Valley accelerators 
in this study, I have formulated ten basic questions that should facilitate 
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entrepreneurs, innovation stakeholders, and policymakers in Europe and 
elsewhere intending to design and build an accelerator. This is a simple 
but fundamental decision tool that crystallizes the raison d’être of every 
accelerator wanting to coach, launch and grow successful startups. These 
guidelines are solidly grounded in the main f indings of my research.
It should be noted that, by its nature, launching an accelerator does not 
fundamentally differ from launching a startup. As a consequence, most of 
the rules that apply to building a startup pertain to building an accelerator 
as well.
In the coming years, the number of new accelerators in Europe will most 
certainly increase rapidly. My hope is that the following decision tool will 
be instrumental in helping them set up their business in a professional 
and appealing way – one that takes into account the experience of Silicon 
Valley accelerators.
1. Mission: for-profit or non-profit?
 The f irst question is whether the accelerator’s main goal is to make 
money or whether it is primarily mission-driven without the sole 
intention of being profitable. Some accelerators are f irst and foremost 
interested in growing startups that will generate handsome revenues, 
while others are inspired by the need to solve urgent social problems. 
The f irst objective implies recruiting startups that are high-growth 
traction potentials; the second objective leads to searching for startups 
that could have a major societal impact. It should be emphasized 
that in reality there is a gray area between these two opposite ends 
of the spectrum. But choosing one or the other of these two principal 
objectives will predetermine an accelerator’s ROI strategy, startup 
selection process, stakeholder involvement, and equity policy – in 
short, its business model.
2. Focus: general or niche market?
 The next basic question to ask is whether the accelerator will take 
a technology-agnostic approach to growing innovative startups or 
whether it will focus on specif ic technologies (e.g., mobility, artif icial 
intelligence, health) or niche markets. This choice directly affects 
an accelerator’s recruitment process, coaching programs, investor 
profiling, and stakeholder participation. A tendency I observed among 
the larger Silicon Valley general accelerators was to include specif ic 
verticals that add to incremental specialization. Niche players tend 
to be smaller, though they can be larger in domains such as clean 
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technology. Smaller niche accelerators are typically characterized by 
hands-on coaching of startup teams. An additional issue is whether 
the accelerator’s market focus will be on B2C or B2B (or a combination 
of both) and whether it will be oriented towards software or hardware.
3. How selective?
 The answer to this question should already be obvious: accelerators 
by def inition need to be highly selective in their startup recruitment 
policy, irrespective of their main goal or mission. Only startups that 
have the right mix of ambition, passion, and business idea sophis-
tication should make the cut. The bar needs to be set high. Quality 
is decisive, distinctiveness is indispensable, and competitiveness is 
essential. Without exception, Silicon Valley accelerators have rigid 
admittance policies which they take very seriously. It would be ill-
advised for accelerators on the European side of the Atlantic to set 
lower recruitment standards.
4. Target group: team or solo entrepreneurs?
 Here, too, the answer should be quite straightforward. As almost all 
my interviewees emphasized, startup teams are to be preferred over 
solo founders. Combining all startup roles – product development, 
marketing, sales, customer issues, investor relations, day-to-day 
management, personnel hiring – into one person is bound to fail. 
Silicon Valley accelerators are quite outspoken in favoring balanced 
teams, and team assessment is consequently a standard part of the 
selection process. Their general experience is that successful startups 
are led by strong teams.
5. Cohorts or rolling admittance?
 The next decision is whether to have startups participate in the new 
accelerator program as cohorts (over a f ixed time period) or on a rolling 
basis. As we have seen, larger accelerators that let in substantial num-
bers of startups tend to be organized in terms of cohorts or batches. 
These startups enter the acceleration program as a class, which ‘gradu-
ates’ on demo day. Smaller accelerators, especially niche players, are 
likely to admit a limited number of startups on a continuous basis.
6. Structured program?
 Related to the previous question is whether startup teams are offered 
a structured growth program or tailor-made coaching. Accelerator 
150 AccelerAtorS in Silicon VAlley: Building SucceSSful StArtupS 
size is also critical in this case. Larger accelerators work with highly 
structured programs, while smaller accelerators focus on empowering 
individual teams. But the underlying issues that are covered in the 
program or coaching are, of course, highly comparable: how to create 
a smart, scalable, and viable business model, how to build a feasible 
demo, how to get traction, how to solve team challenges. Another 
decision that must be made is which parts of the program can be 
offered in-house and which parts remotely, i.e., online. The role of new 
communication technology can facilitate this decision. Monitoring 
the effectiveness of accelerator programs should also be a priority.
7. Mentorship: highly intensive or less intensive?
 Every new accelerator must invest signif icantly in a substantial pool 
of committed and experienced mentors. The size of the accelerator is 
relevant here. In large accelerators with sizeable cohorts, mentoring 
tends to be less intensive (and shorter) compared to smaller niche 
accelerators that deliberately focus on a restricted number of startup 
teams. These smaller accelerators have highly intensive mentoring, 
with coaches working side by side with their teams in all crucial phases 
of startup development. Larger accelerators tend to work with mentors 
from outside, while smaller accelerators use internal coaches.
8. Role of investors?
 One of the most important challenges for a new accelerator is creating 
a close network of investors that are looking for promising startups. 
Accelerators need to have f inancial resources of their own to bring 
promising startups to the marketplace, but they also must have a 
strong panel of angels and VCs willing to invest in talented startup 
teams and to bring scalable business ideas to the next round of fund-
ing. Accelerators that have no structural connections to investors 
will not last long. A fair and accountable relationship between equity 
percentage, investment, and accelerator program magnitude needs to 
be agreed upon.
9. Specialized startup support?
 It is good policy for new accelerators (including accelerating platforms) 
to offer startups a range of support facilities such as legal advice, 
counseling on human resources management, ICT services, adminis-
trative expertise, and f inancial assistance. Silicon Valley has a strong 
reputation in this respect. This kind of support helps startup teams 
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to professionalize their new business venture and to avoid pitfalls. 
It also adds to the practical relevance of an accelerator’s portfolio of 
services.
10. Culture: off ice space or startup vibe?
 An inspiring accelerator must have the right culture to cultivate in-
novation, openness, sharing, entrepreneurship, and excellence – a 
challenging culture that is both dynamic and stimulating. Silicon 
Valley accelerators set an outstanding example in this respect. An 
accelerator or an accelerating platform is not just shared off ice space, 
not just bricks and mortar – it is much more than that. It must resonate 
shared dreams, shared ambitions, and shared passions. The accelerator 
can realize this by organizing an exciting variety of events, seminars, 
expert talks, pitching classes, happy hours, and dream sessions.
These ten questions incorporate the conclusions I have drawn from the 
experiences of accelerators based in Silicon Valley. I believe that in applying 
this decision tool, new accelerators in Europe will be encouraged to think 
in a more structured way about the precise formats that suit their mission 
and objectives.
Final thoughts
My study has shown that accelerators are a vital part of Silicon Valley’s 
highly successful ecosystem. As dedicated ‘schools of entrepreneurship’, 
they help startups to develop, launch, and scale their new venture. These 
accelerators are in great demand by ambitious startup founding teams, also 
by international teams from outside the U.S. Although the metrics used to 
measure accelerators’ success need to be further developed and validated, 
the impact that accelerators can have is clear. Their secret, I conclude, is that 
they operate as intelligent, micro-ecosystems that reinforce cultural and 
institutional factors that are necessary for new business acceleration such 
as the right mindset, the right team, and the right business idea, coupled 
with access to engaged mentors, investors, stakeholders, and talent and 
backed up by a well-functioning startup support system.
If Europe is serious about revitalizing its economic competitiveness, 
rejuvenating its commercial innovation performance, and elevating its 
entrepreneurial leadership, it must dedicate itself to investing in (for-
profit and non-profit) startup accelerators. This is a joint responsibility of 
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industrial stakeholders, innovative entrepreneurs, enterprising universities, 
and facilitating governments. Europe is already moving in the right direc-
tion, but much more needs to be done. One could say that the European 
startup agenda itself needs rapid acceleration.
Accelerators can play a distinct role in furthering European countries’ 
ambitions to become thriving startup nations. As the Silicon Valley story 
shows, accelerators can make all the difference in this respect. They foster 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and help startups to take great ideas to the 
market. These are the three buzzwords that should inspire Europe in mak-
ing the necessary transition to a resilient and sustainable European startup 
and scale-up economy that will def ine the 21st century. In doing so, Europe 
will be securing a solid economic future for itself.
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Terms included in this glossary are def ined within the specif ic context of 
startups and accelerators.
Accelerator metrics Indicators that measure an accelerator’s perfor-
mance in growing and launching startups
Acqui-hire Acquisition of a startup purely for its talent, not 
for its product or technology
AI Artif icial Intelligence. Development of intelligent 
machines that are able to simulate human-like 
thought processes
Angel investors High net worth individuals (HNWIs), often former 
entrepreneurs, who privately invest in early-stage 
startups
AR Augmented Reality. Real-time integration of com-
puter-generated sensory input (e.g., sound, video, 
images) with the user’s view of the environment
BHAG Big Hairy Audacious Goal. Sweeping mission of a 
startup team to change the world
Boot camp Intensive accelerator training event for new 
startup teams
Burn rate Rate at which a startup uses up its initial capital 
and cash reserves
Cap table List of a startup’s securities (i.e., stock, options, 
warrants) and who owns those securities
Chief evangelist Visionary ambassador and passionate promoter 
of a company’s product and technology 
Co-creation model Accelerators that closely work with their startup 
teams, investors, and customers in building a new 
venture and preparing it for commercial take-off
Convertible note Short-term loan that converts into equity. Often 
used by angel investors who wish to fund a startup 
without an explicit valuation
Corporate accelerator Startup accelerator operated by a large company
Decacorn A startup company valued at $10 billion or more 
(e.g., Pinterest, Palantir, Uber, Snapchat, SpaceX, 
Airbnb)
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Deferred payments Startups are billed only when revenues come in 
(e.g., by law f irms)
Demo Day Finale of accelerator program at which startups 
pitch their company to investors
Disruptive technology Game-changing new technology that overturns 
existing markets and creates new markets
Downstream 
innovation 
Turning new technologies and products into 
economic value
Ecosystem A habitat in which all constituent elements 
(talent, capital, support, government, culture) 
are lined up in a way that they promote and 
sustain leading-edge innovation and pioneering 
entrepreneurship
Elevator pitch Extremely concise business presentation to inves-
tors or stakeholders
Equity Ownership interest in a startup in the form of 
common stock or preferred stock
Exit Investor (often a VC) cashes in the startup invest-
ment after an IPO (Initial Public Offering) or after 
acquisition of the startup by a third party
‘Fail Fast, Fail Often’ Silicon Valley startup mantra embracing failure 
as a learning experience. Values extensive ex-
perimentation, testing, early prototyping, and 
pivoting
Financial runway Length of time in which a startup remains solvent 
until it runs out of cash
Follow-on investment 
right 
Investor’s right to startup investments in later 
funding rounds
FOMO Fear of Missing Out. Anxiety among investors to 
be too late to invest in startups that are believed 
to have great potential. May lead to overinvesting
Friends, Family & 
Fools 
Often f irst funders of early-stage startups
Funding series New venture investments ranging from pre-seed 
to seed stage, early stage, expansion stage, to later 
stage. In technical terms: series Seed, series A, 
series B, series C, series D+
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Hackathon Hybrid of ‘hack’ and ‘marathon’. Event at which 
teams of coders, engineers, and designers inten-
sively collaborate to develop new software and 
new applications
H-1B visa Allows U.S. employers to temporarily employ 
foreign workers in specialty occupations. Widely 
used in the tech industry. Under review by the 
Trump administration
Hockey stick growth New venture that starts growing at a normal 
linear pace and at some inf lection point at an 
exponential rate
Innovation gap Insuff icient valorization of scientif ic knowledge 
and research output into successful innovative 
products and services
IoT Internet of Things. Everyday objects and devices 
connected to the Internet
IP Intellectual Property, e.g., of startup inventions 
or technology applications
IPO Initial Public Offering. First public sales of a 
startup’s shares, leading to a stock market listing. 
Goal: new companies seeking money to expand 
their business
Lean startup Business model based on continuous product 
iteration, measurement, and learning. Short 
product development cycle, lean manufacturing, 
and agile management
Market cap Total market value of a startup’s outstanding 
shares
MVP Minimal Viable Product. Startup product with 
just enough features to satisfy early customers, us-
ing customer feedback for product improvements
Moonshot Big, bold, groundbreaking project
Next Big Thing New technology sensation that sets a global trend, 
is adopted by huge markets, and has a tremendous 
worldwide social impact
Path-dependency Technological shifts and breakthroughs that build 
on preceding technologies
Pay-it-forward Entrepreneurs ‘pay back’ the help they got when 
they started their business by offering advice and 
support to new entrepreneurs and startups
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Permanent beta Startup mindset: deliberately launching products 
that are still in the test phase. Leading business 
axiom: there is no such thing as a f inal product
Pivot Startup strategy to redesign its initial product or 
service offering based on early customer feedback 
and market response, and sometimes to redesign 
the core business
ROI Return on Investment: ratio of gain or loss of 
an investment relative to the amount of money 
invested
SaaS Software as a Service. Cloud-based application 
licensed on a subscription basis
Sand Hill Road Avenue in Menlo Park famous for its high concen-
tration of venture capital f irms. The ‘Wall Street’ 
of Silicon Valley.
Scalability Startup product potential to multiply revenue 
with minimal incremental cost. A product and 
business model that expands to new national 
and international markets. This model dominates 
Silicon Valley’s investment math
Serial entrepreneur Entrepreneur who has founded and run several 
companies
Smart money Capital consisting not only of cash investment 
but also of expertise, experience, mentorship, and 
networks. Highly valued by startup founders
‘Software is eating the 
world’ 
Cherished quote by acclaimed Silicon Valley VC 
Marc Andreessen, indicating that established 
industries are invaded and disrupted by software
SoMa South of Market Street. Trendy startup district in 
San Francisco
Spray and pray Investment strategy based on high-volume 
startup portfolio diversif ication
Sweat equity Compensation for the unpaid time and effort 
startup founders and team members invest in 
their new company in order to get it off the ground
Technology-agnostic General accelerators that are not focused on 
specif ic technologies.
Term sheet Bullet-point document listing the terms (funding, 
governance, liquidation) by which an investor will 
invest in a startup
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‘Think Big, Aim High’ Silicon Valley startup motto combining dreams, 
drive, and ambition
Three Comma Club High-tech billionaires (net worth > $1,000,000,000)
Traction Quantitative evidence of customers or users of a 
startup product or service
Upstream innovation The development of new technologies and innova-
tive products
Unicorn Startup company with a valuation in excess of 
$1 billion
Valuation Set of metrics to estimate the economic value of 
a startup business
Valley of Death Feared period between f irst round of startup 
investment and steady stream of startup revenues
Valorization Commercial and societal value-creation of fun-
damental research and knowledge by translating 
outcomes into marketable products or services
Vanity metrics Accelerator performance statistics that look good 
but are not necessarily cause-effect related
VC Venture Capital. Private equity used by f irms or 
institutional funds to invest in potentially high-
growth startups. Also: Venture Capitalist, i.e., 
venture capital investor




Remote online startup team coaching and 
mentoring
VR Virtual Reality. Three-dimensional computer-
generated artif icial environment that is designed 
for the user to experience and manipulate this 
environment as if it were the real world
Walking dead Zombie startups that linger on too long without 
a realistic chance of success
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 Appendix 1
Silicon Valley Accelerator Founders & Chief Executives 
Interviewed
Saeed Amidi, Plug and Play, Sunnyvale (www.plugandplaytechcenter.com)
Sunil Bhargava, Tandem, Burlingame (www.tandemcap.com)
Gary Coover, Samsung NEXT Start, San Francisco (www.samsungnext.com)
Danielle D’Agostaro, Alchemist Accelerator, San Francisco  
(www. alchemistaccelerator.com)
Doug Davenport, Prospect Silicon Valley, San Jose (www.prospectsv.org)
Cyril Ebersweiler, HAX, San Francisco and Shenzhen (www.hax.co)
Marlon Evans, GSVlabs, Redwood City (www.gsvlabs.com)
Tom Ferguson & Nimesh Modak, Imagine H2O, San Francisco  
(www.imagineh2o.org)
Ian Foraker, Cleantech Open, Redwood City (www.cleantechopen.org)
Brian Hoffman, StartX, Palo Alto (www.startx.com)
Ari Horie, Women’s Startup Lab, Menlo Park (www.womenstartuplab.com)
Emily Kirsch, Powerhouse, Oakland (www.powerhouse.solar)
Cindy Klein-Marmer, Butler Venture Accelerator, Babson College, Babson 
Park and San Francisco (www.babson.edu)
Naomi Kokubo, Founders Space, San Francisco (www.foundersspace.com)
Duncan Logan, RocketSpace, San Francisco (www.rocketspace.com)
T.M. Ravi, The Hive, Palo Alto (www.hivedata.com)
Prashant Shah, TiE LaunchPad, Sunnyvale (www.tielaunchpad.com)
Prem Talreja, The Fabric, Mountain View (www.thefabricnet.com)
Harm TenHoff, BayLink, San Jose (www.baylink-llc.com)
Marco ten Vaanholt, BootUP, Menlo Park (www.bootupventures.com)
Matt Walters, Runway, San Francisco (www.runway.is)
Jun Wong, Hacker Dojo, Santa Clara (www.hackerdojo.com)
Elizabeth Yin, 500 Startups, Mountain View (www.500.co)

 Appendix 2
Questionnaire Personal Interviews Silicon Valley 
Accelerators
Name of Accelerator: Year Established:
Name of Respondent: Position:
Date of Interview: Length of Interview:
PHILOSOPHY
Q1 How did the idea of creating this accelerator originate?
Q2 Could you describe the main philosophy on which your accelerator is 
based?
USPs
Q3 What would you say are the Unique Selling Points of your accelerator? 
In what respect do you differ from other accelerators here in Silicon 
Valley or the wider Bay Area?
INTAKE/SELECTION
Q4 What are the main criteria your accelerator applies to admit or reject 
startup applicants?
Q5 What on average is your rejection rate?
Q6 How many selected applicants do you admit yearly?
Q7 Any trends in number of applicants?
Q8 Where do applicants come from? Also from outside the U.S.? If so, 
which countries?
Q9 Do you focus on solo startup founders or on teams? Does it matter?
Q10 What is the percentage of program dropouts? What are the main 
dropout reasons?
FOCUS
Q11 Is your accelerator focused on particular technologies or more general?
Q12 Do you focus on certain target groups of startup founders?
Q13 Who are your main competitors?
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FUNDING
Q14 Is your accelerator backed by an investment fund?
Q15 Do participating startups have to pay a fee? If so, how much?
Q16 Does your accelerator take equity in participating startups, and if so 
how much?
Q17 If not, why not?
Q18 What are the main ingredients of your accelerator’s business model?
PROGRAM
Q19 What are the basics of your accelerator program?
Q20 One program or several programs?
Q21 How long is the program?
Q22 How would you rate the program’s intensiveness?
Q23 What are the main program milestones
Q24 How is mentoring organized? How do you select mentors?
Q25 Any role for strengthening participants’ entrepreneurial & managerial 
skills?
Q26 Is it promoted that startup teams work together? If so, how?
Q27 How are VCs involved? How is access to startup funding organized?
Q28 What about access to lawyers and accountants?
Q29 How is networking organized in the program?
Q30 How do you create a dynamic startup vibe and passionate accelerator 
culture?
Q31 Did the program substantially change in the last few years; if so why?
CHALLENGES
Q32 What are the main challenges your accelerator is facing?
COOPERATION
Q33 What are the main external partners or organizations here in Silicon 
Valley or the wider Bay Area that your accelerator works with?
Q34 Do you have structural relationships with universities or research labs 
in Silicon Valley or the Bay Area?
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SUCCESSES
Q35 What are the most successful startups that participated in your ac-
celerator program?
Q36 Why do you think they are successful?
Q37 What in your experience are the main success and fail factors of 
startups after they completed your program?
Q38 Which startup that completed your program are you most proud of 
and why?
Q39 Do you monitor your participants after they completed the program?
Q40 How much overall has been invested by external funds in your 
startups?
FINAL QUESTIONS ON FUTURE
Q41 Do you plan any changes in the setup or the program of your 
accelerator?
Q42 Any plans to go to Europe?
Thank you very much for your time. We truly appreciate your cooperation.

